- Resource System
- Lagoon Fishery.
- Resource Units
- demersal fish: mullets, groupers, snappers
- Location
- Yumurtalik, Adana, Turkey
The Ayvalik-Haylazli lagoon fishery is located on the Turkish Mediterranean coast near the town of Adana. The resource units are demersal fish (mullets, groupers, and snappers). The original case, which spans from 1976-1978, catalogues an action situation involving 103 registered fishermen from three neighboring villages. As of 2011, the fishery and its adjacent waters are harvested by 397 registered fishermen from three neighboring villages. There are user group organizations (referred to as a co-op) and 504 active fishermen are members of those organizations. The charter of the co-op defines rules for membership. The co-op determines access to the fishery, patrols the lagoon boundaries and also, determines the types of permissible technology.
The resource appropriated from Ayvalik-Haylazli Coop Lagoon, Turkey is demersal fish, including mullets, groupers, snappers. The resource that is discussed in this study consists of a lagoon that is limited by natural boundaries.
SCREENER:
Case: Ayvalik-Haylazli Coop Lagoon, Turkey, Turkey
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a journal article. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe five resources in detail. The primary resource is the Ayvalik-Haylazli Coop Lagoon, Turkey, situated in Ayvalik-Haylazli Lagoon of Turkey. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Ayvalik-Haylazli Coop Lagoon, Turkey. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Ayvalik-Haylazli Coop Lagoon, Turkey have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 101-200 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderately abundant supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
The Ayvalik-Haylazli Lagoon is located on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. The CPR is relatively simple in that there is one UserGroup Organization (a co-op) and a relatively homogeneous group of fishermen, all of whom belong to the UGO. The cooperative, under Turkish lagoon fishery law, has been given exclusive and legal rights to the fish of the lagoon. In other words, local level management is under the control of local fishermen -- they determine access to the fishery. They patrol its boundaries, and they determine the types of technology to be used. Apparently they have been successful: fishing has not approached the sustainable limits of the lagoon, and there is no reported pollution.
CITATION(S):
Berkes, Fikret (1986) "Local Level Management and the Commons Problem: A Comparative Study of Turkish Coastal Fisheries." MARINE POLICY 10: 215-229.
The resource appropriated from Ayvalik-Haylazli Coop Lagoon, Turkey is demersal fish, including mullets, groupers, snappers. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The resource that is discussed in this study consists of a lagoon that is limited by natural boundaries.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, but are divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (inferred). The variance in quality between the zones has at some point in time created conflict among appropriators.
There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Demersal fish: mullets, groupers, snappers can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation over space in the availability of Demersal fish: mullets, groupers, snappers within the resource (inferred). There is considerable variation in the flow of Demersal fish: mullets, groupers, snappers within a single year (inferred). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of Demersal fish: mullets, groupers, snappers from year to year (inferred).
The bottom topography of Ayvalik-Haylazli Coop Lagoon, Turkey is not indicated in the case study information.
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the location. Rather, the location is within the boundaries of the appropriation resource (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource partially overlap the boundaries of the location, but the two boundaries are not equivalent (educated guess). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. Distribution is within the boundaries of production (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in a lagoon and three villages located in Southern Turkey along the Mediterranean. The boundaries of the location are both natural and political. The lagoon has clearly marked physical boundaries, while the 3 villages are politically bounded. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of the lagoon-demersal species (coding). Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
The resource appropriated from Ayvalik-Haylazli Coop Lagoon, Turkey is demersal fish, including mullets, groupers, snappers. The resource that is discussed in this study consists of a lagoon that is limited by natural boundaries.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1985. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 11 to 25 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by the appropriators in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There was a new local group starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because B4 and B9.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (confident). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was moderately abundant (confident).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Tons of fish harvested per year at the end of the period: 105
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in external markets.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (inferred). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (highly confident). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (ambiguous). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (highly confident). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (highly confident). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (highly confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (confident). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (educated guess). No documentation was included in the study regarding whether or not the appropriators of this resource are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource. There are not actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way. There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are officials at some level (highly confident). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (inferred). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators (educated guess). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in one market (highly confident). There appears to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (inferred).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication are not included in the case study.
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (highly confident). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 101-200 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 51-100, at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators (not necessarily all) rotated into this position (inferred).
The case study did not include information regarding whether or not the appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards. The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. The study did not indicate how many of the monitors were full-time.
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 12.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (inferred). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (inferred).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
The author concluded that there was successful control over access, and recourse to extra-legal authority.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the members of the Ayvalik-Haylazli co-op. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 103.
