Heterogeneity in the Commons: Hard Infrastructure and Its Effects on Collective Action and Public Goods Provisioning

Resource System
Coastal marine ecosystem / watershed and associated topography
Resource Units
A variety of marine fish stocks / freshwater
Location
Nicaragua, Greece, Thailand, and India

We compare three artisanal fisheries (Lagoon fishery in Greece; Kembong fishery in Thailand; and the Green turtle fishery in Nicaragua) and tangentially draw on three small-scale irrigation systems (Tirunelveli and Kottapalle in South India, and Nabagram in Bangladesh) in order to understand the impact of hard infrastructure on the prospects of collective action with specific reference to the rules-in-use related to common pool resource (CPR) management.  Based on the small subset of cases examined, we find that as the heterogeneity of hard infrastructure increases, efficiency achieved by regulation decreases due to the increasing incongruence between rules-in-use, appropriation and provisioning behavior, and local conditions.

Case comparison fisheries & irrigation
Resource System

Fisheries

  • Natural infrastructure is the coastal marine ecosystem (shared) and its marine stocks (fish and green turtles) (common pool)

Irrigation

  • Natural infrastructure is terrestrial hydrosphere and topography (shared) and water (common pool).
Resource Users
  • Fishermen in three fishing communities/areas (Nicaraguan green turtle, Greek lagoon, and Thai kembong)
  • Irrigators in three irrigation communities
Public Infrastructure Providers

Fisheries

  • Indigenous Miskito (traditional and contemporary Nicaraguan turtle fishery)
  • Cooperative and independent fishermen (Greek lagoon fishery)
  • Malay fishermen (traditional Thai fishery)
  • Commercial fishermen & small-scale Malay fishermen (contemporary Thai fishery)
  • Officials at various government levels (local, regional/territorial, national) in all three fisheries

Irrigation

  • Irrigation Department staff, field staff, local contractor, village council, field guards, and common irrigators (Kottapalle irrigation)
  • Government agency, public works department, and water users association (Sananeri irrigation)
Public Infrastructure

Public hard infrastructure

Fisheries

  • Markets and roads (traditional and contemporary Nicaraguan and Thai fisheries)
  • None (Greek lagoon)

Irrigation

  • Irrigation canals, channels, cross-bunds

Private hard infrastructure

Fisheries

  • Boats (motorized and non-motorized), nets (nylon and cotton), spears) (traditional and contemporary Nicaraguan and Thai fisheries)
  • Boats (motorized and non-motorized), fences, traps, fine-mesh nets, long-lines and spears (Greek lagoon)

Irrigation

  • Tanks and pumps (Sananeri)

Soft infrastructure

Fisheries

  • Norms and traditions (traditional Nicaraguan and Thai fisheries)
  • Harvesting rules at various government levels (contemporary Nicaraguan and Thai fisheries)
  • Leasing agreements between cooperatives and provincial government (Greek lagoon)
  • Legal access rights provided to independent fishermen (Greek lagoon)
  • Gear, boat, and spatial restrictions all lagoon fishermen (Greek lagoon)

Irrigation

  • Water theft rules (Kottapalle irrigation)
  • Appropriation and land ownership rules (Sananeri irrigation)
Relationship 1

RU => R:

  • Fishermen extract marine fish and turtle stocks
  • Irrigators extract ground and surface water

R => RU:

  • Marine and terrestrial systems provide affordances to RU
Relationship 2

RU => PIP:

  • Unknown what link if any exists between RU and PIP in fisheries cases
  • Irrigators elect water user association members and can themselves be elected

PIP => RU:

  • Fishermen's expectations as PIP are shaped by engagement with market transactions (traditional Nicaraguan and Thai fisheries)
  • PIP establish rules and enforce them (irrigation cases)
Relationship 3

PIP => hard infrastructure

  • Fishermen (as PIP) build and maintain dories and koleks (traditional Nicaraguan and Thai fisheries)
  • No influence (Greek lagoon and contemporary Nicaraguan and Thai fisheries)
  • PIP monitor for water theft (irrigation cases)

PIP => soft infrastructure:

  • PIP at various governance levels provide rules regarding harvesting and gear restrictions (all fisheries)
  • PIP provide water distribution and maintenance rules
Relationship 4

PI hard => RS:

  • No significant direct influence of PI (hard or soft) on RS (all fisheries)
  • Tanks and pumps control the stock and flow of water (irrigation systems)
Relationship 5

Hard PI => [RU => R]

  • Hard new infrastructure is incentivizing overappropriation of marine stocks (traditional and contemporary Nicaraguan and Thai fisheries)
  • Water allocation (irrigation systems)

Soft PI => [RU => R]

  • Rules-in-use enable overappropriation of lagoon fish stocks (cooperative fishermen in Greek lagoon fishery)
  • Regulation of maintenance of irrigation canals (irrigation systems)
Relationship 6

Hard PI => RU

  • New hard infrastructure is eroding social relations between cooperative and independent fishermen (Greek lagoon fishery)

Soft PI => RU

  • Lack of monitoring and sanctioning is empowering RU to skirt regulations (all fisheries)
  • Collective choice rules unite irrigators to clean and maintain irrigation canals
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)

Climate change

Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)

Exogenous drivers on hard and soft infrastructure vary by case.

Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)

Economic deprivation and access to global and domestic markets (fisheries)

Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)

Exogenous drivers on PIP vary by case

Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)

Brady U,  Arizona State University.