- Resource System
- Coastal marine ecosystem
- Resource Units
- Demersal and pelagic fish stocks
- Location
- Valenca, Bahia, Brazil
The port of Valenca, which is popular for its canoe-fishing tradition, is located in the state of Bahia, in northeastern Brazil. The original case spans from 1970-1971; the resource units are demersal and pelagic fish species. The introduction of nylon nets by the Brazil government in 1960 gave entry to non-fishing entrepreneurs who hired inexperienced fishers to fish. This new group of fishers disregarded the existing rules, resulting in conflict. In addition, the appropriative power of the new technology was great enough to threaten the viability of the Valenca fishery.
This case is considered a failure and illustrates how external drivers can disrupt the social and human infrastructure of a system.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Valenca Fishery is demersal and pelagic species. "The fishing grounds consist of a crescent-shaped elongated estuary, enclosed by three large islands." p.33. See map p.32. The resource boundary is primarily natural. The resource is a channel of water bounded on the west by the mainland of Brazil and on the east by 3 islands.
SCREENER:
Case: Valenca Fishery, Brazil
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Valenca Fishery, situated in Valenca Fishery of Brazil. More generally, it is located in South America. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Valenca Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Valenca Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 101-200 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are sometimes formally organized.
Cordell provides a detailed account of the Valenca fishery, its appropriators, and the rules they use to order their appropriation processes. For at least a century, until 1960, the Valenca canoe fishers had evolved a complex set of appropriation processes conditioned by the physical environment. The fishers divided their fishing grounds into hundreds of spots based on water depth, bottom conditions, and tidal and lunar activity. They supported these appropriation activities with traditional forms of mediation. In 1960 the national government of Brazil introduced a new technology, nylon nets, to the Valenca fishery. The new nets were owned by nonfishing entrepreneurs who hired inexperienced fishers to fish. This new group of fishers disregarded the existing rules, resulting in conflict. In addition, the appropriative power of the new technology was great enough to threaten the viability of the Valenca fishery. The result was to push the traditional fishers out of the fishery.
CITATION(S):
Cordell, John C. (1972) "The Developmental Ecology of an Estuarine Canoe Fishing System in Northeast Brazil." Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University.*
Cordell, John C. (1978) "Swamp Dwellers of Bahia." NATURAL HISTORY 87(June/July): 62-74.*
Cordell, John C. (1983) "Social Marginality and Sea Tenure in Brazilian Fishing." Occasional Papers in Latin American Studies, No. 7. Stanford University.*
Cordell, John C. (1978) "Carrying Capacity Analysis of Fixed Territorial Fishing." ETHNOLOGY 17: 1-24.*
Cordell, John C. (1984) "Traditional Sea Tenure and Resource Management in Brazilian Coastal Fishing." In MANAGEMENT OF COASTAL LAGOON FISHERIES, edited by James M. Kapetsky and G. Lasserre, 429-438. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
Cordell, John C. (1974) "The Lunar-Tide Fishing Cycle in North-Eastern Brazil." ETHNOLOGY 13: 379-392.*
The resource appropriated from Valenca Fishery is demersal and pelagic species. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. "The fishing grounds consist of a crescent-shaped elongated estuary, enclosed by three large islands." p.33. See map p.32. The resource boundary is primarily natural. The resource is a channel of water bounded on the west by the mainland of Brazil and on the east by 3 islands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are designated by a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (highly confident). The variance in quality between the zones has not created conflict among appropriators.
There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the demersal and pelagic species -- see page 66 can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of demersal and pelagic species -- see page 66 within the resource (highly confident). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of demersal and pelagic species -- see page 66 within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of demersal and pelagic species -- see page 66 from year to year (inferred).
The bottom topography of Valenca Fishery is primarily mud (inferred).
