- Resource System
- Coastal lagoon ecosystem
- Resource Units
- A variety of fish stocks, including, mullet, sea-bream, eel, and sea-bass
The Messolonghi-Etolico lagoon is in the northern part of Patraikos Gulf, on the west coast of central Greece. The original case, which was published in 1984, catalogues an action situation with approximately 200 independent fishermen and 170 fishermen in 11 co-ops. The resource units are mullets, sea-bream, eel, and sea-bass. The co-ops feel the independents are free-riders on co-op efforts to trap fish; independents resent the co-ops' privileges, power, and subterfuges to restrict membership. The result is inefficient use of the lagoon's fish, violent confrontations, gear violations, and ecological stress.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is mullet and scabream. The fishing ground is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon The boundary of the lagoon is natural. The north, east, and west sides of the lagoon are bound by shoreline. On its southern edge it is divided from the Patraikos Gulf by a chain of islands.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is mullet and scabream. The fishing ground is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon The boundary of the lagoon is natural. The north, east, and west sides of the lagoon are bound by shoreline. On its southern edge it is divided from the Patraikos Gulf by a chain of islands.
SCREENER:
Case: Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery, Greece
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a paper issued by a scholar or research institution. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery, situated in Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon of Greece. More generally, it is located in Europe. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
Appropriator teams for the resource are sometimes formally organized.
Two groups of fishers compete in appropriating from Greece's Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon. One group, organized into co-ops, uses fixed gear and motorized vessels. The other group, independent fishers, uses primarily spears, and unmotorized craft. The co-ops feel the independents are free-riders on co-op efforts to trap fish; independents resent the co-ops' privileges, power and subterfuges to restrict membership. The result is inefficient use of the lagoon's fish, violent confrontations, gear violations and ecological stress.
CITATION(S):
Kotsonias, G. (1984) "The Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon of Greece: Socio-Economic and Ecological Interactions of Cooperative and Independent Fishermen." In MANAGEMENT OF COASTAL LAGOON FISHERIES, edited by James M. Kapetsky and G. Lasserre. GFCM Studies and Reviews 2(61). Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
The resource appropriated from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is mullet and scabream. The fishing ground is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon The boundary of the lagoon is natural. The north, east, and west sides of the lagoon are bound by shoreline. On its southern edge it is divided from the Patraikos Gulf by a chain of islands.
SCREENER:
Case: Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery, Greece
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a paper issued by a scholar or research institution. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery, situated in Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon of Greece. More generally, it is located in Europe. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
Appropriator teams for the resource are sometimes formally organized.
Two groups of fishers compete in appropriating from Greece's Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon. One group, organized into co-ops, uses fixed gear and motorized vessels. The other group, independent fishers, uses primarily spears, and unmotorized craft. The co-ops feel the independents are free-riders on co-op efforts to trap fish; independents resent the co-ops' privileges, power and subterfuges to restrict membership. The result is inefficient use of the lagoon's fish, violent confrontations, gear violations and ecological stress.
CITATION(S):
Kotsonias, G. (1984) "The Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon of Greece: Socio-Economic and Ecological Interactions of Cooperative and Independent Fishermen." In MANAGEMENT OF COASTAL LAGOON FISHERIES, edited by James M. Kapetsky and G. Lasserre. GFCM Studies and Reviews 2(61). Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is mullet and scabream. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The fishing ground is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon The boundary of the lagoon is natural. The north, east, and west sides of the lagoon are bound by shoreline. On its southern edge it is divided from the Patraikos Gulf by a chain of islands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, but are divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
This study did not indicate whether or not there are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource . The study did not indicate whether the quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others . The case information did not indicate whether or not a variance in quality between zones has ever created conflict among appropriators.
The study did not indicate whether or not there are natural barriers within the resource. There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Mullet and scabream can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable variation over space in the availability of Mullet and scabream within the resource (ambiguous). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of Mullet and scabream within a single year (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of Mullet and scabream from year to year.
The bottom topography of Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is not indicated in the case study information.
If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have conflictual effects.
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the location. Rather, the location is within the boundaries of the appropriation resource (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the location (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. Production is within the boundaries of distribution (educated guess).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated on the "north part of Patraikos Gulf, on the west coast of Central Greece". The location includes the lagoon of Messolonghi-Etolico and the villages of Neochori, Etolico and Messolonghi. The boundaries of the location are both naturally and institutionally defined, including both, villages and a lagoon. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of demersal species: mullets and seabream.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred).
