- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Freshwater
In the case of the Silag-Butir Irrigation System, ricefields are located in the adjoining Barrios of Silag, Butir, Pacang and Cabaruan (between 1.5 km and 4 km off Santa Maria municipality) in the Ilocos Sur Province in the Philippines. The resource appropriated is water for irrigation. The system serves an area of 115 hectares cultivated by 201-500 total appropriator teams during wet season and 38 hectares during dry season. At the beginning of the period, there was a moderate shortage of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were conflictual effects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes. However, internal conflicts and non-compliance by resource users and infrastructure providers are routinely settled outside of court by the social infrastructure. While the success of the system is not entirely clear, the source document does not cite any significant challenges to the long-term stability and robustness of the system. Therefore, it is implied that the system is for the most part successful.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found in the CPR tab under institutional analysis.
The resource appropriated from Silag-Butir Irrigation System is water for irrigation. The system of irrigation discussed here, includes canals that divert water from the Silag Creek.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Silag-Butir Irrigation System is water for irrigation. The system of irrigation discussed here, includes canals that divert water from the Silag Creek.
SCREENER:
Case: Silag-Butir Irrigation System, Philippines
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a chapter in a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Silag-Butir Irrigation System, situated in of Philippines. More generally, it is located in Orient. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Silag-Butir Irrigation System. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is not available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Silag-Butir Irrigation System have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 201-500 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderate shortage of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
The rice fields served by the system are located in 4 adjoining barrios. A government agency organized the farmers into a formal association in the late 1950s. There were reports of the interference of the local politicians with association affairs.
CITATION(S):
de los Reyes, Romana P., et al. (1980) "Silag-Butir Irrigation System." In 47 COMMUNAL GRAVITY SYSTEMS: ORGANIZATION PROFILES, 33-41. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University. [ILL: Kennedy School of Government; SB 112.04]*
The resource appropriated from Silag-Butir Irrigation System is water for irrigation. The system of irrigation discussed here, includes canals that divert water from the Silag Creek.
SCREENER:
Case: Silag-Butir Irrigation System, Philippines
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a chapter in a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Silag-Butir Irrigation System, situated in of Philippines. More generally, it is located in Orient. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Silag-Butir Irrigation System. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is not available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Silag-Butir Irrigation System have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 201-500 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderate shortage of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
The rice fields served by the system are located in 4 adjoining barrios. A government agency organized the farmers into a formal association in the late 1950s. There were reports of the interference of the local politicians with association affairs.
CITATION(S):
de los Reyes, Romana P., et al. (1980) "Silag-Butir Irrigation System." In 47 COMMUNAL GRAVITY SYSTEMS: ORGANIZATION PROFILES, 33-41. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University. [ILL: Kennedy School of Government; SB 112.04]*
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from Silag-Butir Irrigation System is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The system of irrigation discussed here, includes canals that divert water from the Silag Creek.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, but are divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year (inferred).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is gently undulating (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the municipality of Sta. Maria. The boundaries of the location are the boundaries of a municipality. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of the Silag-Butir irrigation system (canals that divert water from the Silag Creek). Four privately-owned irrigation systems are also present, but are not coded. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were conflictual effects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).
The latitude of this location is 17.22'N, and its longitude is 120.28'E. The elevation of this location is 21 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 2705 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is 1302 milimeters. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 4, evapotraspiration: 51
February precipitation: 7, evapotraspiration: 39
March precipitation: 8, evapotraspiration: 37
April precipitation: 19, evapotraspiration: 39
May precipitation: 203, evapotraspiration: 171
June precipitation: 377, evapotraspiration: 163
July precipitation: 719, evapotraspiration: 160
August precipitation: 732, evapotraspiration: 153
September precipitation: 426, evapotraspiration: 143
October precipitation: 154, evapotraspiration: 150
November precipitation: 41, evapotraspiration: 118
December precipitation: 15, evapotraspiration: 78
The resource appropriated from Silag-Butir Irrigation System is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The system of irrigation discussed here, includes canals that divert water from the Silag Creek.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, but are divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year (inferred).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is gently undulating (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the municipality of Sta. Maria. The boundaries of the location are the boundaries of a municipality. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of the Silag-Butir irrigation system (canals that divert water from the Silag Creek). Four privately-owned irrigation systems are also present, but are not coded. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were conflictual effects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).
