- Resource System
- Forest ecosystem and associated watershed
- Resource Units
- Forest products (timber, fodder, leaves, etc.)
This paper is an extension of two prior case studies about the Parwara Van Panchayat (forest council):
- the 1988 Parwara Van Panchayat Forest which covered the status of this social-ecological system (SES) from approx. 1931 to 1985 (Case No. 34); and
- the 2008 Parwara Van Panchayat Forest II which provided a SES update up to 2007 (Case No. 159).
For purposes of this report, the SES study boundaries were extended beyond the Parwara village Van Panchayat to include an institutional analysis of various types of forest councils in the entire state of Uttarakhand, India, including the traditional Van Panchayats (VPs), the new Van Panchayats (new VPs), and Village Joint Forest Management (VJFM), as gleaned from various scientific and governmental publications available in early 2012.
This update was prepared by Ute Brady, reachable at zapodidae@cox.net
Case Summary: The Parwara VP I and II studies reflected that the overall robustness of the Parwara VP was declining. While the scope of this paper, though spatially more regional, only analyzed a small portion of this complex system, it appears that this trend is applicable to all forest councils in Uttarakhand. Three emerging issues causing four compromised links in the SES framework have been identified and represent a significant weakening of the SES with the potential for a future shift into an undesirable state.
- The continued exclusion of women and lower castes (which represent the majority of the very poor) in the forest council decision-making processes;
- The lack of clearly defined de jure property rights to forest resources of the indigenous pahari (hill people) is pitting conservationists against indigenous rights activists;
- Institutional path dependency and the undue support of international organizations are guiding the Forest Department to increase state control over participatory local governance to the detriment of overall SES robustness.
The resource appropriated from Parwara Van Panchayat Forest is forest trees. The resource that was studied includes 712 acres (2,881,400 square meters) of community forests in the village of Parwara. It is located near the village and the boundaries are determined administratively.
SCREENER:
Case: Parwara Van Panchayat Forest, India
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a paper issued by a scholar or research institution. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Parwara Van Panchayat Forest, situated in Parwara of India. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of forest products. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Parwara Van Panchayat Forest. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is not available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Parwara Van Panchayat Forest have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 101-200 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are sometimes formally organized.
Van (forest) Panchayats (people's bodies) in the hill districts of Uttar Pradesh in India have been formed at the village level from 1931 onwards. These Panchayats were formed through popular elections to manage Class I forests. This paper investigates the functioning of the Parwara village van Panchayat in the context of the general state of Van Panchayats in the state. The Panchayat enacts and enforces rules for the day to day management of the forests - and functions under the supervision of the district government officials. With increased access to outside markets, greater pressure on resources owing to population increase, and politicization of the village, the Van Panchayats are becoming less effective in managing the village forests.
CITATION(S):
Ballabh, Vishwa, and Katar Singh (1987) "People's Participation in Management of Natural Forests: The Experiences and Lessons from Van Panchayats of Uttar Pradesh Hills." Discussion paper, Institute of Rural Management, Anand, Gujarat, India.*
The resource appropriated from Parwara Van Panchayat Forest is forest trees. It is produced biologically and is a renewable stationary unit. The resource that was studied includes 712 acres (2,881,400 square meters) of community forests in the village of Parwara. It is located near the village and the boundaries are determined administratively.
The boundary of this resource has institutional arrangements. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the forest trees can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation over space in the availability of forest trees within the resource (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of forest trees within a single year. There is not considerable variation in the flow of forest trees from year to year (educated guess).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is relatively flat.
If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have little adverse effects.
The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location. The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource.
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in a village forest, located in the state of Uttar Pradesh in India in Nainital, a hill district. The forest is fifty kilometers from Nainital city and is on the Ramgarh Nainital Road, about 2 kilometers from the main road. The boundaries of the location are not institutionally determined, if they are ecologically distinct boundaries, such as rivers or mountains. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of forest (coding), as well as grazing occurs. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were sometimes complementary effects, and sometimes conflictual effects in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is not frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (educated guess). Additionally, the most common mode of transportation in this region is -1.
