- Resource System
- Marine ecosystem
- Resource Units
- Spiny Lobster
The Quintana Roo lobster fisheries are located on the eastern (Caribbean) side of the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico and stretch along the nearly 900 km of coastline from the border with Belize in the south to the Gulf of Mexico in the north. The original case study divides the fishery into three regions: north, central and south and is based on fieldwork conducted from mid-1978 to mid-1980. It catalogues an action situation involving approx. 643 cooperative fishermen; lobster is the stationary resource unit.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Andres Quinta Roo Lobster is lobster. This resource is located in and around Banco Chinchorro, about 35 kilometers off the coast of Quintana Roo State, Mexico, and along the coast from Punta Herrero to Rio de Bacalar Chico. The boundaries are primarily naturally defined - the reefs and cays of Banco Chinchorro, and institutionally defined boundaries of the coop.
SCREENER:
Case: Andres Quinta Roo Lobster, Mexico
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe seven resources in detail. The primary resource is the Andres Quinta Roo Lobster, situated in Andres Quintana Roo of Mexico. More generally, it is located in Central America & Caribbean. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Andres Quinta Roo Lobster. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Andres Quinta Roo Lobster have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are less than 25 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderately abundant supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Miller gives a description of the scalefish, lobster, conch, shrimp, turtle, and coral fisheries off the Caribbean coast of Andres Quintana Roo State, Mexico. All fisheries, except for scalefish, are organized by coops or firms. He provides information on rules, technology, marketing, and production, with particularly detailed information on the scalefish and lobster fisheries organized by the Andres Quintana Roo Coop, the Ascension Bay Lobster Fishery organized by the Vigia Chico Coop, and the Amberjack fishery. The other fisheries are only briefly described, and in general Miller provides little information on the condition of the resources. The most interesting case is the Ascension Bay lobsterfishery in which members of the coop own their lobster territories and trade and sell them. [Note: the Amberjack Fishery will not be coded because it does not meet our definition of a CPR dilemma.]
CITATION(S):
Miller, David (1982) "Mexico's Caribbean Fishery: Recent Change and Current Issues." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*
The resource appropriated from Andres Quinta Roo Lobster is lobster. It is produced biologically and is a renewable stationary unit. This resource is located in and around Banco Chinchorro, about 35 kilometers off the coast of Quintana Roo State, Mexico, and along the coast from Punta Herrero to Rio de Bacalar Chico. The boundaries are primarily naturally defined - the reefs and cays of Banco Chinchorro, and institutionally defined boundaries of the coop.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country and are not within any general purpose local jurisdictions. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (inferred). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (inferred). The case information did not indicate whether or not a variance in quality between zones has ever created conflict among appropriators.
There are natural barriers within the resource, and they coincide with microzones (inferred). There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the lobster can be controlled (educated guess). There is considerable, and predictable variation over space in the availability of lobster within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of lobster within a single year (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of lobster from year to year.
The bottom topography of Andres Quinta Roo Lobster is primarily rock (confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated off of the coast of Quintano Roo State, located on the eastern side of the Yucatan Penninsula in Mexico, between Punta Herro on the north and Rio de Bacalar Chico. The location includes Chetumal, Xcalak, and Mahahual. The boundaries of the location are institutionally and naturally defined. They correspond to the political boundaries of the state and extend out into the water to the barrier reef. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of lobster and scalefish (coding), shrimp, conch, mullet, snapper, grunts, jacks, and bonefish. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not within any general purpose local jurisdiction. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is -1, and its longitude is -1. The elevation of this location is -1 meters. The highest elevation is -1. The lowest elevation of this location is -1. The region's average annual rainfall is unknown. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is unknown. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
The resource appropriated from Andres Quinta Roo Lobster is lobster. This resource is located in and around Banco Chinchorro, about 35 kilometers off the coast of Quintana Roo State, Mexico, and along the coast from Punta Herrero to Rio de Bacalar Chico. The boundaries are primarily naturally defined - the reefs and cays of Banco Chinchorro, and institutionally defined boundaries of the coop.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 26 to 50 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by an external authority in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no information included in the study to indicate whether or not there was a substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because -2.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Tons of fish harvested per year at the beginning of the period: 20 (inferred)
Tons of fish harvested per year at the end of the period: 51 (educated guess)
It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the beginning of this period. It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the end of this period.