The latitude of this location is -1, and its longitude is -1. The elevation of this location is 0 meters (inferred). The highest elevation is 0 (inferred). The lowest elevation of this location is 0 (inferred). The region's average annual rainfall is 737 milimeters (highly confident). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is unknown. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
The resource appropriated from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is mullet and scabream. It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The fishing ground is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon The boundary of the lagoon is natural. The north, east, and west sides of the lagoon are bound by shoreline. On its southern edge it is divided from the Patraikos Gulf by a chain of islands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, but are divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
This study did not indicate whether or not there are distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource . The study did not indicate whether the quality and/or quantity of units is regularly better in some of the zones than in others . The case information did not indicate whether or not a variance in quality between zones has ever created conflict among appropriators.
The study did not indicate whether or not there are natural barriers within the resource. There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Mullet and scabream can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable variation over space in the availability of Mullet and scabream within the resource (ambiguous). There is considerable, and predictable variation in the flow of Mullet and scabream within a single year (inferred). The case study did not include information regarding whether or not there is considerable variation in the flow of Mullet and scabream from year to year.
The bottom topography of Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is not indicated in the case study information.
If no rules in use were being followed, the relationship among the appropriation processes would have conflictual effects.
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the location. Rather, the location is within the boundaries of the appropriation resource (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the location (inferred). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (educated guess). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. Production is within the boundaries of distribution (educated guess).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated on the "north part of Patraikos Gulf, on the west coast of Central Greece". The location includes the lagoon of Messolonghi-Etolico and the villages of Neochori, Etolico and Messolonghi. The boundaries of the location are both naturally and institutionally defined, including both, villages and a lagoon. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of demersal species: mullets and seabream.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred).
The latitude of this location is -1, and its longitude is -1. The elevation of this location is 0 meters (inferred). The highest elevation is 0 (inferred). The lowest elevation of this location is 0 (inferred). The region's average annual rainfall is 737 milimeters (highly confident). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is unknown. The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is mullet and scabream. The fishing ground is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon The boundary of the lagoon is natural. The north, east, and west sides of the lagoon are bound by shoreline. On its southern edge it is divided from the Patraikos Gulf by a chain of islands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and production. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1985. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 11 to 25 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by an external authority in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no information included in the study to indicate whether or not there was a substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Tons of fish harvested per year at the beginning of the period: 1600 (educated guess)
Tons of fish harvested per year at the end of the period: 1400 (confident)
At the end of this period, the units were not sexually mature at this size or age (educated guess).
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
The information about how units are disposed at the end of the period is missing in case.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there was no information provided in the case study regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are appropriated. As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was experiencing some deterioration due to insufficient maintenance (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was experiencing some deterioration due to insufficient maintenance (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared low levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises rarely used) (educated guess). At the end of the period the appropriators shared low levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises rarely used) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (educated guess). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No documentation was included in the study regarding whether or not the appropriators of this resource are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource. There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). There are always records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Most appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (ambiguous).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use are small and did not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively negative, perhaps even spiteful manner -- one indicator of this would be vandalism by appropriators against appropriators. (inferred).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the end of the period. The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) is not described in detail in this case study. This position monitors rules devised by regional collective choice processes (column 2 of the rules form), rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form), and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards. The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. The study did not indicate how many of the monitors were full-time.
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 31.1 - 32.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 31.1 and 32.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
The author's evaluation of age, weight, withdrawal rates, quality of unit, maintenance, and trust was difficult without comparative date, however, the resources grades low on results. The type of technology used, and competition between coop and non-coop fishers are a factor of the results.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group belong to eleven different coops. The criteria for who is a member is well defined. . This group ended with a estimated membership of 101-200..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Greek. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Caucasian. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Greek.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 11 through 25 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (ambiguous). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (ambiguous). Capital is owned by 76%-90% of this subgroup. No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units where the flow of units first enters into the resource (i.e. headenders) (highly confident). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (highly confident). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (educated guess).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are independent fishermen. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a estimated membership of 101-200..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Greek. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Caucasian. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Greek.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 11 through 25 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (inferred). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after all other subgroups have withdrawn (i.e. tailenders) (educated guess). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (highly confident), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that about half of the members follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally large (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is mullet and scabream. The fishing ground is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon The boundary of the lagoon is natural. The north, east, and west sides of the lagoon are bound by shoreline. On its southern edge it is divided from the Patraikos Gulf by a chain of islands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and production. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1985. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 11 to 25 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by an external authority in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no information included in the study to indicate whether or not there was a substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Tons of fish harvested per year at the beginning of the period: 1600 (educated guess)
Tons of fish harvested per year at the end of the period: 1400 (confident)
At the end of this period, the units were not sexually mature at this size or age (educated guess).
