- Resource System
- Irrigation system
- Resource Units
- Water
The Kaset Samkee water user association is a part of the The Lam Pra Plerng Irrigation Project, constructed by Thailand's Royal Irrigation Department (RID). RID organized four Water User Associations (WUAs) in the project area that are then divided into "chaeks" (a chaek is an area served by a common farm-turn-out). The common irrigator is paid by the RID and is responsible for arranging water distribution and maintenance schedules in the chaek. Farmers in the area of the Kaset Samkee Association have a higher level of participation in the association and maintenance activities because they do not receive water from other sources and are dependent on the irrigation system.
This case was part of the original CPR database developed in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University. The original CPR report can be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee is water for irrigation. The irrigation system that was studied consists of a farm-turn-out and farm ditch that delivers water from a main canal to the adjacent farmland.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee is water for irrigation. The irrigation system that was studied consists of a farm-turn-out and farm ditch that delivers water from a main canal to the adjacent farmland.
SCREENER:
Case: A Chaek in Kaset Samakee, Thailand
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a paper issued by a scholar or research institution. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe two resources in detail. The primary resource is the A Chaek in Kaset Samakee, situated in Zone One of the Lam Pra Plerng Irrigation Project of Thailand. More generally, it is located in 5rient. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is not thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of A Chaek in Kaset Samakee have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 25-50 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
The Lam Pra Plerng Irrigation Project was constructed by Thailand's Royal Irrigation Department (RID). RID organized four water user associations (WUAs) in the project area. Each WUA is divided into "chaeks" (a chaek is an area served by a common farm-turn-out). One or two common irrigators serve each chaek. The common irrigator is paid by RID and is responsible for arranging water distribution and maintenance schedules in the chaek. Farmers in the area of the Amphoe Choke Chai Association have a low level of participation in the Association and maintenance activities because they usually receive water from the natural flooding of rivers and are not very dependent on project water from the irrigation system.
CITATION(S):
Gillespie, Victor A. (1975) "Farmer Irrigation Associations and Farmer Cooperation." East-West Food Institute No. 3. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center.*
The resource appropriated from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee is water for irrigation. The irrigation system that was studied consists of a farm-turn-out and farm ditch that delivers water from a main canal to the adjacent farmland.
SCREENER:
Case: A Chaek in Kaset Samakee, Thailand
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a paper issued by a scholar or research institution. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe two resources in detail. The primary resource is the A Chaek in Kaset Samakee, situated in Zone One of the Lam Pra Plerng Irrigation Project of Thailand. More generally, it is located in 5rient. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is not thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of A Chaek in Kaset Samakee have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 25-50 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
The Lam Pra Plerng Irrigation Project was constructed by Thailand's Royal Irrigation Department (RID). RID organized four water user associations (WUAs) in the project area. Each WUA is divided into "chaeks" (a chaek is an area served by a common farm-turn-out). One or two common irrigators serve each chaek. The common irrigator is paid by RID and is responsible for arranging water distribution and maintenance schedules in the chaek. Farmers in the area of the Amphoe Choke Chai Association have a low level of participation in the Association and maintenance activities because they usually receive water from the natural flooding of rivers and are not very dependent on project water from the irrigation system.
CITATION(S):
Gillespie, Victor A. (1975) "Farmer Irrigation Associations and Farmer Cooperation." East-West Food Institute No. 3. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center.*
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The irrigation system that was studied consists of a farm-turn-out and farm ditch that delivers water from a main canal to the adjacent farmland.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are designated by a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource. There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (inferred). There is not considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year (educated guess).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource was not included in the study.
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, but the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are not the sole operator(s) of the headworks (highly confident). The irrigators being served by this production organization do not participate in the selection of the officials of the production agency except as citizens in a general election (highly confident). The distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) or the groups(s) of people as the appropriation system, but the distribution system is not solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (highly confident). The irrigators being served by this production organization participate in the selection of the officials of the distribution agency through special direct elections by irrigators (highly confident). The distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) (or the same groups of people) as the headworks of the system, but it is not solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (highly confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in Zone One of the Lam Pra Plerng Irrigation Project. The boundaries of the location are a water zone in an irrigation system. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of farm-turn-outs and farm ditches that deliver water from main canals to the adjacent farmlands.
The system is located within one country. A permanent population lives year round in this location (inferred). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred).