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly sold in external markets, and also sold in local markets, and consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in external markets, and also sold in local markets, and consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (inferred). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (inferred). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (inferred). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (inferred). At the beginning of this study, holding all inputs constant the same or greater amounts of resource units were not withdrawn with fewer appropriator teams and/or equipment, and there was no rent dissipation (confident). At the end of this study, holding all inputs constant the same or greater amounts of resource units were not withdrawn with fewer appropriator teams and/or equipment, and there was no rent dissipation (confident). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (educated guess). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (confident). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There was no information provided to indicate whether or not there are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource. There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (highly confident).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in one market (inferred). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related primarily to other local resources (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 25-50, at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and monitors are employees of an external governmental authority (confident). This position monitors rules devised by national collective choice processes (column 1 of the rules form), rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form), and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards. The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. Almost all of the monitors were full-time (inferred).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 95.1 - -2 - -2 - -2
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
The author briefly mentions our results. He has primarily provided description with little comment. He states that the national government regulates lobster fishery in anticipation of problems, as population increases. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -1
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are men who belong to Andres Quintana Roo Coop. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 65 (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Spanish.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 22 groups.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource although they hold the right de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 26 through 50 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (inferred). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a high cost (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The most recent technological change experienced by this subgroup was 11-25 years ago (educated guess). (educated guess). The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was accelerating (inferred). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members do not follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (inferred). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Andres Quinta Roo Lobster is lobster. This resource is located in and around Banco Chinchorro, about 35 kilometers off the coast of Quintana Roo State, Mexico, and along the coast from Punta Herrero to Rio de Bacalar Chico. The boundaries are primarily naturally defined - the reefs and cays of Banco Chinchorro, and institutionally defined boundaries of the coop.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship of a country. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to obtain a license for entry or for equipment in order to appropriate. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
The sum of the fees and licenses is relatively low given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is relatively low given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal only during specific seasons, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 32 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal units of a certain minimum size, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
Payoff Rules
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
Original Andres Quintana Roo Case Representation (1955-1979)
Resource System
Caribbean Spiny Lobster are the stationary resource unit. The lobster season occurs from July to early September when the resource is most abundant. The resource is plentiful thanks to the high biological productivity levels in the area due to the abundance of reef and shallow coastal waters and upwelling events. Increasing degradation via as increased dumping of sewage, over fishing, and physical damage to reefs from construction or dredging threaten habitat quality for the resource.
Resource Users
Lobster fishermen (n=49) are the main resource users; the group is made up of local villagers from Xcalak.
Public Infrastructure Providers
The federal Secretary of Fisheries and Agriculture (SAGARPA) is in charge of fisheries regulation via its National Fisheries Commission (CONAPESCA), which issues permits, certifies legality of capture, and enforces regulations on minimum tail size of captured lobster and the closed season. Fish buyers (sponsors for fishing infrastructure in exchange for exclusive rights on landings). The National Fisheries Institute (INAPESCA) charged with research for planning, regulation, and management.
Public Infrastructure
Hard public infrastructure in Xcalak includes roads (for transport of lobster to markets), boats for fishing trips, gaffs built to catch lobster via skin diving, huts and sanitary facilities built on the island of Banco Chinchorro for 2-week long fishing expeditions, and a processing plant in Xcalak for reception and ice block production, which required the building of a desalinization plant as well.
Soft public infrastructure includes a variety of implied rules on citizen eligibility to become a co-op member, federal fishery officials cooperating with the government for the enactment of laws and regulations, and policies initially favoring local citizens for officer positions, a convention that eroded away with time and increased federalization of the fisheries offices.
Fishermen do not own the fishing grounds, but members of the cooperative have exclusive rights over the resource in their respective zone (the South Zone).
