- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Freshwater
Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation system is one of the six small irrigation systems located in Lintong ni Huta of The subdistrict of Balige in Indonesia. The resource appropriated related to the social dilemma is water for irrigation . The original case was reported in 1979 and catalogues an action situation involving less than 10 members that belongs to one family (descendants of the founder of the irrigation system).
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes canals that divert water from a small stream to farmlands.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes canals that divert water from a small stream to farmlands.
SCREENER:
Case: Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation, Indonesia
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe seven resources in detail. The primary resource is the Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation, situated in Lintong ni Huta of Indonesia. More generally, it is located in Orient. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are less than 25 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Bondar Parhudagar is one of the six small irrigation systems in Lintong ni Huta. Only male heirs of its original builder have propriety rights to a share of the system, a share of the irrigation levies, or to hold office in the system. Any person who owns and work land, or work land on share-crop basis irrigation by the system pay irrigation levies to the system. Levy-paying customers are expected to participate in a yearly cleaning of the system. Otherwise maintenance is the responsibility of the controlling body. These organizational principles provided a pattern for the larger system, Silena Banua, built later in the village.
CITATION(S):
Lando, Richard P. (1979) "The Gift of Land: Irrigation and Social Structure in a Toba Batak Village." Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Riverside.*
The resource appropriated from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes canals that divert water from a small stream to farmlands.
SCREENER:
Case: Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation, Indonesia
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a thesis or dissertation. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe seven resources in detail. The primary resource is the Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation, situated in Lintong ni Huta of Indonesia. More generally, it is located in Orient. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are less than 25 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Bondar Parhudagar is one of the six small irrigation systems in Lintong ni Huta. Only male heirs of its original builder have propriety rights to a share of the system, a share of the irrigation levies, or to hold office in the system. Any person who owns and work land, or work land on share-crop basis irrigation by the system pay irrigation levies to the system. Levy-paying customers are expected to participate in a yearly cleaning of the system. Otherwise maintenance is the responsibility of the controlling body. These organizational principles provided a pattern for the larger system, Silena Banua, built later in the village.
CITATION(S):
Lando, Richard P. (1979) "The Gift of Land: Irrigation and Social Structure in a Toba Batak Village." Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Riverside.*
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes canals that divert water from a small stream to farmlands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
The study did not indicate whether or not there are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled. The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource. The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year. The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year.
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is steeply sloping (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the location that was not indicated in this case study. The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the village of Lintong ni Huta. The boundaries of the location are the boundaries of a village. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of Silean Banua and Bondar Parhudagar (coding), Bondar Saba Balige, Bondar Pansur, Bondar Napitupulu, Bondar Paringgiringgiron, and Bondar Sitangki. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). This location is also characterized by an economy that is changing and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (confident).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
The resource appropriated from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes canals that divert water from a small stream to farmlands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
The study did not indicate whether or not there are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled. The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource. The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year. The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year.
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is steeply sloping (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource have a relationship to the boundaries of the location that was not indicated in this case study. The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (inferred). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the village of Lintong ni Huta. The boundaries of the location are the boundaries of a village. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of Silean Banua and Bondar Parhudagar (coding), Bondar Saba Balige, Bondar Pansur, Bondar Napitupulu, Bondar Paringgiringgiron, and Bondar Sitangki. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). This location is also characterized by an economy that is changing and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (confident).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes canals that divert water from a small stream to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, distribution, and production. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1976. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 101 to 200 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because the system was constructed at that time.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 40000 (inferred)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 40000 (inferred)
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (highly confident). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource.
