- Resource System
- Coastal marine ecosystem
- Resource Units
- Kembong (species of Mackerel) and Udang ako (species of Prawn)
The fishing village of Rusembilan is situated on the shore of the Gulf of Thailand, about 3 and half miles from the provincial capital, Pattani. Fishing, which is largely seasonal, is the most important occupation, followed by rice cultivation. The original case spans from 1956 to 1964 and catalogues an action situation involving approximately 1,000 villagers; the resource units are kembong (species of mackerel) and udang ako (species of prawn). Social relationships and communication in the village weakened (as has village integration) with the introduction of new technology.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Rusembilan Kembong Fishery is kembong (type of mackeral). The Kembong fishing grounds are located in the Gulf of Thailand, extending from 4 miles to 20 miles out of the Bay of Pattani, which is located on the southeastern coast of the Malay Penninsula in southern Thailand. The boundary of this resource is very fluid, changing from season to season depending on where the fish are. Due to technological restraints, the boundary never extends further than 20 miles from the coast line at Rusembilan.
SCREENER:
Case: Rusembilan Kembong Fishery, Thailand
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Rusembilan Kembong Fishery, situated in Rusembilan Kembong Fishery of Thailand. More generally, it is located in Orient. The system's sector is that of fisheries. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Rusembilan Kembong Fishery. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Rusembilan Kembong Fishery have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
The Rusembilan Kembong Fishery covers an unknown area. There are less than 25 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Fraser describes life in Rusembilan, a fishing village in southern Thailand, near the Malay border: economy, ceremony, religion, family, local government and its place in the nation, community organization, and fishing. He does not focus on organization for CPR appropriation or give details on the resource itself, but does explain catch division and marketing, and technology-induced social change. The links of fishing crew solidarity to social relationships and communication in the village have weakened (as has village integration) with the introduction of outboard motors and nylon nets. When motors replaced sails, oars, and paddles, less mutual effort was needed to get boats to fishing grounds; nylon nets require less care by the crew after fishing than natural-fiber nets. Crew members used to call on each other for help in shore activities such as housebuilding. Now, interacting less with each other as a social unit while fishing, the crew as a unit also ashore has become less important.
CITATION(S):
Fraser, Thomas M., Jr. (1960) RUSEMBILAN: A MALAY FISHING VILLAGE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Fraser, Thomas M., Jr. (1966) FISHERMEN OF SOUTH THAILAND: THE MALAY VILLAGERS. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. [ILL: Indiana State University; DS570 .M3F7]
The resource appropriated from Rusembilan Kembong Fishery is kembong (type of mackeral). It is produced biologically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. The Kembong fishing grounds are located in the Gulf of Thailand, extending from 4 miles to 20 miles out of the Bay of Pattani, which is located on the southeastern coast of the Malay Penninsula in southern Thailand. The boundary of this resource is very fluid, changing from season to season depending on where the fish are. Due to technological restraints, the boundary never extends further than 20 miles from the coast line at Rusembilan.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, but are divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess). The variance in quality between the zones has at some point in time created conflict among appropriators.
There are not strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the Kembong (type of mackeral) can be controlled (inferred). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation over space in the availability of Kembong (type of mackeral) within the resource (highly confident). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of Kembong (type of mackeral) within a single year (inferred). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of Kembong (type of mackeral) from year to year (inferred).
The bottom topography of Rusembilan Kembong Fishery is not indicated in the case study information.