Relationship 1
It is known that when fishing pressure is heavy, lobster stocks are quickly cleaned-out. Human-made hard infrastructure, both public and private, mediates the interaction between the resource and the resource users.
Hard infrastructure: gear for skindiving, which consists of shallow-water dives with inexpensive gear (mask, snorkel, fins, and a 1m gaff to which a large fishhook has been wired and with the other end being a sharpened stick). Also, plywood skiffs powered by 6 hp outboards with inboard diesel engines. These skiffs had built-in floorboards where they could store ice-boxes for catch. Gaffs are very efficient in the hands of experienced fishermen.
Soft infrastructure: fish camps were set up in Chinchorro Bank (60 km offshore ).
Relationship 2
Federal development programs to increase the commercialization of the fishery have included the provision of low interest loans for the purchase of gear and vessels and an attempt to increase advisory functions of government representatives working with cooperatives and independent fishermen.
Many fishermen kept previous arrangements with fish buyers who sponsored them with loans, gear, and boats in exchange for a share of the capture and the exclusive right to purchase the rest. However, this also allowed fish buyers to retain access to the high profits of the fishery.
Relationship 3
Federal development programs established:
Hard infrastructure: shoreside processing facilities, roads to remote parts of the coast were opened, the advisory function of government officials was increased, and new fisheries offices were established.
Soft infrastructure: technical schools, and increased number of fisheries officials.
In the early years of the fishery, the issuing of fishing permits to independent permits was usually denied, forcing harvesters to join a cooperative
Relationship 4
Fishermen of the San Andres cooperative have exclusive rights of access and harvesting lobster in its allocated fishing zone (Southern Zone) granted by the state.
Lobster fishermen may not keep lobsters below a minimum tail size of 13.5 cm and they may not fish during the closed season (between March 16th to July 16th, coinciding with the lobster spawning season).
Very little accurate historical data on catch and effort exist, and there are multiple sources of error for registering actual catch since much of the actual catch goes unreported and as much as 40 – 60% of the total capture is sold directly to restaurants and hotels. Transportation regulations are circumvented routinely, introducing sources of errors in the official records.
Relationship 5
Due to the lack of enforcement of regulations and the problem of unreported catch, very little is known about the extent of the lobster resource and its ability to sustain increased fishing pressure, thus limiting the ability to establish population parameters that can aid in appropriate management of the stocks.
Relationship 6
In order to fish for lobster, all fishermen must have identity cards, as well as the fishing permits necessary for harvesting various categories of marine life (except when fishing for subsistence or domestic consumption). All boats and gear must be registered by paying a minimal fee. Capture must be legally registered and certified by CONAPESCA officials upon landing for the transportation of the product to the market. Receipts for tax payment are necessary to obtain a permit for shipping, and these are checked at various checkpoints along the highway.
There is no mention of enforcement success for the lobster fishery.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
In 1955 before skindiving became the preferred method of fishing, fishermen limited their activity to beach weirs when winter storms triggered near-shore lobster migrations.
The author indicates there has been evidence of unhealthy coral reef ecosystems where lobsters are found, such as exploding sea urchin populations and diminished water quality, all of which have the potential of negatively affecting lobster populations.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Hurricanes are also mentioned as a threat to human-made hard infrastructure as they can affect public roads, processing plants, and huts on Chinchorro Bank.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
After the cooperative was formed, many fishermen kept previous arrangements with fish buyers who sponsored them with loans, gear, and boats in exchange for a share of the capture and the exclusive right to purchase the rest. The capital provided by private investors allowed the industry to develop and was instrumental in organizing people into cooperatives. However, this also allowed fish buyers to retain access to the high profits of the fishery.
With the development of the tourist industry, a trade grew for lobster to supply the expanding number of restaurants that came along.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Historically, federal policies and programs were less than permanent and not always appropriate, which give way to a system in which the rules could be stretched to allow for various demands. This pattern was eroded by increasing federalization of the fisheries offices, which allowed increasing numbers of “outsiders” to be put in charge of policy making and programs making it harder for lower-level public servants to rationalize preferential treatment or justify bending the rules in case of exigency.
