- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Pasture land and freshwater
Located in the Nowk valley in Kurnool district in the state of Andhra Pradesh in South India, Kottapalle has an area of 4,600 acres. The village is in the tail-end of a 20-mile irrigation canal. The original research was conducted from 1980 to 1982. The state Irrigation Department is responsible for regulating water allocation between each outlet between each village from the canal. The local council is responsible for distribution of water to fields in the village. Also, livestock are needed for agriculture in Kottapalle, as they are an important source of fertilizer. So, manure is obtained by allowing sheep and goats to come into the village for the period from the harvest until the time of field preparation for the next season.
This case is part of the original CPR database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Kottapalle - Irrigation is water for irrigation. This resource consists of canals that deliver water from the government-managed distributary to farmlands.
SCREENER:
Case: Kottapalle - Irrigation, India
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a book. Currently, there are no additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe two resources in detail. The primary resource is the Kottapalle - Irrigation, situated in Kottapalle of India. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Kottapalle - Irrigation. The condition of this resource is well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Kottapalle - Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 501-1000 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
The village, Kottapalle, is located in the tail-end part of a 20-mile distributary of a government-run irrigation canal. Kottapalle has experienced a scarcer and more unreliable supply of water than other up-stream villages. It, however, has developed a village council which regulates irrigation within the village. The council has about nine members, with general authority to take decisions affecting all the village. The members are expressly chosen year by year, and are quite distinct from the statutory village council of local government legislation, the "panchayat". Wade uses this case to illustrate issues about organizing collective action in relation to irrigation. (see also doc 87)
CITATION(S):
Wade, Robert (1987) VILLAGE REPUBLICS: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION IN SOUTH INDIA. Cambridge, England. Cambridge University Press.
Wade, Robert (1985) "Common Property Resource Management in South Indian Villages." In PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 231-258. Prepared by the Panel on Common Property Resource Management, Board on Science and Technology for International Development, National Research Council. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.*
The resource appropriated from Kottapalle - Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. This resource consists of canals that deliver water from the government-managed distributary to farmlands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are independent of a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (highly confident). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (highly confident). There is considerable, and mildly predictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (highly confident). There is considerable, but unpredictable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year (inferred).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is gently undulating (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are totally seperated from the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are not identical to the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The distribution resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, but the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are not the sole operator(s) of the headworks (highly confident). A regular agency(s) of a regional government (e.g. State Department of Water Resources) operates the headworks for this system (highly confident). The irrigators being served by this production organization do not participate in the selection of the officials of the production agency except as citizens in a general election (highly confident). The distribution system is operated by the same agency(s) or the groups(s) of people as the appropriation system, but the distribution system is not solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (highly confident). A regular agency(s) of a regional government (e.g. State Department of Water Resources) operate(s) the distribution system (inferred). The irrigators being served by this production organization do not participate in the selection of the officials of the distribution agency, except as citizens in a general election (highly confident). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (highly confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in Kottapalle village. The boundaries of the location are the boundaries of a village. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of canals that deliver water from the government-managed distributary to farmlands (coding), as well as grazing land, tamarin nuts, dung dropped in public places, fish in the village. Regarding the use of the irrigation system, there were few adverse affects throughout the entire period in the relationships among appropriation processes.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (highly confident). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). Additionally, the most common mode of transportation in this region is buses .4. This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 0 meters. The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 750 milimeters (highly confident). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
COUNTRY, REGION, TIME:
This study examines a common-pool resource institution in India, starting in 0, ending in 0.
During the period of time that this region was studied, the citizens of India were not able to follow formal procedures to create their own local general purpose governments (educated guess). If a basic charter of a traditionally evolved local general purpose government was in existence, it could be maintained (inferred). The citizens living in India were not able to follow formal procedures to create their own local special purpose enterprises with some public powers (educated guess). The basic charter of a traditionally evolved local special purpose enterprise could be maintained (inferred).
During the time of this study, citizens in this or similar regions had created or evolved public enterprises with public treasuries and collective decisions outside the formal governmental structure (highly confident).
The individuals that made collective choice decisions in India were locally elected officials who could act on their own without prior review (ambiguous).
The resource appropriated from Kottapalle - Irrigation is water for irrigation. This resource consists of canals that deliver water from the government-managed distributary to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, distribution, and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study is a regional government. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1982. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 26 to 50 years. Throughout the duration there were no changes made in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author begins the description of this case at this point in history.