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the location. Rather, the location is within the boundaries of the appropriation resource (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource partially overlap the boundaries of the location, but the two boundaries are not equivalent (confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource, but appropriation is within the boundaries of distribution (inferred). The boundaries of the production resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource (inferred).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in southern Thailand on the Malay Penninsula, in the province of Pattani. The village of Rusembilan is located on Pattani Bay in the Gulf of Thailand. The location includes the village and the Kembong fishery grounds. The boundaries of the location are institutionally determined, including the village and the fishing grounds whose boundaries are determined by use. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of Kembong (coding), as well as crabs, prawns, and shrimp. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location . There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (inferred).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is . The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
February precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
March precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
April precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
May precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
June precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
July precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
August precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
September precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
October precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
November precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
December precipitation: N/A, evapotraspiration: N/A
The resource appropriated from Rusembilan Kembong Fishery is kembong (type of mackeral). The Kembong fishing grounds are located in the Gulf of Thailand, extending from 4 miles to 20 miles out of the Bay of Pattani, which is located on the southeastern coast of the Malay Penninsula in southern Thailand. The boundary of this resource is very fluid, changing from season to season depending on where the fish are. Due to technological restraints, the boundary never extends further than 20 miles from the coast line at Rusembilan.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a central government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is not indicated in this study. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are not indicated as either attempting, or failing to attempt to exercise access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are not exercising, or attempting to exercise closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 0. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was an enhancement of physical capabilities to withdraw units (e.g. introduction of turbine pump) from the resource during the time of this study. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The variables that changed were -2. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because B6.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was moderately abundant (educated guess). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was moderately abundant (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the beginning of this period. It is not indicated whether or not the units were sexually mature at this size or age at the end of this period.
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly sold in local markets, and also consumed by appropriators and families.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was high (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was modest (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (inferred). At the end of this period there was no information provided as to whether or not owners are exercising or attempting to exercise closed access to this resource. At the end of the period there was no information in the study to indicate whether or not appropriators are exercising, or attempting to exercise, closed access to this resource.
INFORMATION LEVELS
There is no information in the study to indicate the availability of maps or charts of the appropration resource for use by the appropriators. Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not documented as being available, or unavailable in this case study. The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing and delivering units (highly confident). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (inferred). There are not actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (educated guess). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (highly confident). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource daily. The appropriators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of this resource (highly confident).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not documented as having experienced any effect of past appropriators. This study did not include information on whether or not there are problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal). Almost all appropriators sell this resource in one market (inferred). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (highly confident). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (highly confident).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related to other local resources, as well as evidence that the appropriators have a general cultural pattern that stressed various types of cooperative activities besides the management of this resource (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did not exist (inferred). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators (educated guess). There was a general estimate of 201-500 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 25-50, at the beginning of the period (educated guess). A general estimate of the number of participants in the team appropriation process was 25-50, at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does not exist (inferred). This position monitors rules-in-use.
The appropriators monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (ambiguous).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 30.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author does not focus on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results.
The author does a little evaluation, primarily description.
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the members of this subgroup are malayan fishermen who live in the village of Rusembilan, Thailand. They use the same fishing technology. The criteria for who is a member is well defined. Membership at the start of this group numbered 200 (inferred). This group ended with a membership of 200 (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
Gender identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are ethnically identified as Malay. The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (highly confident). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are racially identified as Malay. Religious identification causes no difference in composition (highly confident). Most members of this subgroup are religiously identified as Moslem. There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (highly confident). The language spoken by most members of the subgroup is Malay.
The appropriation process is organized as a team process consisting of 14 groups.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (inferred). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (inferred). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (inferred). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (educated guess). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess).
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is more than 1000 years (confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Given the assets of members, the capital required to set up an appropriation team does not place pressure upon the appropriators to get immediate returns from appropriation (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limit rules cause unknown contraints, quantity rules cause unknown contraints, marginal units, or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation, cause unknown contraints.
Technology:
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (educated guess). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Rusembilan Kembong Fishery is kembong (type of mackeral). The Kembong fishing grounds are located in the Gulf of Thailand, extending from 4 miles to 20 miles out of the Bay of Pattani, which is located on the southeastern coast of the Malay Penninsula in southern Thailand. The boundary of this resource is very fluid, changing from season to season depending on where the fish are. Due to technological restraints, the boundary never extends further than 20 miles from the coast line at Rusembilan.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by national collective choice mechanism. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanisms, however a regional level of government does exist.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location but the author provides NO information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
A rule exists requiring citizenship or residence of a local community. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring membership in an ethnic group. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring ownership of some other form of limited property related to the appropriation from the resource. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring an appropriator to be of a certain gender. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring that an appropriator be of a particular race. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring use of a particular technology. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s).
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 1 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The length of the withdrawing season is 0 week(s)..
