- Resource System
- Marine ecosystem
- Resource Units
- Cod and salmon
- Location
- Fermeuse, Newfoundland, Canada
Fermeuse is an inshore fishing community that is located on the southern shore of Newfoundland's Avalon Peninsula, the island's eastern-most coastline. The original study, which was carried out in 1972, catalogues an action situation involving approcimately 56 fishermen and 24 fishing units or boats and crew; the resource units are cod and salmon. Allocation of fishing spots depends on the season. The commonly used allocation processes are "first-in-time, first-in-right", lottery, and division of the grounds based on the technology used.
The original case and governance strcuture was a failure, however, after 30 years and strict government regulation, the SES has come back from complete collapse.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the Institutional Analysis Tab under CPR.
The resource appropriated from Fermeuse Cod Fishery is cod. The appropriation resource is the cod fishery ground located in open water and extends for several kilometers on either side of the mouth of the Fermeuse Harbor, as well as offshore for 3 miles. The boundary is natural and institutional. The western bound is the shore, while the eastern bound is the 3-mile limit that most countries commonly used during this period. The northern and southern bounds adjoin fishing grounds of other groups. These boundaries are based on convention and use.
SCREENER:
Case: Fermeuse Cod Fishery, Canada
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe two resources in detail. The primary resource is the Fermeuse Cod Fishery, situated in Fermeuse of Canada. More generally, it is located in North America. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Fermeuse Cod Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Fermeuse Cod Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
The Fermeuse Cod Fishery covers an unknown area. There are 51-100 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are sometimes formally organized.
Martin describes the fishery of Fermeuse, Newfoundland. Like other Newfoundland fisheries, there is a summer cod fishery and a fall cod fishery in addition to a spring salmon fishery. In the spring salmon fishery, there are more productive spots than fishers; fishing spots are allocated on a first in time, first in right process, and no conflict exists among the fishers. During the summer cod fishery, there are fewer productive spots than fishers, who divide the spots by a lottery. The fall cod fishery, which use handlines and trawls (instead of traps as in the summer fishery), is based on a division of the grounds according to technology used.
CITATION(S):
Martin, Kent O. (1979) "Play by the Rules or Don't Play at All: Space Division and Resource Allocation in a Rural Newfoundland Fishing Community." In NORTH ATLANTIC MARITIME CULTURES, edited by Raoul Andersen, 277-298. The Hague: Mouton.*
Martin, Kent O. (1973) "The Law in St. John's Says...: Space Division and Resource Allocation in the Newfoundland Fishing Community of Fermeuse." M.A. thesis. St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland.
The resource appropriated from Fermeuse Cod Fishery is cod. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The appropriation resource is the cod fishery ground located in open water and extends for several kilometers on either side of the mouth of the Fermeuse Harbor, as well as offshore for 3 miles. The boundary is natural and institutional. The western bound is the shore, while the eastern bound is the 3-mile limit that most countries commonly used during this period. The northern and southern bounds adjoin fishing grounds of other groups. These boundaries are based on convention and use.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country and are not within any general purpose local jurisdictions. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (highly confident). The variance in quality between the zones has not created conflict among appropriators (inferred).
There are natural barriers within the resource, and they coincide with microzones (highly confident). There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Cod can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of Cod within the resource (highly confident). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of Cod within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of Cod from year to year (highly confident).
The bottom topography of Fermeuse Cod Fishery is primarily gravel (highly confident).
If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have conflictual effects (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the location. Rather, the location is within the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location. The boundaries of the location lie within the boundaries of the production resource (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the distribution resource that was not indicated in this case study.
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated on the southeastern shore of Newfoundland, on the Avalon Peninsula. The location includes the Fermeuse Harbor, several kilometers of open water surrounding the mouth of the harbor and three villages, Fermeuse, Kingsman, and Port Kirwan. The boundaries of the location are both natural and institutional. The location includes a harbor, 3 villages, and fishing grounds established on the basis of use. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of cod (coding), as well as salmon. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not within any general purpose local jurisdiction. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (highly confident). Additionally, the most common mode of transportation in this region is car. This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period .
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
The resource appropriated from Fermeuse Cod Fishery is cod. The appropriation resource is the cod fishery ground located in open water and extends for several kilometers on either side of the mouth of the Fermeuse Harbor, as well as offshore for 3 miles. The boundary is natural and institutional. The western bound is the shore, while the eastern bound is the 3-mile limit that most countries commonly used during this period. The northern and southern bounds adjoin fishing grounds of other groups. These boundaries are based on convention and use.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation alone. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a regional government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1970. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 11 to 25 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by the appropriators in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (highly confident). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (highly confident). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (highly confident). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (highly confident).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the beginning of this period. It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the end of this period.
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly sold in external markets, and also sold in local markets, and consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in external markets, and also sold in local markets, and consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there was no information provided in the case study regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are appropriated. As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (highly confident). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (highly confident). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (highly confident). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period a definite change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (highly confident). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (highly confident). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (highly confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (highly confident). No documentation was included in the study regarding whether or not the appropriators of this resource are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource. There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (highly confident). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (highly confident). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (highly confident).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators (educated guess). This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). The number of markets in which this resource is sold was not included in the case study. There appears to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (highly confident).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (highly confident). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related to other local resources, as well as evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (educated guess). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very unlikely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (highly confident). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (inferred). It is very unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (highly confident).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 25-50, at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and monitors are employees of an external governmental authority (highly confident). This position monitors rules devised by regional collective choice processes (column 2 of the rules form), rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form), and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 1-5 (highly confident). Official monitors are paid in money. Almost all of the monitors were full-time (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 42.1 - 92.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 42.1 and 92.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units and in withdrawal rates from the resource.