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Turkish.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 20 groups.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (highly confident).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 11 through 25 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). An estimated 4 months through 5 months are needed to build or to earn enough income to purchase the equipment for an appropriation team (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (inferred). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (highly confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (highly confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (inferred), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The most recent technological change experienced by this subgroup was 11-25 years ago (inferred). Considering other technologies that have not changed, this technology has been in use for 11-25 years (inferred). The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (inferred). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (inferred).
The resource appropriated from Ayvalik-Haylazli Coop Lagoon, Turkey is demersal fish, including mullets, groupers, snappers. The resource that is discussed in this study consists of a lagoon that is limited by natural boundaries.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, there is no regional level of government with collective choice responsibilities.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The regional level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the national level(s).
A rule exists permitting citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the national level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists forbidding membership in an ethnic group. This rule is enforced at the national level(s).
A rule exists permitting membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the national level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to obtain a license for entry or for equipment in order to appropriate. This rule is enforced at the national level(s).
There are no rules-in-use related to inheritance of entry rights.
-2
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal units of a certain minimum size, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: educated guess. Appropriators are party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements with a local (private or public) agency(s) for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
100%
Each team consists of 4 men. They own equal shares of the equipment; they divide the catch equally.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
1980s (static analysis)
Resource System
Key shared resource: fish stocks of bottom-dwelling species of limited abundances but high market value.
Natural infrastructure: Enclosed lagoon of small size and oligotrophic (i.e., low-nutrient levels) water conditions of low productivity.
Resource Users
1) Fishermen & members of the cooperative (n=397) from 3 neighboring villages.
2) Licensed part-time fishermen who are also part-time farmers.
3) Outsider fishermen
4) Sport fishermen
Public Infrastructure Providers
National/provincial level
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Government)
Community/local level
Fishermen & members of the cooperative (n=397) from 3 neighboring villages.
Public Infrastructure
Hard infrastructure: Rowboats and motorized vessels per group of fishermen trammel nets and longlines as gear.
Soft infrastructure: The Aquatic Resources Act gives priority to cooperatives for leasing the lagoon fisheries from the government (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) for a certain period of time. The local fishermen's cooperative charter (founded in 1974) provides a contractual obligation to its members and has de jure right to regulate access to the lagoon.
Relationship 1
RU => RS: Fishermen extract bottom-dwelling species by using trammel nets, which are modified gillnets of small or large mesh depending on the target species, which are set on the bottom within the shelf area, and longlines which consist of a series of baited hooks on a mainline attached to a float. Boats return to home ports within a day to market the catch locally.
RS => RU: Ecosystem dynamics provide the availability of target resources in the fishery
Relationship 2
RU => PIP: The cooperative members have the de jure right to access the lagoon due to the leasing agreement with the government.
PIP => RU: The government is leased the lagoon fishery to the cooperative. All cooperative members are fishermen.
Relationship 3
PIP => PI (hard): Cooperative members receive equal shares of the boat and other fishing equipment.
PIP => PI (soft): The government is leasing the lagoon fishery in line with the Aquatic Resources Act. The small size of the community and the lagoon facilitate monitoring and sanctioning (policing) by the fishermen themselves.
PI (soft) => PIP: The Aquatic Resources Act is established by the Turkish Government
PI (hard) => PIP: No known interaction/influence
Relationship 4
Not mentioned in the study.
Relationship 5
Link 1 => PI (soft): No known interaction/influence.
PI (soft) => Link 1: No known interaction/influence.
PI (hard) => Link 1: No known interaction/influence.
Link 1 => PI (hard): No known interaction/influence.
Relationship 6
PI (soft) => RU: The cooperative restricts its membership to those with a minimum 6-month residency in one of the 3 neighboring villages and who have no other wage employment or taxable income. This way, they keep the cost of fishing very low for cooperative members, who receive equal shares of the boat, gear, and day's earnings.
RU => PI (soft): No known interaction/influence.
PI (hard) => RU:No known interaction/influence.
RU => PI (hard): No known interaction/influence.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Not mentioned in the study.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Not mentioned in the study.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
The coast guard issues a fine for illegal trawlers (i.e. outsider fishermen)
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Not mentioned in the study.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
Boats, motorized vessel, trammel nets, longlines, hooks, and other fishing gear
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, University of Arizona.
Anderies JM, Arizona State University.
MANCHA CISNEROS MDM, Arizona State University.
Vallury S, Arizona State University.
Brady U, Arizona State University.
TEZCAN B, Arizona State University.
Local Level Management and the Commons Problem: A Comparative Study of Turkish Coastal Fisheries. Marine Policy. 10:215-229.
. 1986.