There is a rule requiring withdrawal at specific locations or spots, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
There is a single arrangement by which the appropriation process is organized by teams.The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operators(s) of primary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) (non-operator(s)) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Owner(s) - operator(s) of supplementary appropriation equipment:
0%; 0%; 0%
Crew with special assets (including non-owner captain):
0%; 0%; 0%
Regular crew (each):
0%; 0%; 0%
Other:
0%; 0%; 0%
The ownership of the primary and/or supplemental appropriation equipment is divided into shares. The motorboat receives 3 shares, each member of the crew receives 1 share. The 4 net handlers and the steerer receive an additional 1/4 of a share, the boat receives 3/4 of a share.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
1960s Representation
Resource System
-Key shared resource: Marine fish stocks and their productivity
-Natural infrastructure: Complex marine foodweb
-Target species of high commercial value: kembong (a Mackerel species); and udang ako (large prawn species)
Resource Users
-Villagers of Rusembilan (1,000 Malay Muslims), a majority of which are engaged in fishing activity
Public Infrastructure Providers
-Boat steerers
-Orang baik ("respected men")
-Imam
-Wife of steerer
Public Infrastructure
-Hard public infrastructure:
Koleks (35-50 ft. long boat used for deep sea fishing (mainly kembong and udang ako) and ceremonial occasions; gill nets; roads; and drying and sorting area - all have divisional ownership and are therefore neither strictly public nor private.
-Soft public infrastructure:
Task division of kolek crew members; rules for distribution of fish; norms of reciprocity; knowledge, skill, leadership and experience of the steerer in selecting crew and managing boat and fishing activity.
Each member of boat crew has to supply 2 kembong nets.
Relationship 1
-Schools of kembong migrate up the coast of Thailand and are seasonally available from the beginning of April through the end of September/early October.
-Fishing is limited by the lunar cycle - fishing is done at night when fishermen can detect kembong schools by the fluorescent organisms they disturb as they move through the ocean - accordingly there is no fishing for 7-10 days a month around full moon. Fishing is further limited by weather and, until the mid 1960s, there was no fishing Thursday night due to the observance of the Muslim day of rest.
-Access to this valuable resource is limited by acceptance to a kolek team. No other boundary rules exist.
-Fishermen perceive kembong yields to be decreasing, but whether this observation is fact is uncertain.
Relationship 2
-Fisherman informally compete for positions to kolek teams that have demonstrated their luck in previous seasons.
-Steerers attempt to attract village fishermen with the greatest amount of skill and experience.
-Orang baik are called upon either individually or as a group by community members to deal with matters of conflict (informal authority).
-Imam (formally mediate arguments/disputes and determine whether a particular matter must be forwarded to a higher authority, e.g., Thai government or Muslim guru.
Relationship 3
-Authority of the steerer is absolute and followed by crew.
-Wife of boat owner determines catch share distribution and settles disputes over shares.
-Well-organized boat groups and the influence of an orang baik effectively stopped nighttime theft by organizing a village patrol of fishermen who rotated into their patrol position and were fully compensated.
-Disputes over position of kolek in tow and catch distribution of kolek teams.
Relationship 4
-Hard public infrastructure, such as tow boats increased the distance fishing crews can cover in a night (resource boundaries), thereby potentially increasing resource yield/extraction levels.
Relationship 5
-Motors and nylon nets have reduced the number of crew members that are required per kolek, as well as overall fishing effort.
Relationship 6
-Social norms mandate that kolek crews remain large, despite lower crew requirement due to technological advances (tow boat and nylon nets). This has led to increased resentment by some fishermen that they are subsidizing other fishers who are "not carrying their weight."
-Villagers prefer individual activity to cooperative efforts - rules regarding tow boats were too contentious and abandoned in favor of individual outboard motors.
-Cooperation most likely in areas of economic interest, such as village patrol to stop theft.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Potential over-fishing by outsiders
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
-The monsoon annually destroys the road.
-Technological advances (motors and nylon nets) are negatively impacting rules regarding boat crews and catch distribution.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
-Increasing globalization and economic orientation of villagers is moving them away from cooperative, communal, and kinship-based relationships.