The latitude of this location is -1, and its longitude is -1. The elevation of this location is -1 meters. The highest elevation is -1. The lowest elevation of this location is -1. The region's average annual rainfall is unknown. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is unknown. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
February precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
March precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
April precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
May precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
June precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
July precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
August precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
September precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
October precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
November precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
December precipitation: unknown, evapotraspiration: unknown
The resource appropriated from Parwara Van Panchayat Forest is forest trees. The resource that was studied includes 712 acres (2,881,400 square meters) of community forests in the village of Parwara. It is located near the village and the boundaries are determined administratively.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation alone. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not indicated as either attempting, or failing to attempt to exercise access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators may be exercising or attempting to exercise closed access to this resource, however this information was not included in the study.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1985. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 51 to 75 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was a recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were ??. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because To see whether and how the Van Panchayats have been successful in managing the common forest; If this holds policy relevant lessons..
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (highly confident). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (highly confident).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (highly confident). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (inferred). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was experiencing some deterioration due to insufficient maintenance (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (highly confident). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure but not effective closed access to this resource. At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource.
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are maps and charts of the appropriation resource, but they are not readily available for use by the appropriators (educated guess). Maps and/or charts of the appropriation resource do not differ from the production and distribution resource. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (inferred). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (highly confident). There are not actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are sometimes records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (confident). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (highly confident). There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). The study did not indicate whether or not there are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource. Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance. The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators. There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (highly confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively neutral, quid-pro-quo manner -- each exchange was evaluated for what it might bring (ambiguous). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (inferred). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (confident). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (highly confident). There is a limited range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 101-200 appropriators at the end of the period. The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, some are selected by appropriators and some are selected by a local general purpose government (highly confident). This position monitors rules devised by regional collective choice processes (column 2 of the rules form), rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form), and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (highly confident). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 6-10. None of the monitors were full-time (educated guess).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 97.1 - -2 - -2 - -2
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed. By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (highly confident).
Forest lands have been protected. The authors may have the same concept of results but they give very sketchy and limited information on results. The authors evaluate these relatively positively (perhaps more than warranted). The author considers the potential threats of increased population, market opportunities and politicization of villagers as variables affecting results. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on The author discusses the withdrawals per unit of effort but does not evaluate them.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
The membership of the subgroup is defined as the membership to the village. Their occupation is agriculture. They belong to two castes - Kshahiya and scheduled castes. The criteria for who is a member is well defined. . This group ended with a membership of 110 (educated guess).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (ambiguous). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Hindu. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are of the cast Kshahiya. The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Hindu. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Hindi.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is held de jure by this subgroup (highly confident).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 51 through 75 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource. In general several children of each appropriator become appropriators of this resource when they are adults## Unknown column: OFFSPRING ##. An estimated 0 days through 6 days are needed to build or to earn enough income to purchase the equipment for an appropriation team (ambiguous). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (highly confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is 91%-100% (educated guess). Low cost alternatives for the supply unit are available (highly confident).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (highly confident). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (highly confident), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant. At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). In forestry, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) are in large part used to raise cattle. In forestry, appropriation resources (at the end of the period) are in large part used to raise cattle. During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Members have access to an alternative source of supply (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (educated guess).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has become larger (inferred).
The resource appropriated from Parwara Van Panchayat Forest is forest trees. The resource that was studied includes 712 acres (2,881,400 square meters) of community forests in the village of Parwara. It is located near the village and the boundaries are determined administratively.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed entry fee every time the resource is accessed. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the national level(s).
A rule exists permitting the purchase of access rights to the resource in an auction. This rule is enforced at the national and rules-in-use level(s).
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, or returned to others on a temporary basis, but not permanently severed.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, a local collective choice arena containing some non-appropriators determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal up to a fixed number of units during a period, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect in the winter season.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal only during specific seasons, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect in the winter season.
The length of the withdrawing season is 8 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect in the winter season.
There are other rules, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. Such rules are enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and are part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect in the winter season.
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
The national level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may, for an unclear duration, lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 26 to 50 years.
Van Panchayat (approx. 1931 to 1985)
Resource System
Van Panchayat Community Forests:
grass (for grazing and collection);
forest trees (fuelwood, leaf litter, fodder, construction timber);
dry leaves; twigs; mushrooms; fruit; medicinal plants; and resin.
Resource Users
Villagers belonging to the Van Panchayat (VP), particularly:
women, children, members of the scheduled (lower) castes (untouchables).
Public Infrastructure Providers
Village Van Panchayat (forest council) consisting of between seven to nine members, most of which are men;
women are rarely members and, if they are, they likely do not actively participate;
higher castes can have 80% representation, with lower castes having little or no representation.
