- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Freshwater
The The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water for irrigation as well as for domestic use in the village of Baugha Gumha Panchayat in Palpa District in the Lumbini Zone of southern Nepal, 10 km . Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water (for irrigation and domestic uses). The irrigation system discussed here includes a network of canals inside Chherlung. The network (resource) receives water from the Brangdhi Khola (a river) via a 6.5km canal.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water (for irrigation and domestic uses). The irrigation system discussed here includes a network of canals inside Chherlung. The network (resource) receives water from the Brangdhi Khola (a river) via a 6.5km canal.
SCREENER:
Case: Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation, Nepal
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from . Currently, there additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe in detail. The primary resource is the Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation, situated in Palpa of Nepal. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of nA (article deleted from the bibliography and not relevant to the project).
The Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation covers no area.
CITATION(S):
Martin, Edward, and Robert Yoder (1983) "The Chherlung Thulo Kulo: A Case Study of a Farmer-Managed Irrigation System." In WATER MANAGEMENT IN NEPAL: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON WATER MANAGEMENT ISSUES, Appendix I, 203-217. Kathmandu, Nepal: Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Projects Services Centre and the Agricultural Development Council Inc., July 31-August 2.
Martin, Edward, and Robert Yoder (1983) "Water Allocation and Resource Mobilization for Irrigation: A Comparison of Two Systems in Nepal." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Nepal Studies Association, Twelfth Annual Conference on South Asia, University of Wisconsin, Madison, November 4-6.*
Martin, Edward, and Robert Yoder (1986) "Institutions for Irrigation Management in Farmer-Managed Systems: Examples from the Hills of Nepal." Digana Village, Sri Lanka: International Irrigation Management Institute Research Paper No. 5, December.*
Pradhan, Prachandra (1988) "Pattern of Irrigation Organizations in Nepal: Comparative Study of 21 Farmer-Managed Systems." Manuscript. Kathmandu, Nepal: International Irrigation Management Institute.*
Sharma, L. N., Tempa Gyeltshen, Lhapchu, Sonam Chhogyel, Rinchen Dorji, Chhophel Dorji, Uygen Duckpa, Jiban Bajracharya, and Tashi Dorji (1989) "Report on Thulo Kulo (Upper) Irrigation System (FMIS)." In REPORT ON TRAINING CUM OBSERVATION ON RAPID APPRAISAL METHODS AND WATER USERS: ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES, edited by the IIMI, Annex 10. Digana Village via Kandy, Sri Lanka: IIMI.*
The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water (for irrigation and domestic uses). The irrigation system discussed here includes a network of canals inside Chherlung. The network (resource) receives water from the Brangdhi Khola (a river) via a 6.5km canal.
SCREENER:
Case: Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation, Nepal
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from . Currently, there additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe in detail. The primary resource is the Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation, situated in Palpa of Nepal. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of nA (article deleted from the bibliography and not relevant to the project).
The Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation covers no area.
CITATION(S):
Martin, Edward, and Robert Yoder (1983) "The Chherlung Thulo Kulo: A Case Study of a Farmer-Managed Irrigation System." In WATER MANAGEMENT IN NEPAL: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON WATER MANAGEMENT ISSUES, Appendix I, 203-217. Kathmandu, Nepal: Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Projects Services Centre and the Agricultural Development Council Inc., July 31-August 2.
Martin, Edward, and Robert Yoder (1983) "Water Allocation and Resource Mobilization for Irrigation: A Comparison of Two Systems in Nepal." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Nepal Studies Association, Twelfth Annual Conference on South Asia, University of Wisconsin, Madison, November 4-6.*
Martin, Edward, and Robert Yoder (1986) "Institutions for Irrigation Management in Farmer-Managed Systems: Examples from the Hills of Nepal." Digana Village, Sri Lanka: International Irrigation Management Institute Research Paper No. 5, December.*
Pradhan, Prachandra (1988) "Pattern of Irrigation Organizations in Nepal: Comparative Study of 21 Farmer-Managed Systems." Manuscript. Kathmandu, Nepal: International Irrigation Management Institute.*
Sharma, L. N., Tempa Gyeltshen, Lhapchu, Sonam Chhogyel, Rinchen Dorji, Chhophel Dorji, Uygen Duckpa, Jiban Bajracharya, and Tashi Dorji (1989) "Report on Thulo Kulo (Upper) Irrigation System (FMIS)." In REPORT ON TRAINING CUM OBSERVATION ON RAPID APPRAISAL METHODS AND WATER USERS: ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES, edited by the IIMI, Annex 10. Digana Village via Kandy, Sri Lanka: IIMI.*
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water (for irrigation and domestic uses). It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The irrigation system discussed here includes a network of canals inside Chherlung. The network (resource) receives water from the Brangdhi Khola (a river) via a 6.5km canal.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Water (for irrigation and domestic uses) can be controlled (highly confident). There is not considerable variation over space in the availability of Water (for irrigation and domestic uses) within the resource (educated guess). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of Water (for irrigation and domestic uses) within a single year (highly confident). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of Water (for irrigation and domestic uses) from year to year.
