- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Irrigation water
Fai Muang Mai is one of three irrigation systems along the Mae Klang River in the Chiang Mai Province, Thailand. Muang Mai is the most upstream of the Mae Klang River irrigation systems and provides irrigation to 800 hectares of riceland and orchards through a weir and canal network. The system is managed and maintained by an irrigation organization known as Mu Muang Mai, composed of farmers within the command area. The original case includes a comparative analysis of two traditional irrigation systems in Northern Thailand, the Muang Mai and Nae Pae irrigation systems (Tan-kim-yong, 1983), but this analysis will focus solely on Fai Muang Mai.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Muang Mai Irrigation is water for irrigation. The resource described in this study consists of a network of canals that deliver water from the Mae Klang River to the nearby farmlands.
SCREENER:
Case: Muang Mai Irrigation, Thailand
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe two resources in detail. The primary resource is the Muang Mai Irrigation, situated in Chomthong District of Thailand. More generally, it is located in Orient. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Muang Mai Irrigation. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Muang Mai Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 501-1000 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Tan-Kim-Yong compares two traditional irrigation communities in Northern Thailand. An upland irrigation system (Na Pae) serves 80 members and requires only 2 or 3 days of work by all the members for maintenance every year. The organization of the system is led by two elected officials. Rules are minimal and simple. This upland irrigation system is contrasted with a lowland system (Muang Mai) which serves 600 members and requires more extensive maintenance activities. The organization of the system is more complex. Rules are more elaborate.
CITATION(S):
Tan-Kim-Yong, Uraivan (1983) "Resource Mobilization in Traditional Irrigation Systems of Northern Thailand: A Comparison Between the Lowland and Upland Irrigation Communities." Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.*
The resource appropriated from Muang Mai Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The resource described in this study consists of a network of canals that deliver water from the Mae Klang River to the nearby farmlands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are , and exist in one country, but are divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (highly confident). There is not considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year (educated guess).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is moderately sloping (educated guess).
If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have little adverse effects (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
This study did not include whether or not the headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource. The study did not indicate who operates the headworks for this system. The irrigators being served by this production organization may or may not participate in the selection of the officials of the production agency - that piece of the case was not indicated in the study. This study did not indicate whether or not the distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource. The study did not include who operate(s) the distribution system. The irrigators being served by this production organization may or may not participate in the selection of the officials of the distribution agency - that piece of the case was not indicated in the study. The case study did not include information on whether or not the distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system.
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in Chomtong District. The boundaries of the location are an administrative district. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of several networks of canals that divert water from the Mae Klang River (coding), as well as several networks of canals that divert water from the Ping River, and wells. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were conflictual effects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (highly confident). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 1254 milimeters (highly confident). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 6.6, evapotraspiration: unknown
February precipitation: 11.7, evapotraspiration: unknown
March precipitation: 14.6, evapotraspiration: unknown
April precipitation: 48.7, evapotraspiration: unknown
May precipitation: 143.6, evapotraspiration: unknown
June precipitation: 146.2, evapotraspiration: unknown
July precipitation: 188.3, evapotraspiration: unknown
August precipitation: 230.8, evapotraspiration: unknown
September precipitation: 288.6, evapotraspiration: unknown
October precipitation: 125.9, evapotraspiration: unknown
November precipitation: 38.5, evapotraspiration: unknown
December precipitation: 10, evapotraspiration: unknown
The resource appropriated from Muang Mai Irrigation is water for irrigation. The resource described in this study consists of a network of canals that deliver water from the Mae Klang River to the nearby farmlands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are not exercising, or attempting to exercise closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1981. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 26 to 50 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was a planned change in resource size only. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There was a new local group starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 8000000
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 8000000
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
The information about how units are disposed at the end of the period is missing in case.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was well maintained, and in excellent working order (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (highly confident). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are always records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (highly confident). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily (inferred). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not affect communication (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). The documents present evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (inferred). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (inferred). There is a considerable range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (highly confident). It is unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 501-1000 appropriators (educated guess). There was a general estimate of 501-1000 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators are selected by one another for this position (highly confident).
