- Resource System
- Multispecies Coastal Fishery.
- Resource Units
- Lobster
- Location
- Mount Desert Island, Maine, USA
The lobster grounds of Mount Desert Island are located within Hancock County, Maine, some 250 miles northeast of Boston and 150 miles southwest of the U.S. - Canada border. The original case spans from 1969 to1974 and catalogues an action situation involving approximately 75 lobster fishermen; lobster is the stationary resource unit.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
A 2013 update to the Mount Desert Island Lobsterfishery case extrapolates from research on changes in the greater Gulf of Maine (GOM) lobsterfishery. The original reviewers deemed the case a successful instance of common-pool reserouce management. Based on a 2013 case update, a narrow definition of success remains valid: favorable biophysical conditions have contributed to greater resource productivity, offsetting effects of increased appropriation. When assessed against broader evaluative criteria, however, the case is not as successful as it appears (please see institutional analysis for detail).
The resource appropriated from Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island, Maine is lobster. The appropriation resources are the lobstergrounds of the fishermen from the backside of Mount Desert Island, Maine. The grounds are located off the southern tip of the island. The boundary of this resource is both physical and artifactual. The physical boundary includes islands and the artifactual boundaries are based on use patterns.
SCREENER:
Case: Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island, Maine, U.S.A.
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island, Maine, situated in Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island of U.S.A.. More generally, it is located in North America. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island, Maine. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island, Maine have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 51-100 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderately abundant supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
This dissertation provides an extensive discussion of the lobstermen of Mount Desert Island, Maine. Good information is provided concerning the lobster, its physical features and habits; how lobsterfishing is organized; the strategies of individual lobstermen; and the social context of lobsterfishing. (The condition and boundaries of the resource are not described in detail.)
CITATION(S):
Grossinger, R. S. (1975) "The Strategy and Ideology of Lobsterfishing on the Back Side of Mt. Desert Island, Hancock County, Maine." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan.*
The resource appropriated from Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island, Maine is lobster. It is produced biologically and is a renewable stationary unit. The appropriation resources are the lobstergrounds of the fishermen from the backside of Mount Desert Island, Maine. The grounds are located off the southern tip of the island. The boundary of this resource is both physical and artifactual. The physical boundary includes islands and the artifactual boundaries are based on use patterns.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are the same as the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (highly confident). The variance in quality between the zones has not created conflict among appropriators.
There are natural barriers within the resource, and they coincide with microzones (highly confident). There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Lobster can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation over space in the availability of Lobster within the resource (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of Lobster within a single year (inferred). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of Lobster from year to year (inferred).
The bottom topography of Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island, Maine is primarily rock (confident).
The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the location (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated on Mount Desert, an island located a couple of miles off of the Maine coast. The island is located in Hancock County, about 250 miles northeast of Boston. Most lobsterfishing is done on the backside, or the southeast side of the island.. The boundaries of the location are both political and natural. The location entails two harbors, nine villages, and several uninhabited islands. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of lobster (coding), as well as cod, haddock, hake, and pollock. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (highly confident). Additionally, the most common mode of transportation in this region is -1. This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is -1, and its longitude is -1. The elevation of this location is -1 meters. The highest elevation is -1. The lowest elevation of this location is -1. The region's average annual rainfall is unknown. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is unknown. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
The resource appropriated from Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island, Maine is lobster. The appropriation resources are the lobstergrounds of the fishermen from the backside of Mount Desert Island, Maine. The grounds are located off the southern tip of the island. The boundary of this resource is both physical and artifactual. The physical boundary includes islands and the artifactual boundaries are based on use patterns.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation alone. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a regional government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de facto) closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 51 to 75 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was an enhancement of physical capabilities to withdraw units (e.g. introduction of turbine pump) from the resource during the time of this study. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were 2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in external markets, and also sold in local markets.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (highly confident). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there was no information provided in the case study regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are appropriated. As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (highly confident). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (highly confident). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period a definite change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (highly confident). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de facto closed access to this resource, but "outsiders" began to appropriate at a moderate level (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the appropriation resource do not differ from the production and distribution resource (highly confident). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (confident). Most appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (highly confident). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There are always records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (highly confident). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (highly confident). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (highly confident). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (highly confident). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (highly confident).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Most appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (educated guess). There appears to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (highly confident).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use are small and did not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (highly confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (highly confident). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (highly confident). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (highly confident). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very unlikely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (highly confident). There is a moderate range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (inferred). It is very unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators at the end of the period (inferred). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and local non-appropriators are selected by a local general purpose government (highly confident). This position monitors rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. Official monitors are paid in money. The study did not indicate how many of the monitors were full-time.
