- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Irrigation water
Lurin Sayoc is one of the two barrios of Quinua district of Ayacucho Province in the Peruvian highlands. The resource appropriated related to the social dilemma is water for irrigation distributed through a canal, diverted by stream. The original case was reported in 1976 and 1977 and catalogues an action situation involving 5,348 people. The author reported many fights around water use.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a river to farmlands in Lurin Sayoc.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a river to farmlands in Lurin Sayoc.
SCREENER:
Case: Lurin Sayoc Irrigation, Peru
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a chapter in a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe two resources in detail. The primary resource is the Lurin Sayoc Irrigation, situated in Quinea of Peru. More generally, it is located in South America. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Lurin Sayoc Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
The Lurin Sayoc Irrigation covers an unknown area. There are 201-500 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Two barrios in Quinua district, Lurin Sayoc and Hanan Sayoc, each have their own irrigation system originating in moisture from the mountaintops flowing down to fields. Vertical division of field types allows allocation of water to where it is most needed; there are different principles of water distribution for dry season crops, rainy season crops, and domestic use. Political officials legitimize customary altitude-based rules of water distribution especially in those seasons when water is most needed, but do not make rules. Water is otherwise informally distributed by the users. One of Peru's earliest, largest empires (Huari), which flourished c. A.D. 700, was centered in Quinua. If today's irrigation system, undeniably important in community organization, is any guide, the ancient irrigation system was too small and local to account for the rise of a regional-scale state and political despotism, as Wittfogel's (etc.) "hydraulic theory" might have predicted.
CITATION(S):
Mitchell, William P. (1977) "Irrigation Farming in the Andes: Evolutionary Implications." In PEASANT LIVELIHOOD: STUDIES IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY AND CULTURAL ECOLOGY, edited by Rhoda Halperin and James Dow, 36-59 (chapter 3). New York: St. Martin's Press.*
Mitchell, William P. (1976) "Irrigation and Community in the Central Peruvian Highlands." AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 78: 25-44.*
The resource appropriated from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a river to farmlands in Lurin Sayoc.
SCREENER:
Case: Lurin Sayoc Irrigation, Peru
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a chapter in a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe two resources in detail. The primary resource is the Lurin Sayoc Irrigation, situated in Quinea of Peru. More generally, it is located in South America. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Lurin Sayoc Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
The Lurin Sayoc Irrigation covers an unknown area. There are 201-500 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Two barrios in Quinua district, Lurin Sayoc and Hanan Sayoc, each have their own irrigation system originating in moisture from the mountaintops flowing down to fields. Vertical division of field types allows allocation of water to where it is most needed; there are different principles of water distribution for dry season crops, rainy season crops, and domestic use. Political officials legitimize customary altitude-based rules of water distribution especially in those seasons when water is most needed, but do not make rules. Water is otherwise informally distributed by the users. One of Peru's earliest, largest empires (Huari), which flourished c. A.D. 700, was centered in Quinua. If today's irrigation system, undeniably important in community organization, is any guide, the ancient irrigation system was too small and local to account for the rise of a regional-scale state and political despotism, as Wittfogel's (etc.) "hydraulic theory" might have predicted.
CITATION(S):
Mitchell, William P. (1977) "Irrigation Farming in the Andes: Evolutionary Implications." In PEASANT LIVELIHOOD: STUDIES IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY AND CULTURAL ECOLOGY, edited by Rhoda Halperin and James Dow, 36-59 (chapter 3). New York: St. Martin's Press.*
Mitchell, William P. (1976) "Irrigation and Community in the Central Peruvian Highlands." AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 78: 25-44.*
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a river to farmlands in Lurin Sayoc.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (inferred). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (inferred).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year.
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is steeply sloping (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in Quinua, a district in the central Peruvian highlands.. The boundaries of the location are boundaries of a district. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of two irrigation systems. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and relatively autonomous with respect to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 3396 meters (inferred). The highest elevation is 4100 (inferred). The lowest elevation of this location is 2500 (confident). The region's average annual rainfall is 626 milimeters (inferred). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 130, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 122, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 98, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 36, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 15, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 8, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 6, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 26, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 30, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 36, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 90, evapotraspiration: 0
The resource appropriated from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a river to farmlands in Lurin Sayoc.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (inferred). The quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others (inferred).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (inferred). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year.
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is steeply sloping (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in Quinua, a district in the central Peruvian highlands.. The boundaries of the location are boundaries of a district. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of two irrigation systems. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and relatively autonomous with respect to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 3396 meters (inferred). The highest elevation is 4100 (inferred). The lowest elevation of this location is 2500 (confident). The region's average annual rainfall is 626 milimeters (inferred). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 130, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 122, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 98, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 36, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 15, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 5, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 8, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 6, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 26, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 30, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 36, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 90, evapotraspiration: 0
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a river to farmlands in Lurin Sayoc.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1970. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is not indicated in the information provided. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (educated guess). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period a definite change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are always records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (inferred). The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (inferred). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively neutral, quid-pro-quo manner -- each exchange was evaluated for what it might bring (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied there was no information coded to indicate whether or not the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) existed. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (highly confident).
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 71.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (educated guess).