The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 1-5 (highly confident). Official monitors are paid in commodities. None of the monitors were full-time (confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 243.1 - -2 - -2 - -2
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (inferred). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
Results include information on the ability of the cultivators to handle water allocation, maintenance and conflict resolution. Comments recorded regarding evidence that is presented concerning the nature and level of transaction costs are as follows: The cultivators have done well in the nature and level of transaction costs. The match between physical and organizational factors contributes to this.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). Membership at the start of this group numbered 600 (educated guess). This group ended with a membership of 600 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Mu Chomthong. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (inferred). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Buddism. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (highly confident). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (highly confident).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 76 through 100 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (ambiguous). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 10%-25% (educated guess). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (highly confident). Alternatives for the supply unit are available at a high cost (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (highly confident). Resources have not been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). The maintenance or improvement work is either dependent or contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (highly confident). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). Members of this group have not increased their use of alternative sources of supply of this unit (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred). Towards officials, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules.
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Muang Mai Irrigation is water for irrigation. The resource described in this study consists of a network of canals that deliver water from the Mae Klang River to the nearby farmlands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal up to a fixed percentage of the total units available during a period, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the dry season.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal up to a fixed percentage of the total units available during a period, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the wet season.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the dry season.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the wet season.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of maintenance work done by appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
There exists a rule requiring recording of the rights and duties of the appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used temporarily as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 26 to 50 years.
Muang Mai Irrigation System
Resource System
Irrigation water
Resource Users
600 farmers from 10 villages, using water from Muang Mai to irrigate 800 hectares of rice paddies and orchards
Public Infrastructure Providers
Mu Muang Mai: irrigation organization composed of farmers (both land-owners and tenant cultivators). Internal organization is as follows:
- Irrigation leaders: mu huana (top leader) and puchuey (four assistants to the top leader)
- Laam: messengers between leaders and water users
- Mu luk muang: water users
- Mu khon tao: senior advisory group of retired leaders
- Khana kamakarn: special project committee
External organizations:
- Nai amphoe: Head of the District Office
- Nai Chang: Head engineer of RID project
Public Infrastructure
Natural Infrastructure
- Water flow from the Mae Klang River
Hard Human-Made Infrastructure
- Primary weir and diversion canals
- Main control structure (concrete regulator)
- Secondary distribution networks: irrigation canals, ditches, weirs, gates
Soft Formal Infrastructure
- Kot muang mai (Muang Mai Rules)
Relationship 1
RU=>RS
Farmers appropriate water for rice paddy and orchard irrigation using soft and hard infrastructure.
RS=>RU
90% of flow during the wet season (May to November). Water shortage during the dry season.
Continuous water allocation during the wet season and rotational during the dry season.
Relationship 2
RU=>PIP
- RU are included in PIP through membership in the Mu Muang Mai, and participate in decision-making through biannual meetings
- RU vote on mu huana (irrigation leader)
- RU pay irrigation fee to huana and pouchuey after each season's harvest
PIP=>RU
- Huana communicate maintenance/management plans with RU via laam
Relationship 3
PIP=>PI
- Irrigation leader enforces rules, solves conflicts, supervises tasks and allocates water
- All resource users participate in the review and recommendation of rules
- Government replace bamboo check gates with concrete to raise water for higher level fields
- Government supplies construction materials and engineers in projects requiring outside help
- Government provides other cash grants and assistance
PI=>PIP
- Physical layout of hard human-made irrigation system determines farmers' membeship in the irrigation organization
Relationship 4
PI=>RS
Hard PI diverts water from Mae Klang River into canal system
RS=>PI
- Interseasonal and interannual variability in water flow changes the management of hard PI (ie: opening and closing the gate to allow for more flow or manage flood).
- Build-up of sediment upstream
Relationship 5
Irrigators run water from one field to the next, and conflicts occur because first appropriators can take as much as they want
Relationship 6
RU=>PI
- RU use continuous water allocation during the wet season and rotational allocation during the dry season.
- Users contribute resources and report on disputes, plan work projects, and contribute labor
- All resource users participate in maintenance activities, such as repairing weirs and cleaning canals
PI=>RU
- The main weir is important in annual rituals and is located next to the spirit house (hoh phi fai). It is also located next to the community pavilion where Muang Mai activities (ie: meetings) are held. The phi fai ritual is centered around the spirit which protects the irrigation weir and canal.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Interannual and inter-seasonal variability in water flow
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
Individual RU's own rice paddies and orchards
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Huana (top irrigation leaders) are irrigation experts in their system and are typically re-elected until retirement
Resource Mobilization in Traditional Irrigation Systems of Northern Thailand: A Comparison Between the Lowland and Upland Irriga. Cornell University. PhD
. 1983.