- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Freshwater
This case was part of the original CPR database developed in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University and may be found under the CPR tab under Institutional Analysis.
The resource appropriated from Felderin Irrigation is water for irrigation. The Felderin is one of the three irrigation networks in Torbel, a village in the Swiss Alps. The Felderin is regulated without central authority or official mechanisms for adjudication. Upkeep is provided by a half dozen men working communally one day in the spring, and the system is then left to run itself. Water rights are not publicly recorded, and no one knows the entire pattern of water distribution. Netting argues that this acephalous system of ordered anarchy illustrates that small-scale irrigation systems can function on the basis of an intricate series of water sharing agreements, each meshing with the others but known to individuals only insofar as their use rights are exercised.
From the standpoint of intuitional analysis, this case is originally deemed to be a success. However, technical and economic development may cause a transition from traditional irrigation infrastructure to underground irrigation and sprinkler system. This may lead to the sloy decay of the water management regime based on voluntarily cooperation among users .
The resource appropriated from Felderin Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes a network of canals that deliver water to farmlands.
SCREENER:
Case: Felderin Irrigation, Switzerland
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a chapter in a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe three resources in detail. The primary resource is the Felderin Irrigation, situated in Torbel Village of Switzerland. More generally, it is located in Europe. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Felderin Irrigation. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Felderin Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 51-100 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
The Felderin is one of the three irrigation networks in Torbel, a German-speaking village in the Swiss Alps. The Felderin is regulated without central authority or official mechanisms for adjudication. Upkeep is provided by a half dozen men working communally one day in spring, and the system is then left to run itself. Water rights are not publicly recorded, and no one knows even in outline the entire pattern of water distribution. Netting argues that this acephalous system of ordered anarchy illustrates that small-scale irrigation systems can function on the basis of an intricate series of water sharing agreements, each meshing with the others but known to individuals only insofar as their use rights are exercised.
CITATION(S):
Netting, Robert McC. (1974) "The System Nobody Knows: Village Irrigation in the Swiss Alps." In IRRIGATION'S IMPACT ON SOCIETY, edited by Theodore Downing and McGuire Gibson, 67-76. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. [GN 433 .I718]*
Netting, Robert McC. (1981) BALANCING ON AN ALP: ECOLOGICAL CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN A SWISS MOUNTAIN COMMUNITY. New York: Cambridge University Press.
The resource appropriated from Felderin Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes a network of canals that deliver water to farmlands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (inferred). There is not considerable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (educated guess). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year. The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year.
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is steeply sloping (confident).
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, but the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are not the sole operator(s) of the headworks (educated guess). The study did not indicate who operates the headworks for this system. The irrigators being served by this production organization may or may not participate in the selection of the officials of the production agency - that piece of the case was not indicated in the study. The distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) or the groups(s) of people as the appropriation system, but the distribution system is not solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (educated guess). The study did not include who operate(s) the distribution system. The irrigators being served by this production organization may or may not participate in the selection of the officials of the distribution agency - that piece of the case was not indicated in the study. The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in Torbel village. The boundaries of the location are the boundaries of a village. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of the Felderin irrigation system (coding); Springerin and Augstborderin irrigation systems; grazing lands, and forests. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and relatively autonomous with respect to other economic networks during most of the time period .
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 2972 (highly confident). The lowest elevation of this location is 770 (highly confident). The region's average annual rainfall is 50 milimeters (educated guess). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
The resource appropriated from Felderin Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes a network of canals that deliver water to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, distribution, and production. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study does not exist because there is no formal owner for this resource. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not indicated as either attempting, or failing to attempt to exercise access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1971. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is not indicated in the information provided. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by local collective choice processes involving others besides the appropriators, in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because 4.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 190000 (educated guess)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 190000 (highly confident)
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are available to appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (inferred). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (educated guess). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators (educated guess). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related to other local resources, as well as evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (confident). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (confident).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (educated guess). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators (educated guess). There was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (highly confident).
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (inferred).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 87.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (inferred). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The authors results indicated inequalities, including inequalities in amount of water available per unit of land. The inequalities may have been the result of vested interests.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 75 (educated guess). This group ended with a membership of 75 (educated guess). An estimated 91%-100% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Caste identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is German.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 501 through 1000 years (inferred). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (ambiguous). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly fodder. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly fodder. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (inferred). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Felderin Irrigation is water for irrigation. The irrigation system of interest in this study includes a network of canals that deliver water to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, there is a local level of government or organization of appropriators, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national, regional, and local level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of rights to a certain proportion of the flow. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to one or more members of within a family.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national, regional, and local level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at a fixed time slot, based on the ownership or leasing rights to a certain proportion of the flow. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national, regional, and local level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
Torbel Irrigation System
Resource System
Irrigation water
Resource Users
- Livestock herders and managers in Torbel
- Total population 583
Public Infrastructure Providers
Association of Resource Users
Public Infrastructure
Hard Infrastructure Public
- A total of 10 km of canals, diversion dams, channels, settling pools, sluice gates, and log flumes
Soft Infrastructure
- Rules regarding the use of pastures, contribution to maintenance and repairs
- Watering schedule based on position of the sun
- Conflicts solved through the navigation of interpersonal relationships
- Lack of monitoring system
Relationship 1
(RU => RS)
- Meadows could not support grazing without irrigation
(RS => RU)
- Rainwater can be unpredictable impacting the amount of irrigable water available
Relationship 2
(RU => PIP)
- Election of village resident leaders
Relationship 3
(none specified)Relationship 4
(RS => PI)
- A complex network of canals connects the resource system to the users
Relationship 5
(PIP => 1)
- Fines for non-compliance to rules
- Self-monitoring and sharing labor
Relationship 6
(RU => PI)
- Tightly scheduled individual work and communal labor
- Cleaning and repairing canals every spring
- All users contribute annual labor of two days as well as emergency service and financial expenditures for major repairs
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
(none specified)Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
With integration into the swiss economy, farmland has lost its value, and Torbel is no longer self-sufficient
Torbel villagers must seek factory work outside of the village
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Brady U, Arizona State University.
Laurens E, Arizona State University.
Monakhova M, Arizona State University.
The System Nobody Knows: Village Irrigation in the Swiss Alps. Irrigation's Impact on Society. :67-76.
. 1974.Common property and natural resources in the Alps: the decay of management structures? Forest Policy and Economics. 4:135-147.
. 2002.