Public Infrastructure
Kumaun Panchayat Forest Rules
Revenue Department rules
Forest Department "technical advice"
Individual working rules re: forest use developed independently by each village Van Panchayat
Relationship 1
Recharging of water sources
Harvesting of forest resources: grass (for grazing and collection);
forest trees (fuelwood, leaf litter, fodder, construction timber);
dry leaves; twigs; mushrooms; fruit; medicinal plants; and resin.
Relationship 2
Voting of VP members through an open election system, with villagers raising their hands to vote;
VP members provide working rules regarding community forest use to villagers;
Villagers accept and follow the rules outlined by VP members.
Relationship 3
Providing the legal framework within which the VPs can operate;
Using the legal framework to devise and create working rules regarding community forest use for village VPs.
Relationship 4
Maintaining forest resources, including replanting trees.
Relationship 5
Monitoring and sanctioning of resource extraction in some Van Panchayats.
Relationship 6
No direct impact.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Increasing incidents of landslides and floods.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Policy changes to Kumaon Van Panchayat rules decreasing VP authority.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Population growth
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Policy changes to Kumaon Van Panchayat rules decreasing VP authority.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Van Panchayat (approx. 1985 to present)
Resource System
Forest resources (Van Panchayat and civil/soyam):
grass (for grazing and collection);
forest trees (fuelwood, leaf litter, fodder, construction timber);
dry leaves; twigs; mushrooms; fruit; medicinal plants; and resin.
Resource Users
Villagers with varying access rights and muddied resource boundaries, particularly affecting:
women, children, and members of the scheduled (lower) castes (untouchables).
Public Infrastructure Providers
VP council members
Forest Guard (Forest Department representative)
Joint Forest Management council members
NGOs
Public Infrastructure
Kumaun Panchayat Forest Rules
Revenue Dept rules
“Technical advice” of the FD
VP working rules
Joint Forest Management rules
Relationship 1
Harvesting of forest resources: grass (for grazing and collection);
forest trees (fuelwood, leaf litter, fodder, construction timber);
dry leaves; twigs; mushrooms; fruit; medicinal plants; and resin.
Relationship 2
Continued marginalization of women and scheduled castes;
Villagers distrust Forest Department representative/Forest Guard;
Villagers have lost faith in the power of the VP council;
Villagers have no relationship with members of the Forest Service appointed Joint Forest management council who often do not live in the village forest community;
Villagers fail to participate in forest council meetings;
Members of NGOs are on Forest Service payroll and have a conflict of interest between Forest Department and villagers goals undermining NGO credibility;
VP council has been reduced to resource manager without authority or power;
Joint Forest council members have no vested interest in community forest;
Forest department believes without top-down control of resources - forests will be further degraded.
Relationship 3
VP council is accountable to Forest Guard/Forest Department for management of forests;
Forest Department enforces rules through Forest Guard;
Forest Department creates new Van Panchayats and reorganizes existing Van Panchayats to place them under Joint Forest Management rule which is under the control of the Forest Department (Forest Guard is secretary of Joint Forest council and holder of bank account);
Forest Department is purposely excluding VP leaders with experience in community forest management from the Joint Forest Management process.
Relationship 4
No reported investment in village forests by villagers, VP council, Forest Department, or NGOs.
Relationship 5
VP council reluctant to enforce rules and/or monitor/sanction villagers for violation of rules;
Villagers' willingness to disobey rules increases and forest resources are further degraded.
Relationship 6
Implementation of Joint Forest Management rules by the Forest Department is destroying existing Van Panchayats;
Forest Department is actively demarcating the remaining civil/soyam lands into new Van Panchayats under VJFM rules, irrespective of whether VPs are required or not, and ignoring local community management arrangements and/or boundary disputes;
Forest Department is revoking villagers access rights to forests by invoking conservation laws to protect endangered species;
Without irrevocable de jure property rights, villagers are left without an effective institution to protect their forest access rights from the disparate interests and corruption of the Forest Department;
Villagers are deliberately destroying trees and killing endangered animals in retaliation.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Drought; Landslides; Fire; Deforestation;
Global climate change;
Loss of biodiversity and ecosystem resilience;
Conversion of forest lands for agricultural purposes;
Exploitation of remaining forest resources to meet the commercial demands of pharmaceutical and aroma-chemical-related industries.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
World Bank funding for village forest joint management
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Poverty;
High unemployment;
Out-migration;
Population growth
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Legal changes to the governance structure of Van Panchayats due to the implementation of Village Forest Joint Management.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Brady U, Arizona State University.
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