The latitude of this location is 17.22'N, and its longitude is 120.28'E. The elevation of this location is 21 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 2705 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is 1302 milimeters. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 4, evapotraspiration: 51
February precipitation: 7, evapotraspiration: 39
March precipitation: 8, evapotraspiration: 37
April precipitation: 19, evapotraspiration: 39
May precipitation: 203, evapotraspiration: 171
June precipitation: 377, evapotraspiration: 163
July precipitation: 719, evapotraspiration: 160
August precipitation: 732, evapotraspiration: 153
September precipitation: 426, evapotraspiration: 143
October precipitation: 154, evapotraspiration: 150
November precipitation: 41, evapotraspiration: 118
December precipitation: 15, evapotraspiration: 78
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Silag-Butir Irrigation System is water for irrigation. The system of irrigation discussed here, includes canals that divert water from the Silag Creek.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, distribution, and production. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1978. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 11 to 25 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by local collective choice processes involving others besides the appropriators, in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 1140000
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was extensive (inferred). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (ambiguous). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (educated guess). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are non-appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). There is a moderate range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess). It is likely as not that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators are selected by one another for this position (inferred).
The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 6-10 (inferred). Official monitors are paid paid in reduced obligations (e.g. reduced labor input, membership fees, etc.). None of the monitors were full-time (educated guess).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 3 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 21.1 - 22.1 - 23.1 - 0
Subgroups 21.1 and 22.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 21.1 and 22.1 do not differ in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 21.1 and 23.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 21.1 and 23.1 do not differ in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 22.1 and 23.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 22.1 and 23.1 do not differ in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (ambiguous). The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the regular members of the Silag-Butir Irrigation System Association. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 300.
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Catholic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have neither de facto nor de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 26 through 50 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 91%-100% (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (ambiguous). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a moderate cost (inferred).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units where the flow of units first enters into the resource (i.e. headenders) (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice, and also coffee, teas, cocoa, tabacco, spices, or d. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in the constitutional-choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (educated guess).
Subgroup Results:
By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the appropriators who are not members of the Silag-Butir Irrigation System Association. The criteria for who is a member is not well defined. . .
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (ambiguous). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (ambiguous).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have neither de facto nor de jure rights of access (educated guess). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 91%-100% (educated guess). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a moderate cost (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units where the flow of units first enters into the resource (i.e. headenders) (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (ambiguous), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (ambiguous). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (ambiguous). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (ambiguous). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (ambiguous).
Subgroup Results:
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the special members of the Silag-Butir Irrigation System Association. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 35.
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have neither de facto nor de jure rights of access (educated guess). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 26 through 50 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 91%-100% (educated guess). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a moderate cost (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after one or more other subgroups have withdrawn (educated guess). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (ambiguous), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice, and also coffee, teas, cocoa, tabacco, spices, or d, and a non-listed product. During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (ambiguous). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (ambiguous). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (ambiguous). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (ambiguous).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates less than 10% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (inferred). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Silag-Butir Irrigation System is water for irrigation. The system of irrigation discussed here, includes canals that divert water from the Silag Creek.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, distribution, and production. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1978. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 11 to 25 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by local collective choice processes involving others besides the appropriators, in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 1140000
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was extensive (inferred). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (ambiguous). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (educated guess). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are non-appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). There is a moderate range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess). It is likely as not that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators are selected by one another for this position (inferred).
The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 6-10 (inferred). Official monitors are paid paid in reduced obligations (e.g. reduced labor input, membership fees, etc.). None of the monitors were full-time (educated guess).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 3 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 21.1 - 22.1 - 23.1 - 0
Subgroups 21.1 and 22.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 21.1 and 22.1 do not differ in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 21.1 and 23.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 21.1 and 23.1 do not differ in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 22.1 and 23.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
Subgroups 22.1 and 23.1 do not differ in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (ambiguous). The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the regular members of the Silag-Butir Irrigation System Association. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 300.
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Catholic. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have neither de facto nor de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 26 through 50 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 91%-100% (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (ambiguous). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a moderate cost (inferred).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units where the flow of units first enters into the resource (i.e. headenders) (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (ambiguous). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice, and also coffee, teas, cocoa, tabacco, spices, or d. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in the constitutional-choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (educated guess).
Subgroup Results:
By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the appropriators who are not members of the Silag-Butir Irrigation System Association. The criteria for who is a member is not well defined. . .