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
The information about how units are disposed at the beginning of the period is missing in this case.
The information about how units are disposed at the end of the period is missing in case.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there was no information provided in the case study regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are appropriated. As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was experiencing some deterioration due to insufficient maintenance (educated guess). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was experiencing some deterioration due to insufficient maintenance (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared low levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises rarely used) (educated guess). At the end of the period the appropriators shared low levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises rarely used) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (educated guess). At the end of this period the owners were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators were exercising, or attempting to exercise, de jure and effective closed access to this resource (inferred).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (inferred). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No documentation was included in the study regarding whether or not the appropriators of this resource are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource. There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are always records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). There are always records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (educated guess). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. Records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators (inferred). The keepers of these records are officials at some level (inferred). The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource at a frequency which was not included in the case study. The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are no specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (inferred). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Most appropriators sell this resource in multiple markets (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (ambiguous).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification are not included in the case study. Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use are small and did not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively negative, perhaps even spiteful manner -- one indicator of this would be vandalism by appropriators against appropriators. (inferred).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the beginning of the period. A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was not included in the case study, at the end of the period. The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) is not described in detail in this case study. This position monitors rules devised by regional collective choice processes (column 2 of the rules form), rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form), and rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards. The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was not included in this case study. The study did not indicate how many of the monitors were full-time.
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 2 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 31.1 - 32.1 - 0 - 0
Subgroups 31.1 and 32.1 differ in legal rights to appropriate units, in withdrawal rates from the resource, and in exposure to variations in supply.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period. The study did not indicate whether or not the relatively worst off appropriators have or have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed.
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
The author's evaluation of age, weight, withdrawal rates, quality of unit, maintenance, and trust was difficult without comparative date, however, the resources grades low on results. The type of technology used, and competition between coop and non-coop fishers are a factor of the results.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group belong to eleven different coops. The criteria for who is a member is well defined. . This group ended with a estimated membership of 101-200..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Greek. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Caucasian. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Greek.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup have de jure rights to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource. (inferred). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 11 through 25 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Less than 10% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (ambiguous). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (ambiguous). Capital is owned by 76%-90% of this subgroup. No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units where the flow of units first enters into the resource (i.e. headenders) (highly confident). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (highly confident). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that most of the members follow the rules (educated guess).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are independent fishermen. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (highly confident). . This group ended with a estimated membership of 101-200..
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Greek. Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Caucasian. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Greek.
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 11 through 25 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are moderately dependent (i.e. about half of the family income) on this resource (educated guess). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered low (inferred). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Considering that there are multiple subgroups using this resource, most of the appropriators withdraw units after all other subgroups have withdrawn (i.e. tailenders) (educated guess). A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules heavily constrain (highly confident), time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (educated guess). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (educated guess). The maintenance or improvement work is neither dependent nor contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that about half of the members follow the rules (educated guess). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally large (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred). Attempting to alter the behavior of appropriators, members of this group have threatened or actually used violence to obtain a more favorable situation (regardless of the rules).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is mullet and scabream. The fishing ground is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon The boundary of the lagoon is natural. The north, east, and west sides of the lagoon are bound by shoreline. On its southern edge it is divided from the Patraikos Gulf by a chain of islands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the regional and local level(s).
1
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the most duty(s).
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
Payoff Rules
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, there is no level of government or organization of appropriators at the location with operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists forbidding payment of a fixed entry fee every time the resource is accessed. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists forbidding payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s).
A rule exists permitting use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
2
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the second most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
There is a rule forbidding a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 2nd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: educated guess. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others, and this subgroup receives the 2nd most rewards.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
The resource appropriated from Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery is mullet and scabream. The fishing ground is the Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon The boundary of the lagoon is natural. The north, east, and west sides of the lagoon are bound by shoreline. On its southern edge it is divided from the Patraikos Gulf by a chain of islands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides a few detailed references about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the regional and local level(s).
1
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the quantity of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the most duty(s).
