- Resource System
- Oak Woodland
- Resource Units
- Fodder
- Location
- Uttaranchal, India
Munglori is a village in Uttaranchal, India. The resource appropriated from Munglori Turf Management is fodder. There is a system of informal, locally recognized rules which are respected in and across villages and through which the local oak forests are managed. These rules supersede national laws and result in a reasonable level of forest management. Both institutional and geographical factors affect the boundary of the resource. From the standpoint of social-ecological systems analysis, this case was originally perceived to be a success in terms of village-scale capacity to address a potential commons dilemma. Follow-up research has turned up insufficient evidence to refute initial claims. From all appearances, Munglori villagers seem to sufficiently manage the commons dilemma.
This case was part of the original CPR database developed in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University. The original CPR report can be found in the CPR tab under institutional analysis.
The resource appropriated from Munglori Turf Management is fodder. The forest within the immediate watershed above Munglori Forest near the village is heavily logged and it grades away into uncut fall canopy forest of Nag Tibba. Total area of forest is 485 ha. Both institutional and geographical factors affect the boundary of the resource (see also p.133 on doc 506).
SCREENER:
Case: Munglori Turf Management, India
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a chapter in a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Munglori Turf Management, situated in Munglori of India. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of forest products. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Munglori Turf Management. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is not available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Munglori Turf Management have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 25-50 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are sometimes formally organized.
Munglori with a population of 250 is an overwhelmingly subsistence village. Its economy resembles that of most other hill villages in the Himalayas - with close links between surrounding forests, grazing areas, livestock and agriculture. There is a system of informal, locally recognized rules which is respected in and across villages and through which the local oak forests are managed. These rules supersede national laws and result in a reasonable level of forest management. But with greater pressure on resources near the village the informal system could easily break down.
CITATION(S):
Moench, Marcus (1988) "Turf and Forest Management in a Garhwal Hill Village." In WHOSE TREES?, edited by Louise Fortmann and John W. Bruce, 127-136. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.*
Moench, Marcus, and J. Bandyopadhyay (1986) "People Forest Interaction: A Neglected Parameter in Himalayan Forest Management." MOUNTAIN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (1): 3-16.*
The resource appropriated from Munglori Turf Management is fodder. It is produced biologically and is a renewable stationary unit. The forest within the immediate watershed above Munglori Forest near the village is heavily logged and it grades away into uncut fall canopy forest of Nag Tibba. Total area of forest is 485 ha. Both institutional and geographical factors affect the boundary of the resource (see also p.133 on doc 506).
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (highly confident). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (inferred). The variance in quality between the zones has not created conflict among appropriators (inferred).
There are natural barriers within the resource, and they coincide with microzones (inferred). There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the fodder can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable, and highly predictable variation over space in the availability of fodder within the resource (highly confident). There is considerable, and highly predictable variation in the flow of fodder within a single year (inferred). There is not considerable variation in the flow of fodder from year to year (educated guess).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is steeply sloping (highly confident).
If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have conflictual effects.
The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the location. The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource.
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in Munglori, located in the Tehri Garhwal district of Uttar Pradesh in India. Munglori is situated along a tributary of the Aghar watershed, 11 km, N.NE. of the popular hill resort of Mussoorie. It is in a valley at the base of the Nag Tibba peak. The boundaries of the location are geographical, since the village is quite isolated, (a 2hr walk from the nearest road head); and institutional due to other villages in the same location. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of forest surrounding a village (coding), a village, private grasslands, and agricultural lands. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were sometimes complementary effects, and sometimes conflictual effects in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is not frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). Additionally, the most common mode of transportation in this region is walking. This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and relatively autonomous with respect to other economic networks during most of the time period .
The latitude of this location is -1, and its longitude is -1. The elevation of this location is 1740 meters (highly confident). The highest elevation is -1. The lowest elevation of this location is -1. The region's average annual rainfall is unknown. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is unknown. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
February precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
March precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
April precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
May precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
June precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
July precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
August precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
September precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
October precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
November precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
December precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
The resource appropriated from Munglori Turf Management is fodder. The forest within the immediate watershed above Munglori Forest near the village is heavily logged and it grades away into uncut fall canopy forest of Nag Tibba. Total area of forest is 485 ha. Both institutional and geographical factors affect the boundary of the resource (see also p.133 on doc 506).
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) but not effective in achieving closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1985. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because existing rules for forest use as a factor in success of development projects that outsiders may introduce.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly consumed by appropriators and families, and also used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (inferred). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was extensive (inferred). At the beginning of this study, holding all inputs constant there was no information included in the study regarding whether or not rent dissipation occurred with fewer appropriator teams and/or equipment. At the end of this study, holding all inputs constant the same or even greater amounts of resource units were withdrawn with fewer appropriator teams and/or equipment. There was rent dissipation, but it was hard to isolate the source. At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (highly confident). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure but not effective closed access to this resource. At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource.
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (highly confident). Maps and/or charts of the appropriation resource do not differ from the production and distribution resource. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (inferred). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (highly confident). There are not actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There are not records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There are not arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (highly confident). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators. There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (highly confident). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (inferred). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (confident). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 25-50 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (inferred).
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards.