If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have conflictual effects (highly confident).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the location. Rather, the location is within the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource partially overlap the boundaries of the location, but the two boundaries are not equivalent (educated guess). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. Distribution is within the boundaries of production (educated guess).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in Valenca and the fishing grounds located on the Una River and adjoining estuaries a few miles from the Atlantic in Bahai State, Brazil. The boundaries of the location are primarily naturally determined except for the village. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of a variety of pelagic and demersal species. See p.66. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were conflictual effects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is changing and tied to other economic networks during most of the time period (confident).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
The resource appropriated from Valenca Fishery is demersal and pelagic species. "The fishing grounds consist of a crescent-shaped elongated estuary, enclosed by three large islands." p.33. See map p.32. The resource boundary is primarily natural. The resource is a channel of water bounded on the west by the mainland of Brazil and on the east by 3 islands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation alone. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not exercising nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de facto) closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 26 to 50 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because Conflicts traced back to the 1910s..
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
The information about how units are disposed at the end of the period is missing in case.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (ambiguous). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period a definite change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were not exercising, nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de facto closed access to this resource, but "outsiders" began to appropriate at a moderate level (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (educated guess). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (highly confident). There are not actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). The study did not indicate whether or not there are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource. The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (highly confident).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (inferred).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification are small and created only mild communication problems (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (highly confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). There is a limited range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (educated guess). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 51-100, at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (inferred). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 47.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The levels of conflict and standard of living are relatively low, there is a balance between the number of fishing spots and the number of fishers. The evaluation is based on conflict resolution mechanisms, and opportunity costs. The concept of crowding was not captured in the concept of the results. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on Withdrawals per hour spent fishing.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The members of this subgroup are male full-time fishers who use cotton nets to fish with. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 350 (inferred). Less than 10% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Clan identification causes small differences in composition and mild communication problems (inferred). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Spanish.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 43 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on extended family or clan relationships (inferred).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 76 through 100 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (inferred). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (inferred). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (inferred), time limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules.
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 76%-90% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (confident).
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation alone. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is not well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not exercising nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de facto) closed access to this resource, but "outsiders" began to appropriate at a moderate level.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was an enhancement of physical capabilities to withdraw units (e.g. introduction of turbine pump) from the resource during the time of this study. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There was a new local group starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively high (confident). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (educated guess). At the end of the period the appropriators shared low levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises rarely used) (educated guess). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period developments had occurred which tended toward a change in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were not exercising, nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de facto closed access to this resource, but "outsiders" began to appropriate at a relatively substantial level (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (confident). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There are not actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). The study did not indicate whether or not there are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource. The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (confident). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (inferred).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification are small and created only mild communication problems (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use are large and significantly affected communication (confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication are large and significantly affected communication (confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively negative, perhaps even spiteful manner -- one indicator of this would be vandalism by appropriators against appropriators. (educated guess). The documents do not present evidence of concurrent or prior history of cooperative actions between the appropriators in regards to other activities (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). There is a limited range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (educated guess). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators (confident). There was a general estimate of 501-1000 appropriators at the end of the period (confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 51-100, at the beginning of the period (inferred). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 101-200, at the end of the period (confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (inferred). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 47.2 - 48.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 47.2 and 48.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units and in withdrawal rates from the resource.
Subgroups 47.2 and 48.1 do not differ in exposure to variations in supply and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (inferred). The relatively worst off appropriators have been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (inferred). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as increasing over time (inferred).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
Conflict in the system is high, forcing fishermen out of the fishery. The results were based on standard of living, balance between number of fishing spots and number of fishers, access to markets, and the ability to control external interventions. The level of conflict is due to the type of conflict resolution mechanisms used. The concepts of crowding and autonomy were not captured in the results. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on Withdrawals per hour spent fishing.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The members of this subgroup are male full-time fishers who use cotton nets. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 350 (inferred). . Less than 10% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Clan identification causes small differences in composition and mild communication problems (inferred). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Hispanic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Spanish.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 43 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on extended family or clan relationships (educated guess).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (educated guess). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 76 through 100 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (inferred). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 76%-90% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered very low (inferred). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules.
Subgroup Results:
By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have become smaller (inferred). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become smaller (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The members of this subgroup are male full-time fishers who use nylon nets. The criteria for who is a member is not well defined (educated guess). . This group ended with a membership of 400 (inferred). Less than 10% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Hispanic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Spanish.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 120 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on exchange relationships (inferred).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (inferred). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team places pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (inferred). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 76%-90% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). Capital is owned by less than 10% of this subgroup (inferred). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (ambiguous).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was accelerating (inferred). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place. No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (ambiguous). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have become larger (inferred). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become larger (inferred).
