- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Freshwater
- Location
- Punjab, Pakistan
The irrigation system being studied is located in the state of Punjab in Pakistan. The resource appropriated is water for irrigation. The authors find that farmers operate their irrigation system under a contradictory system of de jure and de facto rules. Illegal trading of water among farmers occurs frequently. Farmers use extra-legal means to obtain increased water supplies through bribes to Canal Department officials. Farmers organize predominately around brotherhood or kinship groups for many cooperative activities such as watercourse cleaning and private tubewells while a major cleavage exists across two castes on the watercourse.
This case was part of the original CPR database developed in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University. The original CPR report can be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Watercourse in Punjab is water for irrigation. A watercourse in the upper Bari Doab irrigation system A watercourse that officially receives water from a mogha (outlet) of a distributary.
SCREENER:
Case: Watercourse in Punjab, Pakistan
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a monograph. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Watercourse in Punjab, situated in A watercourse in the upper Bari Doab Irrigation System of Pakistan. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Watercourse in Punjab. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Watercourse in Punjab have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 25-50 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an extreme shortage of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
This report is a detailed study of the physical and socio-economic conditions of a watercourse in Pakistan. Major problems identified are the accumulations of sediment in the watercourse; excessive watercourse losses; and under-irrigation with canal water. Farmers operate their irrigation system under a contradictory system of de jure and de facto rules. Illegal trading of water among farmers occurs frequently. Farmers use extra-legal means to obtain increased water supplies through bribes to Canal Department officials. Farmers organize predominately around brotherhood or kinship groups for many cooperative activities such as watercourse cleaning and private tubewells, while a major cleavage exists across two castes on the watercourse.
CITATION(S):
Lowdermilk, Max K., Wayne Clyma, and Alan C. Zarly (1975) PHYSICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF A WATERCOURSE IN PAKISTAN'S PUNJAB: SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS AND FARMERS' RESPONSES. Water Management Technical Report No. 42. Fort Collins: Colorado State University Press.
The resource appropriated from Watercourse in Punjab is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. A watercourse in the upper Bari Doab irrigation system A watercourse that officially receives water from a mogha (outlet) of a distributary.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are , and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Water for irrigation can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation over space in the availability of Water for irrigation within the resource (highly confident). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of Water for irrigation within a single year (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of Water for irrigation from year to year.
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is gently undulating (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the location (confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in a watercourse in the upper Bari Doab Irrigation System. The boundaries of the location are the boundaries of a watercourse. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of channels that receive water from the Lahore branch canal (coding), and several tubewells. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (highly confident). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).
The latitude of this location is 30.25'N, and its longitude is 73.00'E. The elevation of this location is 169 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 269 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is 269 milimeters. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 10, evapotraspiration: 9
February precipitation: 18, evapotraspiration: 16
March precipitation: 13, evapotraspiration: 16
April precipitation: 8, evapotraspiration: 8
May precipitation: 10, evapotraspiration: 10
June precipitation: 25, evapotraspiration: 25
July precipitation: 69, evapotraspiration: 69
August precipitation: 71, evapotraspiration: 71
September precipitation: 33, evapotraspiration: 33
October precipitation: 2, evapotraspiration: 2
November precipitation: 2, evapotraspiration: 2
December precipitation: 8, evapotraspiration: 8
The resource appropriated from Watercourse in Punjab is water for irrigation. A watercourse in the upper Bari Doab irrigation system A watercourse that officially receives water from a mogha (outlet) of a distributary.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a regional government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1972. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 76 to 100 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because The irrigation system has existed for about 100 years.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 963160 (highly confident)
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
The information about how units are disposed at the end of the period is missing in case.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was experiencing some deterioration due to insufficient maintenance (highly confident). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (educated guess). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production resource are available to appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. The study did not indicate whether or not there are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource. Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have a moderate familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators (educated guess). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification are small and created only mild communication problems (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification are small and created only mild communication problems (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not affect communication (educated guess).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively neutral, quid-pro-quo manner -- each exchange was evaluated for what it might bring (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related primarily to other local resources (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). It is very likely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (inferred).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (educated guess). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 25-50 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and monitors are employees of an external governmental authority (confident).