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is moderately sloping (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (highly confident). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (highly confident). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (highly confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the village of Chherlung. The boundaries of the location are the boundaries of a village.. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of irrigation systems: Thulo (coding), Sano, and a spring. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).
The latitude of this location is 27.51'N, and its longitude is 83.33'E. The elevation of this location is 650 meters (highly confident). The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 1477 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is 987 milimeters. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 22, evapotraspiration: 50
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 72
March precipitation: 30, evapotraspiration: 75
April precipitation: 25, evapotraspiration: 120
May precipitation: 150, evapotraspiration: 85
June precipitation: 75, evapotraspiration: 175
July precipitation: 350, evapotraspiration: 85
August precipitation: 270, evapotraspiration: 80
September precipitation: 270, evapotraspiration: 70
October precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 65
November precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 45
December precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 65
The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water (for irrigation and domestic uses). It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The irrigation system discussed here includes a network of canals inside Chherlung. The network (resource) receives water from the Brangdhi Khola (a river) via a 6.5km canal.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Water (for irrigation and domestic uses) can be controlled (highly confident). There is not considerable variation over space in the availability of Water (for irrigation and domestic uses) within the resource (educated guess). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of Water (for irrigation and domestic uses) within a single year (highly confident). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of Water (for irrigation and domestic uses) from year to year.
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is moderately sloping (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (highly confident). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (highly confident). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (highly confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the village of Chherlung. The boundaries of the location are the boundaries of a village.. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of irrigation systems: Thulo (coding), Sano, and a spring. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).
The latitude of this location is 27.51'N, and its longitude is 83.33'E. The elevation of this location is 650 meters (highly confident). The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 1477 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is 987 milimeters. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 22, evapotraspiration: 50
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 72
March precipitation: 30, evapotraspiration: 75
April precipitation: 25, evapotraspiration: 120
May precipitation: 150, evapotraspiration: 85
June precipitation: 75, evapotraspiration: 175
July precipitation: 350, evapotraspiration: 85
August precipitation: 270, evapotraspiration: 80
September precipitation: 270, evapotraspiration: 70
October precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 65
November precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 45
December precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 65
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water (for irrigation and domestic uses). The irrigation system discussed here includes a network of canals inside Chherlung. The network (resource) receives water from the Brangdhi Khola (a river) via a 6.5km canal.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1982. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 51 to 75 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was a planned change in resource size only. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was a recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because B5.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (highly confident). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (highly confident).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Tons of fish harvested per year at the end of the period: 400000 (highly confident)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 80000 (ambiguous)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 390000 (confident)
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (highly confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (educated guess). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (highly confident). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (highly confident). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are always records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (highly confident). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (educated guess). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (highly confident).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are non-appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (highly confident). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (inferred). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (highly confident). There is a considerable range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (inferred).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of Less than 25 appropriators (inferred). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators are selected by one another for this position (inferred).
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 6-10 (inferred). Official monitors are paid paid in reduced obligations (e.g. reduced labor input, membership fees, etc.). None of the monitors were full-time (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 15.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (inferred). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as decreasing over time (inferred).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
The author concluded that the system has done well in efficiency of water uses, incentives to develop a bigger water flow and more irrigable lands, and equity (whether the poor have chances to get water). The analysis was based on the transferability of water rights independent of landholdings. The author evaluated this system to be of high efficiency. (An efficient use of water would be using the least amount of water to cultivate as great amount of crops as possible.).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are shares holders of the irrigation organization. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a membership of 105.
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Brahmin. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (highly confident). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), quantity limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice, and also grains other than paddy rice, legumes, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is either dependent or contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (highly confident). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (highly confident). Action in both the collective choice arena and constitutional-choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (confident). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules.
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become larger (highly confident).