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation alone. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is not well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not exercising nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de facto) closed access to this resource, but "outsiders" began to appropriate at a relatively substantial level.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by the appropriators in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (inferred). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was poor (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (ambiguous). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (ambiguous). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was very high (confident). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared low levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises rarely used) (educated guess). At the end of the period the appropriators shared low levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises rarely used) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period a definite change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were not exercising, nor attempting to exercise closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were not exercising, nor attempting to exercise, closed access to this resource (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (confident). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There are not actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). The study did not indicate whether or not there are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource. The appropriators have a moderate familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (confident). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (inferred).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use are large and significantly affected communication (confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication are large and significantly affected communication (confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively negative, perhaps even spiteful manner -- one indicator of this would be vandalism by appropriators against appropriators. (inferred). The documents do not present evidence of concurrent or prior history of cooperative actions between the appropriators in regards to other activities (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). There is a limited range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (educated guess). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 501-1000 appropriators (confident). There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 501-1000, at the beginning of the period (confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 101-200, at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (inferred).
The case study did not include information regarding whether or not the appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards.
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 48.1 - 48.2 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 48.1 and 48.2 differ in withdrawal rates from the resource and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 48.1 and 48.2 do not differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in exposure to variations in supply, and in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (inferred). The relatively worst off appropriators have been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (inferred).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The results indicate high levels of conflict, resulting from the type of conflict resolution mechanisms used. The standard of living is a result of the balance between number of fishing spots and number of fishers, access markets, and control of external interventions. The author commented on the stupidity of bureaucrats. Results are missing concerning crowding, and autonomy. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on Withdrawals per hour spent fishing
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The members of this subgroup are male full-time fishers who use cotton nets. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 350 (inferred). . Less than 10% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Clan identification causes small differences in composition and mild communication problems (inferred). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Hispanic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Spanish.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 43 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on extended family or clan relationships (educated guess).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (educated guess). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 76 through 100 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (inferred). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 76%-90% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered very low (inferred). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules.
Subgroup Results:
By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have become smaller (inferred). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become smaller (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The members of this subgroup are male full-time fishers who use nylon nets. The criteria for who is a member is not well defined (educated guess). Membership at the start of this group numbered 400 (inferred). This group ended with a membership of 128 (confident). Less than 10% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Hispanic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Spanish.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 30 groups. The head of an appropriation team is based on exchange relationships (inferred).
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (inferred). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team places pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (inferred). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 76%-90% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). Capital is owned by less than 10% of this subgroup (inferred). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (ambiguous).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was decelerating (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (ambiguous). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become smaller (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Valenca Fishery is demersal and pelagic species. "The fishing grounds consist of a crescent-shaped elongated estuary, enclosed by three large islands." p.33. See map p.32. The resource boundary is primarily natural. The resource is a channel of water bounded on the west by the mainland of Brazil and on the east by 3 islands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on technology used. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal units of a certain minimum size, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules may or may not assign substantially unequal privileges to certain subgroups, this information was not included in the study.
Scope Rules:
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
There is a single arrangement by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
75%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
12%
Regular crew (each):
13%
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local level(s).
A rule exists permitting an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the local level(s).
A rule exists permitting use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on technology used. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal units of a certain minimum size, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules may or may not assign substantially unequal privileges to certain subgroups, this information was not included in the study.
Scope Rules:
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
There are two arrangements by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.In both cases the owners of the appropriation equipment do not fish. In one case owners use the traditional share system, in the other case, the owners pay wages. The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
75%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
12%
Regular crew (each):
13%
Owners of the nets hire workers to fish with their equipment. The author doesn't state how wages are set. Owners and nonoperators who hire labor receive residual profit.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, there is no level of government or organization of appropriators at the location with operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
A rule exists permitting an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
There is a single arrangement by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
75%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
12%
Regular crew (each):
13%
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, there is no level of government or organization of appropriators at the location with operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
A rule exists permitting an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules may or may not assign substantially unequal privileges to certain subgroups, this information was not included in the study.
