The Alaskan Pollock Fishery, Bering Sea, USA

Case details

Resource system
Arctic marine ecosystem
Resource units
Pollock
Location
Bering Sea, Alaska, USA (United States of America)

Location map

Description

The Alaskan Pollock fishery has been described as a management success, largery attributed to the adoption of ITQs, with allocations to catchers, processers, and to Alaskan communities.  The processor-fisher relationship seems key to the current success at reducing effort in the fishery. Quota is split among catcher-vessels (45%), catcher processer vessels (36%), motherships (9%), and community development quota groups (10%). There is a much smaller number of boats fishing than before rationalization of the fishery. Historical overfishing in the "donut hole" (international waters) in the middle of the Bering Sea has resulted in collapse of the stock in this area. It is now fished for jellyfish. A rapid development of institutions combined with a high tolerance of a complex regulatory environment has resulted in improved management of the Alaskan shelf. 

Institutional analysis

Institutional analysis document

Download document
Preview document

PDF preview is not available in your browser.

Open institutional analysis document

Coded institutional data

No coded case data available.

System representation

Hover over diagram elements to see descriptions

Resource system

-Pollock is fished for fresh catch
-Surimi
-Roe
-Spatially structured
-Transboundary recruitment issues
-Recruitment success depends on temperature
-Cannabalism among some populations
-Some harvesting may be beneficial to recruitment
Dominant semi-demersal species; flexible feeding and breeding habits
Pelagic and epipelagic as eggs and larvae, and late juveniles and adults live in middle portion of the water column

Resource users

-Fishers are very wealthy
-RUs are heterogeneous
-On-shore and offshore fisheries
-Offshore 3 motherships and 15 catcher-processers
-60 onshore catchers that deliver fish to shore-based processers
-High transaction costs hindering the ability for onshore catchers to form cooperatives
-CDQ holders
-Non-consumptive Users
-Coastal villages

Public infrastructure

Cooperatives (offshore and onshore)
Scientific knowledge
Regulations
2 million ton cap on total ecosystem catch
Sideboards
Magnuson-Stevenson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA)
Alaskan constitution (article VIII)
Limited access programs

Public infrastructure providers

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
North Pacific Fisheries Management Council
University of Alaska (UAF)
Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Congress

Relationship 1

Fish harvesting by onshore and offshore fleet
Salmon by-catch
Non-consumptive use of fishery (for existence value) and conservation of marine mammal population
1.5 million tons harvest
A Season harvest of roe-bearing Pollock
B season harvest of dispersed stock
Reduced by-catch and effort after rationalization

Relationship 2

Tight connection between fishers and lobbyists
Lobbying to influence policy of Public Infrastructure Providers
High stakes allocation disputes over sectorial allocations of TAC
Monitoring and reviewing of Limited Access Programs to ensure they comply with National Standards for Fishery Conservation and Management
Cooperatives Permitted under MSFCMA
Catcher processor fleet lobbying for congressional resolution to disagreements regarding allocation in the NPFMC
Nine companies that control 20 Catcher-Processor vessels form the PCC
Setting of TACs based on recommendations from the NPFMC to the Secretary of Commerce, and based on Stock Assessments and Fisheries Evaluations

Relationship 3

High regulation costs
50/50 Onshore/offshore allocation plus 10% CDQ allocation
Americanization of the fleet forcing Norwegian firms to divest of vessels
US State Department, US Fish and Wildlife Service, and US Coast Guard are non-voting members of the NPFMC
37% of Federal fisheries agencies are voting members of the NPFMC
Scientific and Statistical Committies play a role in determining limits for acceptable biological catches (ABCs)
TACs must be lower than ABCs
National standards for fishery conservation and management developed

Relationship 4

Shear resource size, knowledge, and value of the resource
Complex ecological interactions and different dependencies require complex institutions and social structure

Relationship 5

Monitoring funded by quota-holding fishers
100% coverage of fishing vessels
Sanctioning according to contracts with coops

Relationship 6

Resource users contribute to cooperative decision making
CDQ communities influence regulations and make investments into the fishing industry
Non consumptive users and NGOs push for regulation of Alaskan Ecosystem
Influence of coastal villages
Sideboards allocate catch among fishers in the cooperative through an informal process
Sideboards limit flexibility
Stakeholders representing commercial and recreational interests, and conservation and civic organizations form advisory panels to NTFMC

Exogenous drivers (7) - Resource

(none specified)

Exogenous drivers (7) - Infrastructure

(none specified)

Exogenous drivers (8) - Users

(none specified)

Exogenous drivers (8) - Providers

(none specified)

Human infrastructure (users)

(none specified)

Human infrastructure (providers)

(none specified)

Sources

Contributors

Bibliography