The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water (for irrigation and domestic uses). The irrigation system discussed here includes a network of canals inside Chherlung. The network (resource) receives water from the Brangdhi Khola (a river) via a 6.5km canal.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1982. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 51 to 75 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was a planned change in resource size only. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was a recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because B5.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (highly confident). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (highly confident).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Tons of fish harvested per year at the end of the period: 400000 (highly confident)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 80000 (ambiguous)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 390000 (confident)
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (highly confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (educated guess). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (highly confident). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (highly confident). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are always records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (highly confident). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (educated guess). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (highly confident).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are non-appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (highly confident). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (inferred). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (highly confident). There is a considerable range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (inferred).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of Less than 25 appropriators (inferred). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators are selected by one another for this position (inferred).
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 6-10 (inferred). Official monitors are paid paid in reduced obligations (e.g. reduced labor input, membership fees, etc.). None of the monitors were full-time (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 15.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (inferred). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as decreasing over time (inferred).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
The author concluded that the system has done well in efficiency of water uses, incentives to develop a bigger water flow and more irrigable lands, and equity (whether the poor have chances to get water). The analysis was based on the transferability of water rights independent of landholdings. The author evaluated this system to be of high efficiency. (An efficient use of water would be using the least amount of water to cultivate as great amount of crops as possible.).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are shares holders of the irrigation organization. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a membership of 105.
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Brahmin. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (highly confident). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), quantity limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice, and also grains other than paddy rice, legumes, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is either dependent or contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (highly confident). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (highly confident). Action in both the collective choice arena and constitutional-choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (confident). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules.
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become larger (highly confident).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water (for irrigation and domestic uses). The irrigation system discussed here includes a network of canals inside Chherlung. The network (resource) receives water from the Brangdhi Khola (a river) via a 6.5km canal.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership of shares in the resource facility itself. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal up to a fixed percentage of the total units available during a period, based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during maize planting time in mid-April (pre-monsoon seasons).
There is a rule requiring withdrawal up to a fixed percentage of the total units available during a period, based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during rice cultivation in times of water scarcity (monsoon seasons).
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during maize planting time in mid-April (pre-monsoon seasons).
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during rice cultivation in times of water scarcity (monsoon seasons).
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during maize planting time in mid-April (pre-monsoon seasons).
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during rice cultivation in times of water scarcity (monsoon seasons).
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by some payment (e.g. money, materials). Most of the time, the entire labor force works as a team.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the condition of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
There exists a rule requiring recording appropriators' claims to the flow of units from the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
There exists a rule requiring recording of the rights and duties of the appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain aid from a regional (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 26 to 50 years.
The resource appropriated from Chherlung Thulo Kulo Irrigation is water (for irrigation and domestic uses). The irrigation system discussed here includes a network of canals inside Chherlung. The network (resource) receives water from the Brangdhi Khola (a river) via a 6.5km canal.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership of shares in the resource facility itself. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal up to a fixed percentage of the total units available during a period, based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during maize planting time in mid-April (pre-monsoon seasons).
There is a rule requiring withdrawal up to a fixed percentage of the total units available during a period, based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during rice cultivation in times of water scarcity (monsoon seasons).
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during maize planting time in mid-April (pre-monsoon seasons).
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during rice cultivation in times of water scarcity (monsoon seasons).
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during maize planting time in mid-April (pre-monsoon seasons).
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during rice cultivation in times of water scarcity (monsoon seasons).
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, based on ownership of shares of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by some payment (e.g. money, materials). Most of the time, the entire labor force works as a team.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the condition of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
There exists a rule requiring recording appropriators' claims to the flow of units from the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
There exists a rule requiring recording of the rights and duties of the appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain aid from a regional (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 26 to 50 years.
. 1983. The Chherlung Thulo Kulo: A Case Study of a Farmer-Managed Irrigation System. Water Management in Nepal: Proceedings of the Seminar on Water Management Issues.
. 1983. Water Allocation and Resource Mobilization for Irrigation: A Comparison of Two Systems in Nepal. Twelfth Annual Conference on South Asia.
. 1988. Pattern of Irrigation Organizations in Nepal: Comparative Study of 21 Farmer-Managed Systems.
. 1986. Institutions for Irrigation Management in Farmer-Managed Systems: Examples from the Hills of Nepal. Research Paper.
. 1989. Report on Thulo Kulo (Upper) Irrigation System. Report on Training Cum Observation on Rapid Appraisal Methods and Water User Association Activites. :Annex10.