Regime shifts in a social-ecological system

Title Regime shifts in a social-ecological system
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2013
AuthorsLade SJ
Secondary AuthorsTavoni A
Tertiary AuthorsLevin SA
JournalTheoretical ecology
Volume6
Issue3
Start Page359
Pagination13
Date Published07/2013
KeywordsBifurcation, Early warning signals, Generalized modeling, Regime shifts, Social-ecological system, Tipping points
Abstract

This replicator dynamics model considers the case of a common-pool resource system where social ostracism may be used to compel non-complying harvesters to avoid over-exploitation of the resource base. Here, non-compliant harvesters (i.e., defectors) are identified by their payoff strategy and incur an 'ostracism' penalty proportional to the number of compliant harvesters (i.e., co-operators) in the system. When the ostracism effect is equivalent to the number of compliant harvesters and the resource inflow rate is constant, regime shifts are removed from the purely social and ecological subsystems in the model. However, bifurcations remain possible due to the interactions between the social and ecological components. Changing the cost of effort, strength of ostracism, or multiple drivers readily triggers a regime shift.

DOI10.1007/s12080-013-0187-3
Refereed DesignationRefereed
Source DocumentAccessible with appropriate permission
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Type

Social Ostracism and Resource Management

Model
This replicator dynamics model considers the case of a common-pool resource system where social ostracism may be used to compel non-complying harvesters to avoid over-exploitation of the resource base. Here, non-compliant harvesters (i.e., defectors) are identified by their payoff strategy and incur an 'ostracism' penalty proportional to the number of compliant harvesters (i.e., co-operators) in the system. When the ostracism effect is equivalent to the number of compliant harvesters and the...
07 Oct 2016