- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Freshwater
The rice paddies and irrigation system of this case are near Tihingan village, in the Klungkung district of Bali, Indonesia ‐ 45 km northeast of Denpasar. The original case spans from 1957 to 1959, and it catalogues an action situation involving 455 rice farmers who are members of an organization that regulates irrigation and planting cycles (a subak). The subak system in Bali represents a longstanding tradition for irrigation, dating back to at least the 12th century (some estimates suggest as far back as the 9th century). The data was extracted from a chapter by Geertz (1967) in a book about irrigation systems in South Asia (ed. Coward, 1980), and additional information can be found in Lansing (2007).
The key resources (natural infrastructure) in the system are the watershed and its associated ecology, which includes both land (private) and water (shared). The key resource relevant to the commons dilemma faced by the community is water for irrigation (common-pool). It should be noted that water dictates crop cycles, which are managed to mitigate pests and require coordination of crop fallowing techniques. This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Subak A is irrigation water. The irrigation system discussed here includes a dam, a canal, and numerous small rivulets.
SCREENER:
Case: Subak A, Indonesia
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a chapter in a book. Currently, there are additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Subak A, situated in Tinhingan Area of Indonesia. More generally, it is located in Orient. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Subak A. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Subak A have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 201-500 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
A Balinese "subak" is defined as all the rice terraces irrigated from a single dam and major canal. All individuals owning land irrigated by the subak are "citizens" of it. The subak however is more than an "irrigation society": it is also an agricultural planning unit, an autonomous legal corporation, and a religious community. It is the seat of effective power with respect to agricultural matters in Bali, where water control is an overwhelmingly local and intensely democratic matter. The subak is administered by a pyramidal hierarchy (top two levels elected); monitoring and maintenance of the system are the responsibility of this hierarchy. The annual pattern of subak-associated ritual matches the flow of agricultural activity. In this article, Geertz describes the agricultural and municipal organization of one Balinese settlement (Tihingan) to illustrate generalities about the subak system. Residents belong to five subaks; information on Subak A has been coded.
CITATION(S):
Geertz, Clifford (1967) "Organization of the Balinese Subak." In IRRIGATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, edited by E. Walter Coward Jr., 70-90. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
The resource appropriated from Subak A is irrigation water. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The irrigation system discussed here includes a dam, a canal, and numerous small rivulets.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the irrigation water can be controlled (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation over space in the availability of irrigation water within the resource. There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of irrigation water within a single year (ambiguous). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of irrigation water from year to year.
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is gently undulating (educated guess).
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
This study did not include whether or not the headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource. The study did not indicate who operates the headworks for this system. The irrigators being served by this production organization may or may not participate in the selection of the officials of the production agency - that piece of the case was not indicated in the study. The distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) or the groups(s) of people as the appropriation system, but the distribution system is not solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (highly confident). The case study did not include information on whether or not the distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system.
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the Tihingan area, a cluster of village settlements and farmlands along the slope of a mountain. The hamlet, Tinhingan, is one among several village settlements in the area. The boundaries of the location are defined by a pattern of village settlements. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of several canal systems supplying water to different irrigation societies, out of which only one, Subak A, is coded. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were conflictual effects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (ambiguous). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and relatively autonomous with respect to other economic networks during the entire time period (ambiguous).
The latitude of this location is 8.32'S, and its longitude is 115.25'E. The elevation of this location is 188 meters (confident). The highest elevation is 300 (highly confident). The lowest elevation of this location is 75 (highly confident). The region's average annual rainfall is 1802 milimeters. The region's average annual evapotranspiration is 1476 milimeters. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 248, evapotraspiration: 139
February precipitation: 224, evapotraspiration: 129
March precipitation: 216, evapotraspiration: 140
April precipitation: 115, evapotraspiration: 134
May precipitation: 109, evapotraspiration: 127
June precipitation: 87, evapotraspiration: 109
July precipitation: 50, evapotraspiration: 53
August precipitation: 42, evapotraspiration: 81
September precipitation: 54, evapotraspiration: 85
October precipitation: 157, evapotraspiration: 145
November precipitation: 217, evapotraspiration: 146
December precipitation: 283, evapotraspiration: 148
COUNTRY, REGION, TIME:
This study examines a common-pool resource institution in Indonesia, starting in 0, ending in 0.
During the period of time that this region was studied, the citizens of Indonesia were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local general purpose governments (ambiguous). Regarding the charter of a local general purpose government, the citizens had full choice and could draft their own charter without receiving approval elsewhere (ambiguous). The citizens living in Indonesia were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local special purpose enterprises with some public powers (highly confident). Regarding the charter of a local special purpose enterprise, the citizens had full choice and could draft their own charter without receiving approval elsewhere (inferred).
During the time of this study, citizens in this or similar regions had created or evolved public enterprises with public treasuries and collective decisions outside the formal governmental structure (highly confident).
The individuals that made collective choice decisions in Indonesia were locally elected officials who could act on their own without prior review (inferred).