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 18.1 - -2 - -2 - -2
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
The author's evaluation reveals that the lobstergrounds around Mt. Desert are experiencing stress due to number of fishers, number of lobstertraps fishers use. There are no opportunity costs. The author's evaluation is based on balances, withdrawals per unit of effort, opportunity cost, and price.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the lobsterfishers who fish out of Bass Harbor and Southwest Harbor on the backside of Mount Desert Island, Maine. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 72.
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Caucasian. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is English.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (highly confident). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (highly confident). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 201 through 300 years (ambiguous). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance of the average annual family income across families is high (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (highly confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (highly confident). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (highly confident).
Technology:
The most recent technological change experienced by this subgroup was 51-75 years ago (educated guess). Considering other technologies that have not changed, this technology has been in use for 101-200 years (educated guess). The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was decreasing (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (highly confident). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules.
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident).
The resource appropriated from Lobsterfishing, Mount Desert Island, Maine is lobster. The appropriation resources are the lobstergrounds of the fishermen from the backside of Mount Desert Island, Maine. The grounds are located off the southern tip of the island. The boundary of this resource is both physical and artifactual. The physical boundary includes islands and the artifactual boundaries are based on use patterns.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, there is no level of government or organization of appropriators at the location with operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership of some other form of limited property related to the appropriation from the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring continued usage of resource entry rights. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring demonstration of knowledge or skills (or holding a skills license) in order to gain access to the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to obtain a license for entry or for equipment in order to appropriate. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to one or more members of within a family.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be transferred to members of a family but not outside the family.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the set of local appropriators determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
-2
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on the historical pattern of appropriation. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on the type of license issued by governing authority. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on the historical pattern of appropriation. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal units of a certain minimum size, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is imposed for an unstated duration, as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Light fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource.
There is a single arrangement by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
100%
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 101 to 199 years.
Original Mount Desert Case Representation (1969-1974)
Resource System
The Mount Desert Island resource is the renewable resource system of the lobstergrounds; lobster are the stationary resource unit. The distribution of lobster varies in space, unpredictably. The quantity of lobster varies annually, also unpredictably. The resource is sensitive to water temperature, salinity, a variety of other oceanographic factors, and levels of toxics.
Resource Users
Lobster fishermen (n=75) are the main resource users; the group is fairly homogenous. The original CPR report indicates high levels of trust at the beginning and end of the case.
Public Infrastructure Providers
Maine State Department of Sea and Shore Fisheries. Wardens/monitors.
Public Infrastructure
Hard public infrastructure in the Mount Desert Island case includes wharves, roads (for transport of lobster to markets) radio spectrum, maps and charts of resource distribution, and physical historical records of hauls. Soft public infrastructure in the Mount Desert Island case includes a variety of conservation laws, restricting catch size and access to the resource. Fisherman do not own the fishing grounds.
Relationship 1
Resource users employ a variety of soft human, and hard human-made infrastructures to extract the resource. Soft infrastructure includes: working knowledge of the best fishing grounds (often passed down through families), the culture of the fishing community (norms around honor, boat cleanliness, etc.), two distinct fishing strategies (canny and hard), and an illegal practice of trap cutting to enforce informal fishing territories. Hard infrastructure includes: boats, lobster traps, bait, netting, radios (to communicate and exchange information about weather and rescue), hydraulic haulers, fathometers (to measure depth), and buoys.
Relationship 2
Monitors/official wardens record resource extraction by appropriators. Monitors are provided with a monetary compensation for work.
Relationship 3
(none specified)Relationship 4
(none specified)Relationship 5
State conservation laws restrict catch size and access to the resource (e.g., no fishing on Sundays between June 1 and August 31).