Subgroups 42.1 and 92.1 do not differ in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (highly confident).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The resource is slowly deteriorating, due to balance, externalities, units of effort, and conflict. The author focuses on conflict, rules stress equality, controlling access, the technologies used, local input into regional decision-making, and evven handedness in enforcement. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on Author just states fishers have to work longer hours.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the fishermen who live in Fermeuse, Port Kirwan, and Kingsman who fish the summer cod fishery using traps. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a estimated membership of 25-50.. An estimated 91%-100% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Irish. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Catholic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is English.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 6 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on extended family or clan relationships (educated guess).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (highly confident). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a high cost (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after one or more other subgroups have withdrawn (educated guess). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to withdrawal of appropriation units (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (highly confident).
Subgroup Results:
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the fishermen who live in Fermeuse, Port Kirwan, and Kingsman who fish the fall cod fishery. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a estimated membership of less than 25.. An estimated 91%-100% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Catholics. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is English.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 6 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on extended family or clan relationships (educated guess).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (highly confident). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a high cost (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units where the flow of units first enters into the resource (i.e. headenders) (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to withdrawal of appropriation units (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
The resource appropriated from Fermeuse Cod Fishery is cod. The appropriation resource is the cod fishery ground located in open water and extends for several kilometers on either side of the mouth of the Fermeuse Harbor, as well as offshore for 3 miles. The boundary is natural and institutional. The western bound is the shore, while the eastern bound is the 3-mile limit that most countries commonly used during this period. The northern and southern bounds adjoin fishing grounds of other groups. These boundaries are based on convention and use.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring the obtaining of access right through a lottery. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on periodic lottery. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on periodic lottery. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a regional (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators are party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements with a regional (private or public) agency(s) for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 51 to 75 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a major subdivision of a country. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on technology used. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a private enterprise.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a regional (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators are party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements with a regional (private or public) agency(s) for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 51 to 75 years.
Fermeuse System Representation
Resource System
Key resource: cod fish, but also salmon and caplin fish are captured in a short season. Natural infrastructure: Specific fishing sites during the fishing season in the Fermeuse Harbor inshore and offshore waters.
Resource Users
The resource is used mainly by the local fisherman, although foreign fisherman are also allowed with some restrictions.
Public Infrastructure Providers
Newfounland Government
Local Fishers
Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Public Infrastructure
Hard public infrastructure:: Harbor, roads, traps, trawls and boats.
Soft public infrastructure: Fermeuse harbor committee formed by local fishermen that regulate the fisheries placements. The sanctuary assigned by local fishermen for handline fishery.
Relationship 1
Fisheries technologies and regulations. Fisheries activity is limited by the cod season. Access to this valuable resource is limited by scarcity of allocations. Fishermen perceived cod fish mean size had been decreased through years.
Relationship 2
The fisheries activity is regulated by the fishery officer who is the representative of the Newfoundland government. Most powerful fisherman group circulate a petition to reserve fishing ground. Often, when a conflict occurs is not complained with the fishery officer.
Relationship 3
Newfounland government maintain the functionality of the roads and the Fermeuse Harbor. Fermeuse Harbor fishery officer is supported by Newfounland and followed by crew when a case of law violation is claimed.
Relationship 4
The harbor and roads are fundamental to do trade the harvested resource after the fisheries activities. The harbor allow the use of boats increased the distance fishing crews can cover thereby potentially increasing resource yield/extraction levels.
Relationship 5
The Fermeuse Harbor allows the boats to land, in counter part the sanctuary provides a restricted handline fishing area to local fishermen. The use of trawls has reduced the fishing effort in the permitted areas.
Relationship 6
Fishermen acting illegally are sanctioned by Fermeuse fishery officer. Villagers prefer individual activity to cooperative efforts and also prefer to avoid peer to peer conflict.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
High humidity, high precipitation and low temperature. Migration movement of cod and caplin fish due to weather conditions. Potential local and foreign over fishing.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Technological advances (motors and nylon nets) are negatively impacting rules regarding boat crews behavior and catch distribution.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Increasing globalization and economic orientation of villagers is moving them away from cooperative, communal relationships. Individualistic, overall friendly and competitive values are leading to investment in capital goods and accumulation of money - increased commercialization of fishery.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Interdependence between fishers is weakened with technology improvements. Distrust between fishermen and Fermeuse fishery official leads to difficult institutional arrangements when needed.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, University of Arizona.
Brady U, Arizona State University.
Lambert L, Arizona State University.
Play by the Rules or Don't Play at All: Space Division and Resource Allocation in a Rural Newfoundland Fishing Community. North Atlantic Maritime Cultures:Anthropological Essays on Changing Adaptations. :277-298.
. 1979.The Law in St. John's Says: Space Division and Resource Allocation in the Newfoundland Fishing Community of Fermeuse. St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland. M.A.
. 1973.