Port Lameron Lobster Fishery II, Nova Scotia, Canada
Case details
- Resource system
- Coastal marine ecosystem
- Resource units
- Lobster
- Location
- Port Lameron, Nova Scotia, Canada (Canada)
Location map
Description
Since this original case, much of the Atlantic Canadian fisheries have been reduced to a fraction of historical levels. In Port Lameron, very few harvesters fish for groundfish (cod, haddock, pollock, hake), swordfish, or tuna. The collapse of the Codfishery has been attributed to many issues, including scientific uncertainty, government policies to increase employment in the area, and subsidies to increase fishing capacity, and the inability of enforcement to stop foreign trawlers from overfishing within the 200 mile economic zone. In the 1980s, the government set fish quotas for the large-scale fleets, and in the 1990s, these quotas were extended to the small-scale fleets, including Port Lameron, including fixed gear (longline and handlining).
While there used to be a system of zoning for catching different species of inshore fish, these rules do not seem to prevail today, because there are no fish to zone for. Currently the depletion of groundfish stocks seem most pronounced on the inshore grounds. This may be due to increased predation from grey seals, parasatism caused by increased grey seal populations, or a lack of recruitment due to low populations on the offshore grounds. Nevertheless, the collective action arrangements surrounding finfish in Port Lameron are largely non-existent today.While the harvesting of lobsters is sustainable, this fishery is experience a curse of abundance, combined with high dependency on lobsters due to the decline of groundfish (i.e., cod, hake, pollock, haddock) and the concentration of quota. This has led many harvesters to increase their pressure on lobster stocks. The current regulatory framework has been set up for increasing larval recruitment, but does not have institutions to deal with high abundances. In addition, the lack of trust in the public infrastructure providers and lack of participation from resource users leaves the collective action arena regarding harvesting institutions in a rigid and vulnerable state.
Institutional analysis
Institutional analysis document
No institutional analysis document available.
Coded institutional data
No coded case data available.
System representation
Resource system
Lobster
Resource users
Inshore strategy - catch less lobsters with less fuel costs and higher quality;
Offshore strategy - catch more lobsters with higher fuel costs and lower quality
Public infrastructure
Limitations on technology, minimum size requirement of lobsters caught, requirement to throw egg-bearing females back, trap limit and seasonal closures. Gentlemen's agreements are less prevalent but still exist, mostly on inshore grounds.
Public infrastructure providers
The DFO is responsible to the Minister of Fisheries, and not fishermen;
They focus on maximizing economic rents, employment, and sustainability of resource harvesting;
The DFO is slow to change rules or to make modifications;
Relationship 1
High effort, especially during the beginning of the season, resulting in gluts and low prices
Relationship 2
Low trust or belief the DFO, and a lack of influence on the DFO's decisions
Relationship 3
The DFO sets a series of broad rules, and enforces them using DFO enforcement officials, and tips from resource users
Relationship 4
(none specified)Relationship 5
Current rule enforcement is seemingly effective at maintaining catches of lobsters, but not at ensuring incomes for captain and crewmembers.
Relationship 6
Harvesters do not participate in decision-making in regulations, and resist regulatory changes imposed by the DFO
Exogenous drivers (7) - Resource
(none specified)Exogenous drivers (7) - Infrastructure
(none specified)Exogenous drivers (8) - Users
(none specified)Exogenous drivers (8) - Providers
(none specified)Human infrastructure (users)
(none specified)Human infrastructure (providers)
(none specified)Resource system
Lobsters, groundfish, herring, mackerel,
Resource users
Small-scale inshore fishermen
Public infrastructure
Gentlemen's agreements, which specify territories and fishing bottom to be fished by local fishers using specific technologies
Public infrastructure providers
Fishermen are public infrastructure providers
Relationship 1
Resource users switch between species depending on season, prices, and catch rates, and based on a knowledge of migratory patterns and spawning times.
Relationship 2
Rules are discussed and reinforced over citizen band radio at sea and at fishermen's havens
Relationship 3
Fishermen monitor each other and enforce rules using social shaming strategies
Relationship 4
Not applicable
Relationship 5
Infrastructure is responsive to changing conditions. For example, in times of scarcity, outsiders are more rigorously repelled, but in times of abundance, territories are more permeable.
Relationship 6
Low cost of monitoring and sanctioning due to direct relationship between resource users and public infrastructure providers
Exogenous drivers (7) - Resource
(none specified)Exogenous drivers (7) - Infrastructure
(none specified)Exogenous drivers (8) - Users
(none specified)Exogenous drivers (8) - Providers
(none specified)Human infrastructure (users)
(none specified)Human infrastructure (providers)
(none specified)Sources
Contributors
- Allain Barnett, Arizona State University
- Ute Brady, Arizona State University
Bibliography
- (1975). The Organization of Production and Market Relations in a Nova Scotian Inshore Fishing Community. University of Manitoba Department of Anthropology, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. M.A.