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was not included in the case information. For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was a moderate shortage (educated guess). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was not included in the case information. For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was a moderate shortage (educated guess).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 5000000
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was not included in the study. As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there was no information provided regarding whether or not there are problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated. At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was not indicated. As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was relatively low (educated guess). At the beginning of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study, the interference between the appropriation technology for this resource and the appropriation processes for other resources in this location had no effect on the appropriation resources (educated guess). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was being maintained at a level that was not recorded in the case information. At the end of this study the appropriation resource was moderately well maintained, and in good working order (educated guess). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared levels of trust that are not indicated in the case study. At the end of the period the appropriators shared modest levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises are used but appropriators may be uncertain about performance) (educated guess). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource (highly confident).
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are readily available maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (ambiguous). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are available to appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (ambiguous). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way. There are not records of the appropriators' contributions to monitoring of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There was no information in the study about whether or not there are records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way. There is no information in the study to indicate whether or not records are kept in a language accessible to most of the appropriators. The keepers of these records are not indicated as being "officials" or "non-officials" in this case study. The case study did not indicate whether or not these records are available for inspection by appropriators. The study did not indicate whether or not there are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource. Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (educated guess). The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are non-appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (educated guess). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators (highly confident). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (educated guess). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively neutral, quid-pro-quo manner -- each exchange was evaluated for what it might bring (inferred). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related primarily to other local resources (inferred). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is unlikely that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). There is a considerable range of sanctions imposed depending on rule infractions and in regard to social, physical, and official sanctions (highly confident). It is likely as not that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (educated guess). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of some undocumented number appropriators. There was a general estimate of 501-1000 appropriators at the end of the period (educated guess). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and local non-appropriators are selected by appropriators for this position (highly confident). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form) and rules-in-use.
The appropriators do not monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (educated guess). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 11-25 (highly confident). Official monitors are paid in commodities. Almost all of the monitors were full-time (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 1 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 16.1 - 0 - 0 - 0
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The authors results identified a relatively adequate water supply for tailenders (pp.27-34) (article). The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -1-
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are the the irrigators of the village. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). . This group ended with a membership of 800 (educated guess). An estimated 26%-50% of this group is literate in a language that records or publications about this resource and/or location (or other similar resources) is kept (inferred).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Difference in composition with regard to ethnic or cultural identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to racial identification does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). Most members of this subgroup are of the cast Reddy. The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de facto (inferred). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de facto (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 26 through 50 years. Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (highly confident). Most people in this subgroup are very dependent (i.e. most of the family income) on this resource (inferred). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (inferred). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Capital is owned by 76%-90% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (inferred). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules cause unknown contraints, time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice heavily constrain (inferred), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a high value immediate return (inferred).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used threatens the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (inferred).
Strategies Adopted:
At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). In irrigation, appropriation resources (at the beginning of the period) produce mostly paddy rice, and also legumes. In irrigation, the appropriation resources (at the end of the period) produce mainly grains other than paddy rice, and also edible tree crops. During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (inferred). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). The maintenance or improvement work is either dependent or contingent on the quantity of units appropriated (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 91%-100% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (highly confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (highly confident). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Kottapalle - Irrigation is water for irrigation. This resource consists of canals that deliver water from the government-managed distributary to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, the author provides a few detailed references to operational level rules as devised by regional collective choice mechanism which have been coded below..
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring ownership or leasing of land in the location of the resource. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s).
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights cannot be transferred to anyone else.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the first paddy season.
The authority and scope rules do not apply to whether or not certain subgroups received substantially unequal privileges, because there is only one subgroup.
Scope Rules:
The national level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the regional, local, and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring labor, money, or materials to be used for major capital investment, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: inferred. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Moderate fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used temporarily as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain aid from a regional (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 26 to 50 years.
Open-field husbandry
Resource System
- The key shared natural infrastructure is the complex web of the hydrosphere and topography in which agriculture is done.
- The key shared resource: fallow fields for grazing
Resource Users
There are two different classes of resource users in this system:
- Livestock,
- Herders, and
- Farmers
Public Infrastructure Providers
- Irrigation Department staff (supervisor, executive engineer, and assistant engineers)
- Field staff (two channel men and one foreman)
- Local village contractor
- Village council (9 members)
- Field guards (4 guards)
- Common irrigators (12 or 13)
Public Infrastructure
- Key human-made soft infrastructure consists of various rules regulating harvesting dates, livestock movement, and crop theft.
Relationship 1
- Resource users mobilize private infrastructure in the form of oxen and buffalo, sheep and goats, and the occasional herd of pigs to extract fodder from fallow fields.
- Fields with standing crops endure losses inflicted by straying livestock.
Relationship 2
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Relationship 3
- Regulation aspects governing the exploitation of land are handled by the public infrastructure providers:
- The village council provides the the date at which sorghum harvesting can begin, so as to minimize patchwork harvesting.