The author's results indicate that conflict exists among appropriaters. Conflict is affected by the extent of political control over the system. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -2
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 400 (ambiguous).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Quechua.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly grains other than paddy rice, and also legumes, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules and to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a local government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1975. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by an external authority in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively high (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (educated guess). At the end of the period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (educated guess). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are always records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (inferred). The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (inferred). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively negative, perhaps even spiteful manner -- one indicator of this would be vandalism by appropriators against appropriators. (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied there was no information coded to indicate whether or not the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) existed. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators (educated guess). There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (highly confident).
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 71.2 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (educated guess).
The author's results indicate that arguments and fishing conflicts existed among appropriators. The conflict is affected by the extent of political control over the system. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -2
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 400 (ambiguous). This group ended with a membership of 400 (ambiguous).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Quechua.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly grains other than paddy rice, and also legumes, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly grains other than paddy rice, and also legumes, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to withdrawal of appropriation units (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that about half of the members follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules and to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a river to farmlands in Lurin Sayoc.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1970. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is not indicated in the information provided. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (educated guess). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period a definite change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are always records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (inferred). The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (inferred). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively neutral, quid-pro-quo manner -- each exchange was evaluated for what it might bring (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied there was no information coded to indicate whether or not the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) existed. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (highly confident).
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 71.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (educated guess).
The author's results indicate that conflict exists among appropriaters. Conflict is affected by the extent of political control over the system. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -2
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 400 (ambiguous).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Quechua.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly grains other than paddy rice, and also legumes, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules and to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a local government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1975. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by an external authority in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively high (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (educated guess). At the end of the period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (educated guess). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (educated guess).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way. There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are always records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (inferred). The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (inferred). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively negative, perhaps even spiteful manner -- one indicator of this would be vandalism by appropriators against appropriators. (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied there was no information coded to indicate whether or not the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) existed. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators (educated guess). There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (highly confident).
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 71.2 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The study did not indicate whether or not there are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (educated guess).
The author's results indicate that arguments and fishing conflicts existed among appropriators. The conflict is affected by the extent of political control over the system. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -2
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 400 (ambiguous). This group ended with a membership of 400 (ambiguous).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Quechua.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly grains other than paddy rice, and also legumes, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly grains other than paddy rice, and also legumes, and non-tree fruits and vegetables. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to withdrawal of appropriation units (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that about half of the members follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally medium (educated guess). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to enforce compliance with existing rules and to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a river to farmlands in Lurin Sayoc.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the rainy season planting, the period in which water needs are most critical.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the rainy season planting, the period in which water needs are most critical.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect at other times. Water is distributed on an informal basis by those seeking it.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by some payment (e.g. money, materials).
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of maintenance work done by appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a local administrative body.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a local (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the rainy season planting, the period in which water needs are most critical.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the rainy season planting, the period in which water needs are most critical.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect at other times. Water is distributed on an informal basis by those seeking it.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by some payment (e.g. money, materials).
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of maintenance work done by appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a local administrative body.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a local (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The resource appropriated from Lurin Sayoc Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a river to farmlands in Lurin Sayoc.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, set annually/periodically by someone living in the location. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the rainy season planting, the period in which water needs are most critical.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the rainy season planting, the period in which water needs are most critical.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect at other times. Water is distributed on an informal basis by those seeking it.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by some payment (e.g. money, materials).
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of maintenance work done by appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a local administrative body.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a local (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the rainy season planting, the period in which water needs are most critical.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the rainy season planting, the period in which water needs are most critical.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect at other times. Water is distributed on an informal basis by those seeking it.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by some payment (e.g. money, materials).
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of maintenance work done by appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by a local administrative body.
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may temporarily lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is not used as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a local (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
Lurin Sayoc Irrigation System
Resource System
- Key shared resource: Water for Irrigation
- Key natural resource: watershed and associated topography
Resource Users
- Farmers in the upper savanna
- Farmers in the lower savanna
Public Infrastructure Providers
- Municipal authorities
- Farmers
Public Infrastructure
- Hard infrastructure: Canals, reservoirs and gates
- Soft infrastructure: A set of rules regarding water allocation and hard infrastructure maintenance; religious festivals as gratitude to the water and earth energy.
Relationship 1
- Farmers extract water based on a combination of different rules for different seasons.
Relationship 2
Not mentioned in the study
Relationship 3
- Municipal authorities allocate water to farmers in both dry and wet seasons.
- Resource users maintain the canals and reservoir.
Relationship 4
Controls the stock and the flow of water in the system.
Relationship 5
- Prior appropriation regulates the use of water in dry seasons.
- Rules restrict water withdrawal to Sundays during the month of September.
- There are no rules to regulate water withdrawal in wet seasons.
Relationship 6
- Ambiguity in water allocation rules leads to escalates conflicts among water users to violence.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
- Earthquakes
- Floods
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
- Earthquakes
- Floods
- Droughts
- New laws or policies
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
- Earthquakes
- Terrorism
- New job or education opportunities
- Market integration
- Climate variability.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
- Earthquakes
- Terrorism
- Capacity Building
- Corruption
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified). 1977. Irrigation Farming in the Andes: Evolutionary Implications. Peasant livelihood: studies in economic anthropology and cultural ecology. :36-59.
. 1976. Irrigation and Community in the Central Peruvian Highlands. American Anthropologist. 78:25-44.
. 1994. Dam the water: the ecology and political economy of irrigation in the Ayacucho Valley, Peru. Irrigation at High Altitudes:the social organization of water control systems in the Andes. :275-302.