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 2.1 - -2 - -2 - -2
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The author says that even if no formal rule system is in force in Munglori, the villagers have evolved patterns of use through which the management of the resource is in balance at present. These rules in use must be recognized by development experts. The causal model is only implicit. The author does not explicitly evaluate efficiency but suggests that efficiency can be increased by careful management of logging levels (p.16, doc505) and improved use of village grassland to reduce pressure on oak forests for fodder (p.16, doc 505). The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -1
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The appropriators belong to the Hindu Pahari culture and are primarily Rajputs, 206 out of 254 (Rajputs are a relatively high caste). The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a membership of 5 (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Hindu, Pahari. The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). Most members of this subgroup are of the cast Rajput. Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Hindu. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Garhwali.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de facto rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de facto (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (educated guess). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de facto by this subgroup (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). An estimated 0 days through 6 days are needed to build or to earn enough income to purchase the equipment for an appropriation team (inferred). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 51%-75%. Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered high (confident). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (ambiguous). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). Low cost alternatives for the supply unit are available.
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (highly confident). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). In forestry, appropriation resources (at the end of the period) are in large part used to raise cattle. During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource. Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules.
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Munglori Turf Management is fodder. The forest within the immediate watershed above Munglori Forest near the village is heavily logged and it grades away into uncut fall canopy forest of Nag Tibba. Total area of forest is 485 ha. Both institutional and geographical factors affect the boundary of the resource (see also p.133 on doc 506).
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location but the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights are transmitted for an entire household or production unit (such as a boat) from one generation to another.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be transferred to members of a family but not outside the family.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
-2
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
There is a rule permitting withdrawal only during specific seasons, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal units of a certain minimum size, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: educated guess. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used temporarily as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
Munglori System Representation
Resource System
Oak woodland.
- Resource units: Oak biomass (branches, twigs, and leaves)
- Spatially heterogenous; biomass volume and regenerative capacity vary with altitude, aspect, and distance from settlements.
Resource Users
Small-scale village agropastoralists.
- Villagers collect oak biomass as fodder for livestock and fuel for fires.
- Divided into hierarchically-nested social groups (villages and households).
Public Infrastructure Providers
Villagers are public infrastructure providers, as they uphold informal, local norms and rules.
- Informal with no explicitly-defined roles.
Public Infrastructure
Informal, local norms and rules direct who may use forest resources and from where in the forest individuals extract resources.
Relationship 1
1. Villagers extract Oak branches with 2-3 years of growth from forests and transform biomass into fuel and fodder.
Relationship 2
Villagers are both resource users and public infrastructure providers. There are no special social roles. By following informal, local norms and rules, villagers uphold the traditional institutions that govern resource management.
Relationship 3
Villagers maintain the local, informal norms and rules that have traditionally governed resource use. There are no explicit punishments for violating these norms, but (violent) conflicts are seen as a potential result of violation.
Relationship 4
Affects forest response and changes the spatial and successional growth patterns that affect forest density, canopy, and plant species dynamics that can affect fodder production (i.e. The “Nibble Effect” that induces peripheral degradation, The Density Effect increases Oak fodder production, and The Replacement Effect decreases Oak fodder production as the canopy).
Relationship 5
Regulates access to land and grassland/forest resources.
Relationship 6
By upholding the rules and norms, resource users co-produce the public infrastructure that governs resource use.
- Informal, close-knit social controls regulate intra-village resource use
- Mediate inter-village land-use conflicts.
- Enculturate future generations or recent migrants
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Munglori villagers lead subsistence lifestyles that center around non-irrigated agriculture and the collection of fodder for livestock and fuel for cooking and heating. Livestock eat grass (fodder) and small leaves/twigs discarded from fuel collection and turn these resources into fertilizer that villagers use in farming. Fodder, fuel, and fertilizer are intimately linked, and villagers are vulnerable to any shocks to this system.
Lopped trees on exposed slopes regenerate slower than lopped trees in other locations. Prolonged drought and excessive heat could further reduce forest regeneration. Wildfire and other natural disasters could further threaten the ability of the Munglori forest to produce resources at a level that can meet village demand.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
As of 1988, Munglori was located two miles from the nearest road, which is one of the only examples of hard, public infrastructure in the village. A sustained absence of hard infrastructure may protect the Munglori forest from overexploitation. The extension of the road and the introduction of other pieces of infrastructure from outside of the village could impact resource management.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
State-level forest management policies do not recognize Munglori turf management norms, but the state grants villages in the region concessions to use forest resources. Changes in villager perception towards the state as well as changes in state forest policy could impact how villagers use and manage resources.
Since 1988, Munglori’s population has nearly doubled, but the village is still small. Research doesn’t tell what size population the Munglori forest can support, but a dramatic growth in population could compromise villagers’ ability to extract resources within the forest’s regenerative capacity.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Munglori villagers are both resource users and public infrastructure providers as they follow and uphold local norms and rules that guide resource management. The disturbances to the villagers as resource users could have a similar impact on the villagers as public infrastructure providers. Changes in state forest policy could impact the villagers’ ability to use local traditions as the rules that govern resource use.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, University of Arizona.
Anderies JM, Arizona State University.
Carvalhaes T, Arizona State University.
Turf and Forest Management in a Garhwal Hill Village. Whose trees?: Proprietary dimensions of forestry. :127-136.
. 1988.People Forest Interaction: A Neglected Parameter in Himalayan Forest Management. Mountain Research and Development. 6(1):3-16.
. 1986.