The federal government implemented development programs in the 1950s to stimulate modern marine resource exploitation to increase food production and maintain self-sufficiency. These programs encouraged the formation of cooperatives.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Updated Andres Quintana Roo Case Representation (2013)
Resource System
Caribbean Spiny Lobster remained the stationary resource unit. There was a shift towards conch and scaly fisheries towards 2007 by other resource users, yet the San Andres Quintana Roo co-op remained primarily focused on lobster.
Resource Users
As of 2013, the co-op is composed of 35 core members.
Public Infrastructure Providers
The federal Secretary of Fisheries and Agriculture (SAGARPA) is in charge of fisheries regulation via its National Fisheries Commission (CONAPESCA), which issues permits, certifies legality of capture, and enforces regulations on minimum tail size of captured lobster and the closed season. Fish buyers (sponsors for fishing infrastructure in exchange for exclusive rights on landings). The National Fisheries Institute (INAPESCA) charged with research for planning, regulation, and management.
Public Infrastructure
Hard public infrastructure in Xcalak includes roads (for transport of lobster to markets), boats for fishing trips, gaffs built to catch lobster via skin diving, huts and sanitary facilities built on the island of Banco Chinchorro for 2-week long fishing expeditions, and a processing plant in Xcalak for reception and ice block production, which required the building of a desalinization plant as well.
Soft public infrastructure includes a variety of implied rules on citizen eligibility to become a co-op member, federal fishery officials cooperating with the government for the enactment of laws and regulations, and policies initially favoring local citizens for officer positions, a convention that eroded away with time and increased federalization of the fisheries offices.
Fishermen do not own the fishing grounds, but members of the cooperative have exclusive rights over the resource in their respective zone (the South Zone).
Relationship 1
A drawback to the skindiving method of fishing is that once a lobster is hooked, it is wounded mortally. Thus, if a captured lobster is gravid or undersized, it does little good to return it since its potential contribution to the future catch has been wasted.
Relationship 2
During the building of the processing plant, officials failed to communicate with the co-ops (resource users) about the ownership and administration, and there was much resentment among the fishermen who felt they had been given no real input in planning.
Relationship 3
(none specified)Relationship 4
The lack of monitoring regulations along the shoreline makes it likely that the black market and illegal imports will continue to affect accuracy of catch reports.
Relationship 5
(none specified)Relationship 6
Lack of manpower for enforcement of fisheries regulations remains a key problem for the fishery.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Reefs are highly susceptible to changes in water quality associated with shoreside development (increased dumping of sewage, increasing microbial activity, and physical damage to the reef from construction or dredging, increasing turbidity). The destruction of mangrove forests also presents a risk of lowering production in neighboring aquatic ecosystems since they are a major source of organic nutrients and they provide physical structure. Interception of freshwater at the shoreline could speed the collapse of the fishery since a substantial reduction of groundwater to sea would allow accumulated contaminants to flush into the estuary with heavy rains, resulting in a super shock for shallow water organisms. At some point, the focus of fishing effort may have to shift to deep water stocks and to areas farther form shore, just north of Chinchorro Bank.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
The processing plant, although located within distance from the beach to prevent hurricane damage, the roads leading to it are little more than bulldozed traces prone to flooding during rainy seasons. These roads also pass close to the beach in many places, being at risk for breaching during hurricane season. Also, the desalinization plant is exposed to an open site only 50 m from the shore.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Economic decisions and operating constraints imposed by the federal development program and fish buyers have compromised the development of fishing co-ops, as fish buyers have attained unchallenged control over a co-op’s destiny.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, University of Arizona.
Brady U, Arizona State University.
. 1982. Mexico's Caribbean Fishery: Recent Change and Current Issues. University of Wisconsin Milwaukee. PhD
. 1988. Technology, Territoriality and Ecology: The Evolution of Mexico's Caribbean Spiny Lobster Fishery. State University of New York at Cortland. MS
. 2006. Xcalac, Quintana Roo. El turismo costero en la ecorregión del sistema arrecifal mesoamericano. :232-261.