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (highly confident). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource annually (educated guess). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related to other local resources, as well as evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (highly confident). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (inferred). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). It is unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied there was no information coded to indicate whether or not the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) existed. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of Less than 25 appropriators (inferred). There was a general estimate of Less than 25 appropriators at the end of the period (inferred). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators are selected by one another for this position (inferred). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators do not monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (educated guess). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 1-5 (highly confident). Official monitors are paid in commodities. None of the monitors were full-time (confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 85.1 - 86.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 85.1 and 86.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 85.1 and 86.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (inferred). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The author's results indicated a successful ability to mobilize local resources for maintenance, and further mentioned organizational arrangements supported by ADAT.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are male hiers of Raja Parhudagar Simanjuntak who own propriety rights to the system. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a estimated membership of less than 25..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Clan identification results causes no difference in composition (inferred). The clan identification for most of this subgroup is Simanjuntak. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered high (confident). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). Low cost alternatives for the supply unit are available (inferred).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was decreasing (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly paddy rice. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to investment or maintenance (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in the constitutional-choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have become smaller (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become smaller (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are all levy-paying customers. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a estimated membership of less than 25..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (inferred). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). Low cost alternatives for the supply unit are available (inferred).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly paddy rice. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have become larger (inferred). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes canals that divert water from a small stream to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, distribution, and production. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1976. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 101 to 200 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because the system was constructed at that time.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 40000 (inferred)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 40000 (inferred)
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (highly confident). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource.
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (highly confident). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource annually (educated guess). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related to other local resources, as well as evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (highly confident). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (inferred). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). It is unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied there was no information coded to indicate whether or not the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) existed. At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of Less than 25 appropriators (inferred). There was a general estimate of Less than 25 appropriators at the end of the period (inferred). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators are selected by one another for this position (inferred). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators do not monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (educated guess). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 1-5 (highly confident). Official monitors are paid in commodities. None of the monitors were full-time (confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 85.1 - 86.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 85.1 and 86.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 85.1 and 86.1 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (inferred). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The author's results indicated a successful ability to mobilize local resources for maintenance, and further mentioned organizational arrangements supported by ADAT.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are male hiers of Raja Parhudagar Simanjuntak who own propriety rights to the system. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a estimated membership of less than 25..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Clan identification results causes no difference in composition (inferred). The clan identification for most of this subgroup is Simanjuntak. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered high (confident). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). Low cost alternatives for the supply unit are available (inferred).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was decreasing (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly paddy rice. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to investment or maintenance (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in the constitutional-choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have become smaller (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become smaller (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are all levy-paying customers. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). At the start of this group the membership was less than 25. This group ended with a estimated membership of less than 25..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (inferred). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 101 through 200 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is low (inferred). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). Low cost alternatives for the supply unit are available (inferred).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly paddy rice. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have become larger (inferred). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes canals that divert water from a small stream to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a clan. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership of shares in the resource facility itself. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to one or more offspring.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights cannot be transferred to anyone else.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
The authority and scope rules may or may not assign substantially unequal privileges to certain subgroups, this information was not included in the study.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, the entire labor force works as a team. Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 2nd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others, and this subgroup receives the most rewards. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 101 to 199 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
The authority and scope rules may or may not assign substantially unequal privileges to certain subgroups, this information was not included in the study.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by some payment (e.g. money, materials). Most of the time, the entire labor force works as a team. Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others, and this subgroup receives the 2nd most rewards. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 101 to 199 years.
The resource appropriated from Bondar Parhudagar Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes canals that divert water from a small stream to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in a clan. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership of shares in the resource facility itself. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to one or more offspring.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights cannot be transferred to anyone else.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
The authority and scope rules may or may not assign substantially unequal privileges to certain subgroups, this information was not included in the study.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, the entire labor force works as a team. Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 2nd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others, and this subgroup receives the most rewards. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 101 to 199 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
The authority and scope rules may or may not assign substantially unequal privileges to certain subgroups, this information was not included in the study.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
If labor input for maintenance is required, the input can be substituted by some payment (e.g. money, materials). Most of the time, the entire labor force works as a team. Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others, and this subgroup receives the 2nd most rewards. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 101 to 199 years.
. 1979. The Gift of Land: Irrigation and Social Structure in a Toba Batak Village. University of California, Riverside. PhD