The latitude of this location is Amphoe Chok Chai: 14.44'N, and its longitude is Amphoe Chok Chai: 102.10'E. The elevation of this location is 181 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 1036 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is 1036 milimeters. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 12, evapotraspiration: 29
February precipitation: 22, evapotraspiration: 40
March precipitation: 56, evapotraspiration: 68
April precipitation: 68, evapotraspiration: 77
May precipitation: 156, evapotraspiration: 157
June precipitation: 71, evapotraspiration: 76
July precipitation: 117, evapotraspiration: 120
August precipitation: 104, evapotraspiration: 106
September precipitation: 182, evapotraspiration: 147
October precipitation: 217, evapotraspiration: 137
November precipitation: 29, evapotraspiration: 56
December precipitation: 2, evapotraspiration: 23
COUNTRY, REGION, TIME:
This study examines a common-pool resource institution in Thailand, starting in 0, ending in 0.
During the period of time that this region was studied, the citizens of Thailand were not able to follow formal procedures to create their own local general purpose governments (educated guess). If a basic charter of a traditionally evolved local general purpose government was in existence, it could be maintained (inferred). The citizens living in Thailand were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local special purpose enterprises with some public powers (inferred). Regarding the charter of a local special purpose enterprise, the citizens could choose between existing boilerplate charters (educated guess).
During the time of this study, citizens in this or similar regions had created or evolved public enterprises with public treasuries and collective decisions outside the formal governmental structure (inferred).
The individuals that made collective choice decisions in Thailand were locally elected officials whose actions were reviewed, approved, or rejected by officials of a higher level government in some decision areas, but who could act on their own in other decision areas (educated guess). The source of funds used by general purpose local governments was not included in the case study. The judiciary system in this region during the time of the study was not included in the case study. The judges gained their positions through ways that were not included in the case information. The tenure of the judges was not included in the case information. In general, the judges in Thailand has a reputation that was not included in the case information. The case study did not include information on whether there was a single dominant legal tradition in use in this region.
The resource appropriated from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The irrigation system that was studied consists of a farm-turn-out and farm ditch that delivers water from a main canal to the adjacent farmland.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are designated by a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource. There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (inferred). There is not considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year (educated guess).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource was not included in the study.
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, but the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are not the sole operator(s) of the headworks (highly confident). The irrigators being served by this production organization do not participate in the selection of the officials of the production agency except as citizens in a general election (highly confident). The distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) or the groups(s) of people as the appropriation system, but the distribution system is not solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (highly confident). The irrigators being served by this production organization participate in the selection of the officials of the distribution agency through special direct elections by irrigators (highly confident). The distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) (or the same groups of people) as the headworks of the system, but it is not solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (highly confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in Zone One of the Lam Pra Plerng Irrigation Project. The boundaries of the location are a water zone in an irrigation system. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of farm-turn-outs and farm ditches that deliver water from main canals to the adjacent farmlands.
The system is located within one country. A permanent population lives year round in this location (inferred). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred).
The latitude of this location is Amphoe Chok Chai: 14.44'N, and its longitude is Amphoe Chok Chai: 102.10'E. The elevation of this location is 181 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 1036 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is 1036 milimeters. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 12, evapotraspiration: 29
February precipitation: 22, evapotraspiration: 40
March precipitation: 56, evapotraspiration: 68
April precipitation: 68, evapotraspiration: 77
May precipitation: 156, evapotraspiration: 157
June precipitation: 71, evapotraspiration: 76
July precipitation: 117, evapotraspiration: 120
August precipitation: 104, evapotraspiration: 106
September precipitation: 182, evapotraspiration: 147
October precipitation: 217, evapotraspiration: 137
November precipitation: 29, evapotraspiration: 56
December precipitation: 2, evapotraspiration: 23
COUNTRY, REGION, TIME:
This study examines a common-pool resource institution in Thailand, starting in 0, ending in 0.
During the period of time that this region was studied, the citizens of Thailand were not able to follow formal procedures to create their own local general purpose governments (educated guess). If a basic charter of a traditionally evolved local general purpose government was in existence, it could be maintained (inferred). The citizens living in Thailand were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local special purpose enterprises with some public powers (inferred). Regarding the charter of a local special purpose enterprise, the citizens could choose between existing boilerplate charters (educated guess).
During the time of this study, citizens in this or similar regions had created or evolved public enterprises with public treasuries and collective decisions outside the formal governmental structure (inferred).
The individuals that made collective choice decisions in Thailand were locally elected officials whose actions were reviewed, approved, or rejected by officials of a higher level government in some decision areas, but who could act on their own in other decision areas (educated guess). The source of funds used by general purpose local governments was not included in the case study. The judiciary system in this region during the time of the study was not included in the case study. The judges gained their positions through ways that were not included in the case information. The tenure of the judges was not included in the case information. In general, the judges in Thailand has a reputation that was not included in the case information. The case study did not include information on whether there was a single dominant legal tradition in use in this region.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee is water for irrigation. The irrigation system that was studied consists of a farm-turn-out and farm ditch that delivers water from a main canal to the adjacent farmland.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not indicated as either attempting, or failing to attempt to exercise access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1974. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by an external authority in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 280000 (educated guess)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 280000 (educated guess)
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was moderate (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was moderate (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are available to appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There was no information regarding the existance of a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance. The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not affect communication (educated guess).