Relationship 6
Lobster fishermen must have a license to fish. Lobster fishermen may communicate with each other about the location and productivity of the resource. Lobster fishermen may not cut the traps of other fishermen. Lobster fishermen may not own territory. If conservation laws are not upheld, trap cutting is discovered, or any other infractions noted, lobster fishermen may be fined. A group of local appropriators is required to approve a fisherman’s wishes to pass his licensee outside of his immediate family. Lobster fishermen may sell their catch for market price to dealers. Dealers use roads (hard public infrastructure) to transport resource to market.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
In the original case, the author indicates scientific forecasting of cooling fishery waters, which would trigger a southerly migration of the resource.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
In the original case, the author indicates outside encroachment of non-local fisherman (inferred: who lack the soft human capital around community norms, fishermen culture, etc.). Market price of lobster influences the fishing strategy ('canny' v. 'hard') of the resource users. Market price of fuel (gasoline or diesel) influences the fisherman's choice of boat engine.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Updated Mount Desert Case Representation (2013)
Resource System
The Mount Desert Island resource is the renewable resource system of the lobstergrounds; lobster are the stationary resource unit. The distribution of lobster varies in space, unpredictably. The quantity of lobster varies annually, also unpredictably. The resource is sensitive to water temperature, salinity, a variety of other oceanographic factors, and levels of toxics.
Resource Users
Lobster fishermen remain are the dominant resource users; the group is fairly homogenous. New recreational user position Update indicates lower levels of trust and social cohesion among resource users than in the original case
Public Infrastructure Providers
Maine State Department of Sea and Shore Fisheries. Wardens/monitors.
Public Infrastructure
Hard public infrastructure in the Mount Desert Island case includes wharves, roads (for transport of lobster to markets) radio spectrum, maps and charts of resource distribution, and physical historical records of hauls. Soft public infrastructure in the Mount Desert Island case includes a variety of conservation laws, restricting catch size and access to the resource. Fisherman do not own the fishing grounds.
Relationship 1
Resource users employ a variety of soft human, and hard human-made infrastructures to extract the resource. Soft infrastructure includes: working knowledge of the best fishing grounds (often passed down through families), the culture of the fishing community (norms around honor, boat cleanliness, etc.), two distinct fishing strategies (canny and hard), and an illegal practice of trap cutting to enforce informal fishing territories. Hard infrastructure includes: boats, lobster traps, bait, netting, radios (to communicate and exchange information about weather and rescue), hydraulic haulers, fathometers (to measure depth), and buoys.
Relationship 2
Monitors/official wardens record resource extraction by appropriators. Monitors are provided with a monetary compensation for work. New law requiring monthly landings to be reported for license renewal. New law allowing state monitors to board fisherman's boats without a warrant.
Relationship 3
If State co-management arrangements fail at enforcement of the federal laws, the federal government may withhold state funding.
Relationship 4
New benchmarking system to track lobster abundance relative to historical yields. New formal boundaries: 7 Lobster Conservation Management Areas and variety of zones within each LCMA. Mount Desert is now part of zone B of the Gulf of Maine LCMA.
Relationship 5
State conservation laws restrict catch size and access to the resource (e.g., no fishing on Sundays between June 1 and August 31). Federal and state investment in research on lobster improves monitoring of resource and resource system integrity.
Relationship 6
Lobster fishermen must have a license to fish. Lobster fishermen may communicate with each other about the location and productivity of the resource. Lobster fishermen may not cut the traps of other fishermen. Lobster fishermen may not own territory. If conservation laws are not upheld, trap cutting is discovered, or any other infractions noted, lobster fishermen may be fined. A group of local appropriators is required to approve a fisherman’s wishes to pass his licensee outside of his immediate family. Lobster fishermen may sell their catch for market price to dealers. Dealers use roads (hard public infrastructure) to transport resource to market. New zone-based trap-limits New aggregation rule, the co-management zone the right to vote on whether or not to adopt trap limits New limit on licenses to individuals under 18 with three years of exp. New anonymous balloting law to change license availability
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
In the original case, the author indicates scientific forecasting of cooling fishery waters, which would trigger a southerly migration of the resource. Warming waters Reduction in predator populations Foreign vessel encroachment
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Local disaffection with State policies or state & local disaffection with federal policies
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
In the original case, the author indicates outside encroachment of non-local fisherman (inferred: who lack the soft human capital around community norms, fishermen culture, etc.). Market price of lobster influences the fishing strategy ('canny' v. 'hard') of the resource users. Market price of fuel (gasoline or diesel) influences the fisherman's choice of boat engine. Depressed lobster prices linked to record catches New federal and state interventions (trap limits, formal boundaries, stronger enforcement against trap-cutting)
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Foreign vessel encroachment State and local disaffection with federal policy
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, University of Arizona.
Anderies JM, Arizona State University.
The Strategy and Ideology of Lobsterfishing on the Back Side of Mt. Desert Island, Hancock County, Maine. University of Michigan. PhD
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