The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. Almost all of the monitors were full-time (ambiguous).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 69.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (highly confident). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The author focuses on poor water supply; water losses from the watercourse and during irrigation; and costs of operating waterlifting devices.Possibly causing these results, is a contradictory system of dejure and defacto rules; as well as farmers' lack of knowledge. The author evaluates the efficiency as low, based on water losses from watercourse and during irrigation, costs of operating water lifting devices, and the use of an optimal amount of water for different types of crops. To increase efficiency the author suggests that electric pumps are more cost effective. The author also suggests informing farmers about proper irrigation.. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on The estimated operational costs of the existing waterlifters is about ten times that of alternative electric pumps. See page 69.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 41 (highly confident). An estimated 10%-25% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Clan identification causes small differences in composition and mild communication problems (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Caste identification causes small differences in composition and mild communication problems (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are of the cast Arian. Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Sunni religious sect. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (educated guess). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (educated guess). Members of this subgroup have de facto rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de facto by this subgroup (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is exercised de jure## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 76 through 100 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 10%-25% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a high cost (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice, and also grains other than paddy rice, and fodder. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Resources have not been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is either dependent or contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (inferred). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred). Towards officials, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules.
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (inferred). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Watercourse in Punjab is water for irrigation. A watercourse in the upper Bari Doab irrigation system A watercourse that officially receives water from a mogha (outlet) of a distributary.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, there is a local level of government or organization of appropriators, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The regional and local level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s).
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The regional and local level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal up to a fixed percentage of the total units available during a period, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The regional and local level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the national level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by hired labor. Most of the time, the entire labor force works as a team.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Light fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a regional (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
Bari Doab
Resource System
Irrigation water coming from the Lahore branch canal and the Upper Bari Doab
Variable interannual and intra-annual flow associated with precipitation seasons.
The watercourse serves 319 acres: 238 acres under cultivation and 73 acres eroded.
Resource Users
41 Farmers
Public Infrastructure Providers
Canal Department Officials
Patwari: local overseer of around 3000-5000 acres or 400 farms
Zillander: supervisor of 10-14 patwaris
Public Infrastructure
Soft - De Jure & De Facto Rules that govern appropriation of water & ditch maintenance
Pucca warabundi: official turn-based system of water allocation according to proportional land requirements. No trading is allowed.
Many farmers break this set of rules and opt for flexible trading schemes.
The Canal Department controls the amount of water allocated to each watercourse through the mogha (outlet).
Farmers organize deals with the patwari to alter the mogha size in exchange for direct payments.
All farmers must contribute to cleaning of the main ditch, organized by position along the watercourse subject to fines or service cutoff.
The Patwari and Zillander rarely monitor the status of the system.
Hard
1 Mogha (outlet)
11.63 miles of main ditch and nakkas (branches)
Relationship 1
(RS => RU)
Farmers extract water from the watercourse through gravity systems or their cooperatively managed jalars.
(RU => RS)
Amount of water used alters the system flow and can even submerge the mogha.
Reduced flow deposits more sediment in the main ditch and nakkas
Relationship 2
(RU => PIP)
Farmers pay official taxes to the Canal Department in proportion to water use with the exception of legal remissions.
(PIP => RU)
No significant interaction from PIP to RU
Relationship 3
(PIP => PI)
Canal Department sets appropriation regime & other system rules
Canal Department can mobilize investment in built water system improvements
(PI => PIP)
Canal Department should stay updated on irrigation system status
Relationship 4
(PI => RS)
Built branches alter flow
Status of built delivery system and elevation control affects water losses
(RS => PI)
Local officials should monitor system status but often fail to do so
Relationship 5
(PI => 1)
Use of jalars slows water appropriation at the user-level and alters system flow by potentially submerging the canal
Pucca Warabundi controls the timing of water appropriation by day and time of day
Relationship 6
(PI => RU)
Canal Department notifies farmers of system updates (i.e. policy changes, service disruptions, or forecasts) through the local officials like the patwaris
(RU => PI)
Farmers mobilize side payments to the patwari for negotiated “extralegal” water.
Farmers mobilize labor for cleaning the main ditch of sediment.
Farmers directly manipulate the watercourse through digging nakkas and altering the mogha
Farmers illegally alter the appropriation regime through inter-farmer trading
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Basin hydrological change
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Flooding events submerge moghas
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
(none specified)
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Political Reforms
Technical & Administrative Improvements
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
Land is privately owned in designated plots. Average plot size is 5.67 acres & medium plot size is 17 acres. 28 of the 41 farmers jointly own land.
Jalars (persian water wheel pumps) are managed cooperatively by sub-groups of users, primarily according to kinship affiliation.
Scattered private tubewells and one cooperatively-run tubewell.
Radios are the primary, privately-owned communication infrastructure.
Many farmers are illiterate and lack the technical expertise to address water losses and control irrigation amounts.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)
Brady U, Arizona State University.
Wiechman A, Arizona State University.
Thapa P, Arizona State University.
Physical and Socio-Economic Dynamics of a Watercourse in Pakistan's Punjab: System Constraints and Farmers' Responses. Water Management Technical Report.
. 1975.