Scope Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
There are two arrangements by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.In both cases the owners of the appropriation equipment do not fish. In one case owners use the traditional share system, in the other case the owners pay wages. The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
75%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
12%
Regular crew (each):
13%
Owners of the nets hire workers to fish with their equipment. The author doesn't state how wages are set. Owners and nonoperators who hire labor receive residual profit.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
Valenca Canoe Fishery Systems Rep
Resource System
Key shared resource: Fish stocks of catfish species of limited abundances but high market value.
Natural infrastructure: Water channel enclosed between Brazil`s mainland and three islands.
Resource Users
- Canoe fishermen
- Entrepreneur fishermen (nylon nets owners)
Public Infrastructure Providers
- Fishermen
- Sudepe
Public Infrastructure
- Soft human-made infrastructure: The sea tenure is supported by cooperative ethics, which flow from the concept of respeito, a cognitive reference point linked to the community’s collective conscience.Respeito restricts the benefits of reciprocity for people who consistently create conflict in fishing; the most severe type of censure occurs when an entire network of fishing captains decide to deny territorial use rights to a troublemaker.
- Also, the memories of the oldest traditional fishers, including their knowledge of fishing in previous generations, establish the sea tenure in the form of space controlled by the community, individuals, and social networks
Relationship 1
RU => RS
Traditional fishermen: Exert fishing effort using canoes and cotton nets.
Entrepreneur fishermen: Exert fishing effort using boats and nylon nets.
Relationship 2
Before the introduction of nylon nets, fishermen used to decide together where and when which of them would fish.
Sudepe, the government agency that subsidized nylon nets, was not well connected to traditional fishers, which might have been the reason why their access to the new technology was not ensured.
Relationship 3
PIP => PI
Traditional fishermen are the stewards of knowledge concerning the fishing area and the proper strategies for different environment conditions. They provide this shared human infrastructure to the younger apprentices that they train to be fishermen.
Relationship 4
Not mentioned in the study.
Relationship 5
PI => 1
- No official restriction on who can and cannot fish in the area.
- Each fishing spot is defined with reference to the phase of the lunar-tide cycle (neap, spring, waxing, or waning side) when it may be used.
- Timing and zoning principles, formulated on the basis of the lunar-tide cycle, regulate the use of fishing spots at different times of the year.
Relationship 6
Expertise about fishing strategies, environment conditions and cultural assets related to the respeito system are human shared infrastructures within traditional fishers, but are not accessible to everyone in the community. The lack of access of new entrepreneur fishermen to this PI was one of the factors leading to the common dilemma in this system.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Not mentioned in the study.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Not mentioned in the study.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Introduction of nylon nets added a group of resource users to the pool: entrepreneurs that could afford buying the nets but who had no previous experience fishing and did not respect the rules established by traditional fishers.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Introduction of nylon nets diminished the power of traditional fishers to make decisions about fisheries management (who would fish, where and when).
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
Older traditional fishers: knowledge concerning the ideal fishing techniques to use according to the environmental conditions.
Hard human-made infrastructure: Dugout canoes, traps, and trotlines as gear. And, after the 1960’s, nylon nets.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, University of Arizona.
Vallury S, Arizona State University.
Tarr K, Arizona State University.
Cruz L, Arizona State University.
The Developmental Ecology of an Estuarine Canoe Fishing System in Northeast Brazil. Stanford University. PhD
. 1973.Traditional Sea Tenure and Resource Management in Brazilian Coastal Fishing. Management of Coastal Lagoon Fisheries. :429-438.
. 1984.Carrying Capacity Analysis of Fixed Territorial Fishing. Ethnology. 17:1-24.
. 1978.Swamp Dwellers of Bahia. Natural History. 87:62-74.
. 1978.The Lunar-Tide Fishing Cycle in North-Eastern Brazil. Ethnology. 13:379-392.
. 1974.Social Marginality and Sea Tenure in Brazilian Fishing. Occasional Papers in Latin American Studies.
. 1983.