Alanya Coastal Fishery, Turkey

RESOURCE:

The resource appropriated from Alanya Fishery, Turkey is pelagic fish, including bonits and large carangids. The resource is a 50km stretch of Mediterranean coastline that does not extend further than 3 miles from shore and is not deeper than 100 meters.

SCREENER:

Case: Alanya Fishery, Turkey, Turkey

The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a journal article. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.

These documents describe five resources in detail. The primary resource is the Alanya Fishery, Turkey, situated in Alanya of Turkey. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Alanya Fishery, Turkey. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Alanya Fishery, Turkey have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.

There are 51-100 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.

The Alanya fishery is located off the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. The fishery is relatively simple in that there is one user group organization and no subgroups -- just one group of small boat fishermen. The fishermen cooperate with one another and over a period of about 15 years have evolved access rules that involve listing the fishing spots and then distributing them through a lottery. The fishermen use the mechanisms of the local cooperative to oversee the lottery even though only half of the fishermen belong to the cooperative. The fishermen have been successful in managing their fishery since they report no problems of overuse or pollution.

CITATION(S):

Berkes, Fikret (1986) "Local Level Management and the Commons Problem: A Comparative Study of Turkish Coastal Fisheries." MARINE POLICY 10: 215-229.

RESOURCE INFO:

The resource appropriated from Alanya Fishery, Turkey is pelagic fish, including bonits and large carangids. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The resource is a 50km stretch of Mediterranean coastline that does not extend further than 3 miles from shore and is not deeper than 100 meters.

The boundary of this resource has institutional arrangements. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.

There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is not regularly better in some of the zones than in others (highly confident). The variance in quality between the zones has not created conflict among appropriators (highly confident).

The study did not indicate whether or not there are natural barriers within the resource. There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Pelagic fish: bonits and large carangids can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of Pelagic fish: bonits and large carangids within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of Pelagic fish: bonits and large carangids within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable variation in the flow of Pelagic fish: bonits and large carangids from year to year (ambiguous).

The bottom topography of Alanya Fishery, Turkey is not indicated in the case study information.

The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the location. Rather, the location is within the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource partially overlap the boundaries of the location, but the two boundaries are not equivalent (confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. Distribution is within the boundaries of production.

LOCATION:

The appropriation resources are situated in the village of Alanya, Turkey, and a coastal fishery that extends for approximately 20km (20,000m) on either side of the village. The boundaries of the location are primarily politically defined by the village and the appropriators who define the fishing spots. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of pelagic fish (coding). Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.

The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).

The latitude of this location is 36.32' N .5, and its longitude is 32.02' E .5. The elevation of this location is -1 meters. The highest elevation is -1. The lowest elevation of this location is -1. The region's average annual rainfall is unknown. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is unknown. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:

January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A

RESOURCE:

The resource appropriated from Alanya Fishery, Turkey is pelagic fish, including bonits and large carangids. The resource is a 50km stretch of Mediterranean coastline that does not extend further than 3 miles from shore and is not deeper than 100 meters.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL:

TYPE OF SITUATION

The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not exercising nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) closed access to this resource, but "outsiders" began to appropriate at a moderate level.

EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION

It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1985. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 26 to 50 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by the appropriators in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because B4.

CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*

For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).

The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:

Tons of fish harvested per year at the end of the period: 150

*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.

The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.

At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets.

As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there was no information provided in the case study regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are appropriated. As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared low levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises rarely used) (educated guess). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (highly confident). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period a definite change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were not exercising, nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (highly confident).

INFORMATION LEVELS

There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (confident). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (inferred). No documentation was included in the study regarding whether or not the appropriators of this resource are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource. There are not actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (educated guess). There are sometimes records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (highly confident). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (highly confident). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).

POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL

The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). About half of the appropriators sell this resource in one market (highly confident). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).

PATTERNS OF INTERACTION

Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not affect communication (inferred).

The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively neutral, quid-pro-quo manner -- each exchange was evaluated for what it might bring (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related primarily to other local resources (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (inferred). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). There is a limited range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess).

POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS

At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 51-100, at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (highly confident). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.

The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (highly confident).

NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS

There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 6.1 - 0 - 0 - 0

EVALUATION OF RESULTS

The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.

AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS

In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.

The author reported apparent balance between withdrawals and availability resulting in no conflict. The author is using a model based on a homogeneous group, closed access, enforcement mechanisms, and communications. The author has captured the concept and evaluation of the results.

SUBGROUP:

Participants:

This appropriation group are the fishermen from the village of Alanya, Turkey. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 100.

The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:

Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Turkish.

The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 45 groups.

Legal Rights:

Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (educated guess). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident).

Stakes and Resources:

The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 26 through 50 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). An estimated 4 months through 5 months are needed to build or to earn enough income to purchase the equipment for an appropriation team (highly confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 51%-75% of this subgroup (highly confident).

Potential Actions and Levels of Control:

A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (inferred), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.

Technology:

The most recent technological change experienced by this subgroup was 26-50 years ago (confident). Considering other technologies that have not changed, this technology has been in use for 26-50 years (confident). The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).

Strategies Adopted:

At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (inferred). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to withdrawal of appropriation units (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (highly confident).

Subgroup Results:

This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident).

RESOURCE:

The resource appropriated from Alanya Fishery, Turkey is pelagic fish, including bonits and large carangids. The resource is a 50km stretch of Mediterranean coastline that does not extend further than 3 miles from shore and is not deeper than 100 meters.

OPERATIONAL RULES:

Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.

With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.

Boundary Rules

The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.

A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists permitting membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists forbidding an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the national level(s).

A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists permitting registration on an eligibility list. This rule is enforced at the national level(s).

A rule exists requiring registration on an eligibility list. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists permitting the obtaining of access right through a lottery. This rule is enforced at the national level(s).

A rule exists requiring the obtaining of access right through a lottery. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).

A rule exists requiring an appropriator to obtain a license for entry or for equipment in order to appropriate. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).

-2

Authority and Scope Rules

The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.

The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).

Authority Rules:

There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, based on periodic lottery. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..

There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on periodic lottery. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on periodic lottery. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

There is a rule requiring withdrawal units of a certain minimum size, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.

The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.

Scope Rules:

Information Rules

Payoff Rules

The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may, for an unclear duration, lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.

The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.

; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%

Aggregation Rules

Overall Questions About Rules Configuration

The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 26 to 50 years.