- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Freshwater
The El Mujarilin Irrigation System is located in Daghara nahiya, Diwaniya Province, Iraq. The resource appropriated related to the social dilemma is water for irrigation diverted through canals but mainly from one off-take of the Hurriyya canal, which has been named El Khurays. The original case was reported in 1970 but field was done between 1956 and 1958, and catalogues an action situation involving 85 resource users. At the beginning of the study, there was a moderate shortage of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from El Mujarilin Irrigation is water for irrigation. The resource described in this study consists of canals that divert water from the Hurriyya canal to farmlands cultivated by the El Mujarilin.
SCREENER:
Case: El Mujarilin Irrigation, Iraq
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a book. Currently, there are additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the El Mujarilin Irrigation, situated in Daghara of Iraq. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from El Mujarilin Irrigation. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of El Mujarilin Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 25-50 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was a moderate shortage of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Using irrigation management as a case study, Fernea examines the shift of local interests and loyalties from the tribe to the national government as control of water distribution becomes one of the government's most important local functions. There had been some congruence between traditional tribal methods of land tenure and cultivation on one hand, and the nature of the land, water, and climate on another. Water is available now [1960s] more year-round than it had been earlier [under British and Ottoman rule] but the resultant intensified land use has led to salination and flight to the cities. Fernea contrasts those aspects of irrigation management still at the tribal level with those now assumed by the government.
CITATION(S):
Fernea, Robert A. (1970) SHAYKH AND EFFENDI: CHANGING PATTERNS OF AUTHORITY AMONG THE EL SHABANA OF SOUTHERN IRAQ. Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, 14. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [HN 764 .I7 F6]
The resource appropriated from El Mujarilin Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The resource described in this study consists of canals that divert water from the Hurriyya canal to farmlands cultivated by the El Mujarilin.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (inferred). There is not considerable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (educated guess). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (inferred). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year (inferred).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is moderately sloping (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the location (educated guess). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are not operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (educated guess). A regular agency(s) of the national government (e.g. Ministry of Resources) operates the headworks for this system (inferred). The irrigators being served by this production organization do not participate in the selection of the officials of the production agency except as citizens in a general election (inferred). The distribution system is not operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (educated guess). A regular agency(s) of the National Government (e.g. Ministry of Resources) operate(s) the distribution system (inferred). The irrigators being served by this production organization do not participate in the selection of the officials of the distribution agency, except as citizens in a general election (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the Daghara nahiya. The boundaries of the location are determined by the smallest unit in the hierarchy of territorial divisions established and controlled by the central government of Iraq. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of networks of irrigation canals. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were conflictual effects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (highly confident). This location is also characterized by an economy that is changing and tied to other economic networks during most of the time period (confident).
The latitude of this location is Ad Diwaniyah: 32.00'N, and its longitude is Ad Diwaniyah: 44.57'E. The elevation of this location is 20 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 119 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is 119 milimeters. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 22, evapotraspiration: 7
February precipitation: 19, evapotraspiration: 14
March precipitation: 13, evapotraspiration: 15
April precipitation: 13, evapotraspiration: 20
May precipitation: 14, evapotraspiration: 23
June precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 7
July precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 3
August precipitation: 1, evapotraspiration: 3
September precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 1, evapotraspiration: 2
November precipitation: 14, evapotraspiration: 14
December precipitation: 22, evapotraspiration: 11
COUNTRY, REGION, TIME:
This study examines a common-pool resource institution in Iraq, starting in 1925, ending in 1967.
During the period of time that this region was studied, the citizens of Iraq were not able to follow formal procedures to create their own local general purpose governments (educated guess). If a basic charter of a traditionally evolved local general purpose government was in existence, it could be maintained (highly confident). This study did not indicate whether or not the citizens living in Iraq were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local special purpose enterprises with some public powers. Regarding the charter of a local special purpose enterprise, the level of choice given to the citizens was not included in the case information.
It was not included in the case whether or not citizens in this or similar regions had created or evolved public enterprises with public treasuries and collective decisions outside the formal governmental structure. The stance of the national government was not included in the case information toward efforts of the citizens to organize locally and create general or special enterprises to cope with local problems.
The individuals that made collective choice decisions in Iraq were officials appointed by a higher level government whose actions were reviewed, approved, or rejected by their superiors in some decision areas and who could act on their own in other areas (confident). The source of funds used by general purpose local governments was not included in the case study. The judiciary system in this region during the time of the study was a mixed system - some conflicts were resolved by traditional system and some conflicts were processed by a non-traditional system (highly confident). The judges gained their positions through ways that were not included in the case information. The tenure of the judges was not included in the case information. In general, the judges in Iraq has a reputation that was not included in the case information. The single dominant legal tradition in use in this region was Islamic Law (confident).
The resource appropriated from El Mujarilin Irrigation is water for irrigation. The resource described in this study consists of canals that divert water from the Hurriyya canal to farmlands cultivated by the El Mujarilin.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1967. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 26 to 50 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was a planned change in resource size and structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 3075600
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 3075600
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was moderate (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was moderate (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are available to appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not affect communication (educated guess).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (educated guess). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). There is a considerable range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (inferred).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied there was no information coded to indicate whether or not the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) existed. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 25-50 appropriators (educated guess). There was a general estimate of 25-50 appropriators at the end of the period (inferred). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) is not described in detail in this case study.
The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. The study did not indicate how many of the monitors were full-time.
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 62.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
There have been maintenance mechanisms developed to mobilize cultivators to clean the canals, and to complete salinization of the soil. There are also mechanisms for conflict resolution. The quality of soil is getting worse. There is coordination between state and local irrigation.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 38 (educated guess). This group ended with a membership of 38 (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Clan identification results causes no difference in composition (inferred). The clan identification for most of this subgroup is El Mujarilin. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Shia Muslin. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 26 through 50 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 76%-90% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly grains other than paddy rice, and also paddy rice, edible tree crops, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly grains other than paddy rice, and also paddy rice, edible tree crops, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (highly confident). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from El Mujarilin Irrigation is water for irrigation. The resource described in this study consists of canals that divert water from the Hurriyya canal to farmlands cultivated by the El Mujarilin.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the national, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by other means.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is imposed for an unstated duration, as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 26 to 50 years.
static analysis
Resource System
Key shared resource: Water for irrigation
Natural infrastructure: Land
Resource Users
Members of the El Mujarilin irrigation system
Public Infrastructure Providers
National/provincial level: Government
Community/local level: Members of the El Mujarilin irrigation system
Public Infrastructure
Hard infrastructure: Canals diverting the water for irrigation
Soft infrastructure: Rules regarding the use of the system (distribution of water and rotating system), contribution to the maintenance
Relationship 1
RU => RS: Farmers draw water from the locally managed irrigation canals for irrigation
RS=>RU: Resource system provides the availability of target resources in the irrigation system
Relationship 2
PIP => RU: Government is responsible for maintaining the main canal
RU => PIP: Members has a right to access to the canal due to having land in the system
Relationship 3
PI(hard)=>PIP: No known interaction/influence
PI(soft) => PIP: Main Canals are controlled by the government
PIP => PI(hard): No known interaction/influence
PIP => PI(soft): No known interaction/influence
Relationship 4
Not mentioned in the study.
Relationship 5
PI(soft) => Link 1: Sanctions applied to those who do not participate in the maintenance
Relationship 6
RU => PI (hard): Cleaning the canals twice each year, before the winter growing season and summer cultivation
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority Among the El Shabana of Southern Iraq. Harvard Middle Eastern Studies.
. 1970.