Information Rules
There exists a rule requiring recording of the number of units withdrawn. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
This information was recorded by an AGO.
Payoff Rules
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
The default condition, that no rules specify contraints or requirements on the process to be used in deciding which actions will be taken, and that appropriators can have as much independence in deciding upon actions as they are physically able to exert, is imposed in this case.
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, there is no level of government or organization of appropriators at the location with operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists permitting membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists forbidding payment of a fixed entry fee every time the resource is accessed. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists forbidding payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the regional and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s).
A rule exists permitting use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
2
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal at specific locations or spots, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule forbidding withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule permitting withdrawal whenever and wherever desired, based on unspecific criteria. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal privileges to subgroups in the second most privileged position.
Scope Rules:
The local level(s) of government or organization does not exist.
There is a rule forbidding a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on membership/non-membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the regional level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups, and this subgroup has the 2nd most duty(s).
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: educated guess. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others, and this subgroup receives the 2nd most rewards.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%; 0%
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 11 to 25 years.
Messolonghi-Etolico Lagoon Fishery
Resource System
- The key shared natural infrastructure is the complex food web of which the fish stock is a part.
- The key shared resource: the fish stock (mullets, sea-bream, eel, and sea-bass)
Resource Users
There are two different classes of resource users in this fishery:
(1) Fishers who operate as part of Cooperatives
(2) Fishers who operate independently of Cooperatives
Public Infrastructure Providers
- Governor of province
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Local councils of Messolonghi, Etolico and Neochori
Public Infrastructure
- Key human-made hard infrastructure consist of fences and fish traps.
- Key human-made soft infrastructure consists of various rules restricting fishing activities. The details of these rules are described in link 5.
Relationship 1
(RS => RU)
- Resource users employ a variety of human, and hard human-made infrastructure to extract the resource.
- Resource users mobilize private infrastructure in the form of boats and other fishing gear to extract fish from the lagoon.
Relationship 2
(RU => PIP)
- Some cooperative fishermen have gained enough wealth and power to influence public infrastructure providers with money.
- Cooperative fishermen pay 25% of their gross income to the government as a lease fee.
Relationship 3
(PIP => PI)
- The legal aspects governing the exploitation of the lagoon are handled by the public infrastructure providers:
(1) The governor of the province can lease out part or whole of the lagoon to the cooperatives or businessmen for a period of 10 years.
(2) The Ministry of Agriculture supervises the lagoon (the document doesn't mention what supervision specifically entails).
(3) The local councils of Messolonghi, Etolico, and Neochori collect most of the income that the cooperatives and businessmen pay.
Relationship 4
(RS => PI)
- The public human-made hard infrastructure has a direct impact on the stock and flow of fish:
(1) Fish enter the lagoon in the spring, grow during the summer on natural feeds and are trapped when they attempt to return to the sea in autumn.
(2) Use of fences and fish traps of very fine mesh affect the speed of tidal currents of the area and in turn adversely impact the lagoon's resources.
(3) Non-removal of fences from the mouth of the lagoon during spring time inhibit lagoonward migration of the fish, and kill small fry and fingerling over the summer
Relationship 5
(PI => 1)
- Public infrastructure restricts where and when fishing can occur:
(1) Rules restrict fishing efforts of any kind within a zone of 500-1000 metres from the mouth of the lagoon
(2) Rules restrict fishers from cooperative from fishing on unleased areas of the lagoon
(3) Rules require cooperative to maintain a minimum number of members in order to have a legal status
(4) Rules restrict independent fishers from using motorized equipment for fishing throughout the year, and spears and lights from the beginning of November to the end of March. There are no such rules restricting fishers from the cooperative.
Relationship 6
(RU => PI)
- The nature of public infrastructure generates potential conflict between different groups:
(1) Members of the cooperatives accuse independent fishermen of free-riding on the hard work of the former group. Independent fishermen accuse cooperatives of being closed clubs that serve the interests of their friends and families. The conflict between these two groups often includes violence.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
- Non motorized personal boats of independent fishermen. (Implied)
- Knowledge of how to fish effectively with a spear.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, University of Arizona.
Brady U, Arizona State University.
Shaffer L, Arizona State University.
. 1984. The Messolonghi-Etoliko Lagoon of Greece: Socio-Economic and Ecological Interactions of Cooperative and Independent Fishermen. Management of coastal lagoon fisheries. :521-528.