- The village council employs a squad of four field guards for most of the year, whose job is to regulate straying of livestock and prevent crop theft.
Relationship 4
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Relationship 5
- Public infrastructure restricts where and when grazing can occur:
- Rules enable farmers to take part in an auction in order to solve the problem of allocating flocks to farmers.
- Rules incentivize herders to graze their flock for four nights in the designated field. By failing to do so, they will receive only half of their share from the auction.
- Rules regulate the time for which herders must leave their flock in the designated field. This is from 6:30 PM to 8 AM next day.
- Rules restrict herders from allowing their flock to graze standing crops.
- Rules restrict the number of stock that can be brought into the village to graze the stubble. This rule doesn't apply to the stock owned by households in the village.
Relationship 6
The nature of public infrastructure generates revenue, promotes social relationships, and also generates conflicts:
- Rules sanction owners of straying livestock to pay a fine of Rs. 4 per head at night and Rs. 2 per head during the day.
- Activities like "sheep-folding" auction and general body meetings enhance social relations by assembling villagers in a meeting area to exchange information.
- Rules mediate quarrels that arise due to unregulated grazing in cropped lands and crop thefts.
- Factions based on caste often divide villagers, resulting in conflicts and violence.
- The village crier educates villagers by about upcoming meetings and festivals, common irrigator elections, and any other decisions made by the village council.
- The nature of public infrastructure also disempowers women from expressing their opinion(s) in public forums.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)Irrigation
Resource System
- The key shared natural infrastructure is the complex web of the hydrosphere and topography in which agriculture is done.
- The key shared resource: irrigation water
Resource Users
- There is one class of resource users in this system:
- Farmers
Public Infrastructure Providers
- Irrigation Department staff (supervisor, executive engineer, and assistant engineers)
- Field staff (two channel men and one foreman)
- Local village contractor
- Village council
- Common irrigators
Public Infrastructure
- Key human-made soft infrastructure consists of various rules restricting water theft.
- Key human-made hard infrastructure consists of cross-bunds, channels, and a canal.
Relationship 1
- Resource users employ a variety of human, hard human-made and soft human-made infrastructures to extract the resource:
- Resource users mobilize private infrastructure in the form of stones and mud to build cross-bunds and extract water from the main canal.
Relationship 2
- Resource users can influence the actions of infrastructure providers:
- Tail-end farmers petition with the village council to employ common irrigators, to cope with water scarcity.
- Resource users can petition with the council to dismiss a common irrigator if their performance is unsatisfactory.
- Resource users elect the common irrigators every year.
- Resource users may monitor the activities of other irrigators and water levels in their fields in an ad hoc arrangement.
Relationship 3
- Regulation aspects governing the exploitation of water are handled by the public infrastructure providers:
- The village council must appoint common irrigators each year depending on water supply conditions and the area planted in paddy and must also decide the exact daily wage rate at the start of their employment.
- The village council must appoint two village elders who allocate particular outlets to the common irrigators. This is to make sure no common irrigators is assigned the responsibility of an outlet leading to his own land.
- Along with the common irrigators, the village council also must involve in getting more water to the village and in resolving conflicts over water within the village.
- Common irrigators must prevent irrigators up the distributary line from Kottapalle’s boundary from blocking Kottapelle’s branch in order to increase their own supplies.
- Common irrigators must make minor repairs to the field access roads and help the field guards protect crops from theft near harvest time.
Relationship 4
- Hard human-made infrastructure concentrates the flow of the resource:
- The main distributary in the village is cross-bunded for one or two days at a time, in order to raise the depth and transport more water through the outlet.
Relationship 5
- Public infrastructure restricts when and how much water can be collected:
- Rules restrict farmers from collecting water out of their turn.
- Rules restrict fields to be irrigated only until it has an 'adequate' depth of water standing in it, as decided by the common irrigators.
Relationship 6
- The nature of public infrastructure generates revenue, potential conflict, elite capture, and corruption in the village:
- Rules sanction farmers to pay a fine if are caught stealing water.
- Rules mediate conflicts concerning water theft, that often arise between head-end and tail-end farmers.
- The nature of public infrastructure empowers wealthy farmers take more water into their fields and use their connections to escape fines. The common irrigators are usually afraid to complain against these farmers due to their influence in the community.
- Reliance on timely delivery of water empowers engineers to demand a compensation (bribe) from the farmers, in order to assure water supplies in the first season.
- Rules empower farmers to monitor the activities of other irrigators.
The nature of public infrastructure also disempowers women from expressing their opinion(s) in public forums.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
Based on the source document, there are no disturbances described.