-Individualistic and competitive (Western) values are leading to investment in capital goods and accumulation of money - increased commercialization of fishery.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
-Interdependency between fishers is weakened with technology improvements.
-Authority of steerer and orang baik undermined by technological advances and individualistic values.
-Distrust between fishermen and Thai government officials means that it will be difficult to craft nested institutional arrangements when needed.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)2013 Representation
Resource System
-Key shared resource: Marine fish stocks and their productivity
-Natural infrastructure: Complex marine foodweb
-Target species of high commercial value: kembong (a Mackerel species); and udang ako (large prawn species)
Resource Users
-Commercial fishermen
-Artisanal fishermen (from Rusembilan)
-Aquaculturists
-Rice farmers
Public Infrastructure Providers
-Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO)
-Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO)
-Sectoral ministries (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Department of Fisheries; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Natural Resources)
-Village-level public infrastructure providers (Royal Marine Police; Royal Navy; Marine Resources Development Center; government-appointed village headman)
Public Infrastructure
-Hard public infrastructure: Fish markets and fishing port in Pattani
-Soft public infrastructure: TAO jurisdiction over fisheries for the first 3 nautical miles (nm); PAO jurisdiction for the next 6 nm; a variety of concurrently authorized laws and regulations that operate and are implemented without clear jurisdictional boundaries.
-Fishing boat requires two licenses (fishing license and navigation certificate) issued by two different agencies
-Fishing gear fees (not assessed)
-Motor boat registration fees
Relationship 1
-Kembong yields have decreased dramatically in recent years due to over fishing by resource users and improvements in fishing equipment
-2/5 of catches are trashfish and a significant portion of those catches are marine juveniles.
Relationship 2
Most fishing operations use bribes so that they do not have to obey equipment rules, which is seen as being less costly than registration. Some local fishers have tried to organize to change what type of equipment is allowed, but this rule does not have adequate enforcement and the pressure from commercial fishermen means that locals also use all technology available to them. Also the local fishermen are an out group (Malay Muslims) which has low trust with the state officials identify as being Thai and have different native languages, histories, and cultures.
Relationship 3
-Conflicting rules and inadequacy of law enforcement due to lack of political will, and financial and manpower resources leads to empowerment of local officials to interpret regulations with impunity and in their best financial interest (increased bribery and corruption).
-The market, port and rule enforcement are performed by the Thai officials and there is no history of successful incorporation of local institutions or leaders.
-Economic incentives foster the continued promotion of the fishmeal industry and trashfish catch practices.
Relationship 4
-New marine zoning laws do not comport with geological conditions, e.g., Pattani Bay is wider than 3 nm and heavily utilized by small scale fishermen.
-Continued use of push nets in coastal areas facilitating the continued overexploitation and destruction of marine habitat.
Relationship 5
-Department of Fisheries officials only have two boats to patrol 116 km of coastline.
-Insufficient budget to compensate officials for overtime and most fishing is conducted at night.
-Push nets are banned but continue to be used by commercial and small-scale fishermen.
-Unreasonably low license fees and charges promote overexploitation of resources.
Relationship 6
-Bribery and corruption facilitated by empowerment of local officials due to institutional weaknesses in fishery laws and regulations.
-Lack of oversight and enforcement of laws.
-Promotion of fish industry.
Locals have primarily been reduced to subsistence fishing and agriculture, so they participate much less in the market than they used to. They also are not incorporated in creating fishing institutions.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
-The fishery has dramatically declined or collapsed due to overfishing.
-Persistent violations in mesh size are further contributing to extirpation of marine species.
-Impacts of water and land pollution on marine environment.
-Massive transformation of coastal landscapes due to tourism industry, human settlements, commercial agriculture, and aquaculture.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Rapid economic growth and concomitant transformation of marine fishery from an artisanal occupation to a multibillion dollar export industry.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
-A massive influx of new users with sophisticated technology has demolished the resource.
-Population growth.
-Increasing poverty and inability to economically depend on fishing.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
-Corporate interests influencing public decision-making.
-Public infrastructure providers are now primarily the Thai government who facilitates the laws and (lack of) enforcement for fishing.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Schlager E, University of Arizona.
Brady U, Arizona State University.
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