If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (inferred).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied there was no information coded to indicate whether or not the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) existed. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 25-50 appropriators (educated guess). There was a general estimate of 25-50 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, others? (confident).
The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 1-5 (inferred). Official monitors are paid in money. None of the monitors were full-time (educated guess).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 56.1 - 57.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 56.1 and 57.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 56.1 and 57.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
Results focus on water distribution; farmers' contribution to maintenance; the frequency of farmer-common irrigator contact; and to what extent farmers rely on water from the resource.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the chaek who are members of the Kaset Samakee Association. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a estimated membership of less than 25..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to the languages spoken does not affect communication (educated guess).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (inferred). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (highly confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (highly confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly paddy rice. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (highly confident). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the chaek who are not members of the Kaset Samakee Association.At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a estimated membership of less than 25..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to the languages spoken does not affect communication (educated guess).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (inferred). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (highly confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (highly confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly paddy rice. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (highly confident). Members of this group have not increased their use of alternative sources of supply of this unit (highly confident). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee is water for irrigation. The irrigation system that was studied consists of a farm-turn-out and farm ditch that delivers water from a main canal to the adjacent farmland.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not indicated as either attempting, or failing to attempt to exercise access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1974. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by an external authority in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 280000 (educated guess)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 280000 (educated guess)
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was moderate (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was moderate (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are available to appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There was no information regarding the existance of a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance. The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not affect communication (educated guess).
If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (inferred).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied there was no information coded to indicate whether or not the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) existed. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 25-50 appropriators (educated guess). There was a general estimate of 25-50 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, others? (confident).
The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 1-5 (inferred). Official monitors are paid in money. None of the monitors were full-time (educated guess).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 56.1 - 57.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 56.1 and 57.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 56.1 and 57.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
Results focus on water distribution; farmers' contribution to maintenance; the frequency of farmer-common irrigator contact; and to what extent farmers rely on water from the resource.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the chaek who are members of the Kaset Samakee Association. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a estimated membership of less than 25..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to the languages spoken does not affect communication (educated guess).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (inferred). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (highly confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (highly confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly paddy rice. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (highly confident). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the chaek who are not members of the Kaset Samakee Association.At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a estimated membership of less than 25..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to the languages spoken does not affect communication (educated guess).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (inferred). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (highly confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (highly confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a low value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly paddy rice. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (highly confident). Members of this group have not increased their use of alternative sources of supply of this unit (highly confident). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee is water for irrigation. The irrigation system that was studied consists of a farm-turn-out and farm ditch that delivers water from a main canal to the adjacent farmland.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the second most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 2nd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
The resource appropriated from A Chaek in Kaset Samakee is water for irrigation. The irrigation system that was studied consists of a farm-turn-out and farm ditch that delivers water from a main canal to the adjacent farmland.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by an external public official. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is scarce; RID can impose schedules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when each Chaek decides its own water schedules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the second most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 2nd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
Static Analysis
Resource System
Key shared resource: surface water for irrigation
Natural infrastructure: the watershed, topography
Resource Users
Farmers
Public Infrastructure Providers
Water User Associations (WUAs) established under the pra plerng irrigation project by the Royal Irrigation Dept of Thailand.
Royal Irrigation Department, Thailand
Public Infrastructure
Hard Infrastructure: Dam, canals, farm ditch
Soft Infrastructure: water schedule
Relationship 1
Farmers rely on water from the Pra Plerng irrigation project in non-monsoon months to irrigate their fields.
Relationship 2
Farmers vote for the rFarmers vote for the President of the Water User Association
A zoneman is appointed by the RID to spread information among farmers.
Famers pay a membership fee to belong to the WUA
Relationship 3
The WUA decides the water schedule and may stop the water to zones where the farm ditch has not been cleaned.
Relationship 4
Dams store water.
Canals carry water to farm ditches over a varied topography.
Farm ditches store water and can be diverted to individual fields.
Relationship 5
Dams store water and enable farmers to grow crops in the dry season.
Canals carry water to farm ditches from where farmers can divert water into their individual fields.
The amount of water available to each farm ditch depends on the topography as well as the water schedule.
Farmers clean the farm ditch.
Relationship 6
Farmers adhere to the water schedule.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Anderies JM, Arizona State University.