The resource appropriated from Subak A is irrigation water. The irrigation system discussed here includes a dam, a canal, and numerous small rivulets.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, distribution, and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1958. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 76 to 100 years. Throughout the duration there was no indication in this study as to whether or not there are major changes in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no information provided in this study to indicate whether or not there are any changes in the size and/or structure of the resource. There was no indication in this study which indicated whether or not new technology was introduced to the resource during the time of coding. There was no information included in the study to indicate whether or not there was a substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not have documentation regarding changes due to the appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There was no information in this study indicating whether or not there were any new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no information included in the study to indicate whether or not there was a recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because The author did his field research in 1957-1958. The pattern he described had probably lasted for over 75 years..
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 16000000
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (ambiguous). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was moderate (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was well maintained, and in excellent working order (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are always records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). There are always records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (ambiguous). These records are available for inspection by appropriators (ambiguous). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (educated guess). The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (inferred).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (highly confident). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators (educated guess). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). The study does not indicate whether or not there was an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource.
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related to other local resources, as well as evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (highly confident). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is very likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (inferred).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (educated guess). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and appropriators (not necessarily all) rotated into this position (highly confident).
The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 6-10 (highly confident). Official monitors are paid in money. None of the monitors were full-time (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 4.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the Subak. The criteria for who is a member is well defined. . This group ended with a membership of 455.
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). Religious identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Hindu. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 76 through 100 years (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice lightly constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly paddy rice, and also grains other than paddy rice. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (ambiguous). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is either dependent or contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (highly confident). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (inferred). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Subak A is irrigation water. The irrigation system discussed here includes a dam, a canal, and numerous small rivulets.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal up to a fixed percentage of the total units available during a period, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input based on unincluded, specific criteria. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor based on equal division among all appropriators or teams of appropriators. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Most of the time, labor force is organized in relatively small teams.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators cannot obtain external aid to develop technologies for using the resource units. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 76 to 100 years.
Balinese subak (9th Century - ~1970)
Resource System
Watershed and its associated ecology
Resource Users
Irrigators (rice farmers) -- 455 rice farmers in Subak A (from Geertz (1967) original case document)
Public Infrastructure Providers
- Water temple head for each watershed (this is a priest, which for Crater Lake (the watershed of Subak A) is named Jero Gde, who governs several hundred subak
- One leader (klian subak) for each subak (a subdivision of the watershed)
- Sub-subak (tempek) leaders, called klian tempek (7 in Subak A)
- Pekaseh (paid members/workers of the subak - 120 in Subak A)
- The subak cropping system in Bali governs ~1200 subak total, and is organized by 5 water temples, each defined topographically by watershed
Public Infrastructure
Hard human-made infrastructure includes: (1) dams, canals, and bamboo water dividers to divert water to individual fields, and (2) water temples.
Soft human-made infrastructure includes the subak constitution, rules-in-use for crop choice and cycle, and religion which plays an important role in maintaining social capital and dictating rules for resource use.
Relationship 1
R => RU
- Farmers extract water for rice cropping using soft and hard infrastructure
RU => R
- Farmers' rice yields can be influenced by pests that damage crops
Relationship 2
RU => PIP
- One person, one vote for the subak leader (klian subak) and the tempek leaders (klian tempek)
- Some members of each subak become pekaseh (paid members of the subak), who maintain hard infrastructure
PIP => RU
- Pekaseh (paid members of the subak) monitor farmers within their subak
- The klian subak (elected leader of a subak) provides information to farmers on which crops to plant and when, based on the farmer's tempek (a subdivision of a subak)
- Jero Gde (the temple head) manages potential conflict between tailenders and headenders across the watershed
Relationship 3
Pekaseh (paid members of the subak) are responsible for maintenance, monitoring, and water provisioning -- and they also guard against theft
Relationship 4
Hard PI => R
- Irrigation infrastructure transports water
Soft PI => R
- Cropping system control the ecology of pests
Relationship 5
Soft & Hard PI => R
- The crop cycles and water schedules set by the water temple, and the hard human-made water irrigation infrastructure, dictate the dynamics of water timing and volume, regulating rice production, fallow field times, and alternative cropping patterns.
Soft PI => RU
- Regulates who gets water, when
- Rules harmonize the crop planting dates, thereby regulating pest outbreaks
Relationship 6
RU => Hard PI
- All land owners (e.g., subak members) have the right to participate and must do so for larger tasks
Soft PI => RU
- Farmers can get fined for not following rules
- Farmers can rent land to tenants under a strict set of rules
- Farmers are taxed to pay the pekaseh workers based on how much land they own
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
- Cycles of weather can influence floods, droughts, and pests
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
- A flood can destroy the irrigation system (Hard PI)
- Social change (Green Revolution) destroyed the rules-in-use (Soft PI) of the subak system in the late 1970s
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
- The Green Revolution influenced agricultural policy in Indonesia, which fined farmers for not using high yield rice varieties and farming maximum yields
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
- The subak system temporarily collapsed during the Green Revolution (no PIP)
- In the early 1990s, irrigation control was restored to the local subak system
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
- No human infrastructure is explicitly specified; but it can be inferred that water temple leaders have much local knowledge of the watershed and associated ecology, in order to make effective cropping and fallowing decisions for the many subak in the system
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. 2014.Cultural landscape of bali province: the subak system as a manifestation of the tri hita karana philosophy, State of Conservation 2015. State of Conservation.
. 2015.Managing a living cultural landscape: Bali’s subaks and the UNESCO World Heritage Site. SEI Project Report 2015-05.
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