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (ambiguous). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (ambiguous).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have neither de facto nor de jure rights of access (educated guess). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 91%-100% (educated guess). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a moderate cost (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units where the flow of units first enters into the resource (i.e. headenders) (inferred). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (ambiguous), quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (ambiguous). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (ambiguous). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (ambiguous). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (ambiguous).
Subgroup Results:
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the special members of the Silag-Butir Irrigation System Association. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 35.
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have neither de facto nor de jure rights of access (educated guess). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 26 through 50 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 91%-100% (educated guess). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a moderate cost (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after one or more other subgroups have withdrawn (educated guess). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (ambiguous), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice, and also coffee, teas, cocoa, tabacco, spices, or d, and a non-listed product. During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (ambiguous). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (ambiguous). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (ambiguous). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (ambiguous).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates less than 10% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (inferred). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Silag-Butir Irrigation System is water for irrigation. The system of irrigation discussed here, includes canals that divert water from the Silag Creek.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when the water supply of the system decreases; the water is distributed by rotation (BARSAK).
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when the water supply of the system decreases; the water is distributed by rotation (BARSAK).
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is abundant.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by hired labor. Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others, and this subgroup receives the most rewards.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The sum of the fees and licenses is relatively low given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is relatively low given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
The license or entry fees are not the same across all categories of applicants, so that some other form of pricing is used.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 3rd most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal only during specific seasons, determined by a formula related to the conditions of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the third most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 2nd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 2nd most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal only during specific seasons, determined by a formula related to the conditions of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the second most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 3rd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
The resource appropriated from Silag-Butir Irrigation System is water for irrigation. The system of irrigation discussed here, includes canals that divert water from the Silag Creek.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when the water supply of the system decreases; the water is distributed by rotation (BARSAK).
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when the water supply of the system decreases; the water is distributed by rotation (BARSAK).
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect when water is abundant.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by hired labor. Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others, and this subgroup receives the most rewards.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The sum of the fees and licenses is relatively low given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is relatively low given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
The license or entry fees are not the same across all categories of applicants, so that some other form of pricing is used.
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 3rd most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal only during specific seasons, determined by a formula related to the conditions of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the third most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 2nd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The boundary rules assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others, and this subgroup is in the 2nd most privileged position.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal only during specific seasons, determined by a formula related to the conditions of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the second most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 3rd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
Silag-Butir Irrigation System
Resource System
Water for irrigation
Resource Users
Farmers irrigating fields
Public Infrastructure Providers
-Butir Irrigation Association consists of elected representatives from the pool of resource users (farmers) or other locals. Leadership in the Silag-Butir Irrigation Association rests in the Board of Directors. Leaders normally remain indefinitely unless deposed due to significantly consequential circumstances. There is a “gatekeeper” whose task is to manage streamflow.
Public Infrastructure
Silag-Butir gravity-based irrigation system consists of mostly earthen canals and a dam on Silag Creek where the canals are drawn from.
Relationship 1
Farmers draw water from the locally managed irrigation canals to sustain ricefields.
Relationship 2
Public infrastructure providers are elected among the farmers (resource users). Leaders are formed into a board of directors with a president, vice-president, treasurer, and secretary that make decisions on rotational water use and manage communal maintenance events where.
Relationship 3
While the board members supervise maintenance activity and make decisions on water use and religious rituals, all farmers are expected to contribute to cleaning and repair activities that support the public infrastructure.
Relationship 4
Unclear/unspecified.
Relationship 5
Regulates access to water drawn from Silag Creek.
Relationship 6
Resource users (farmers) elect leaders for the Silag-Butir Irrigation Association. Candidates for elected positions are also local farmers. The Irrigation Association collects fees from the farmers that use the system, and institute fines for lack of payment or misuse.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Wet and dry seasons affect the abundance of water in the irrigation system.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
There are secondary water sources from local springs that require the hiring of pumps, which is outside of the domain canal system and its PIP.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Some members are considered “special members” who are not obliged to contribute fees or system maintenance. Qualifications for special members are not clear.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Conflicts between Silag-Butir Irrigation Association officials and local politicians have occurred in the past, which has resulted in the demanded resignation the Association’s president who was ultimately re-elected.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified). 1980. Silag-Butir Irrigation System. 47 Communal Gravity Systems: Organization Profiles. :33-41.