- Resource System
- Watershed and associated topography
- Resource Units
- Freshwater
The Nabagram Irrigation System is located in Comilla District in Bangladesh. The resource appropriated related to the social dilemma is water for irrigation appropriated by a tube well The original case was reported in 1979 and catalogues an action situation involving 50 families. Nabagram improved its efficiency and technology largely through mobilization of locally provided and controlled resources, developing only limited dependency on a government agency.
This case study is part of the original Common-Pool Resource (CPR) database. A summary of the original CPR coding conducted in the 1980s by Edella Schlager and Shui Yan Tang at Indiana University may be found under the CPR tab in the Institutional Analysis section below.
The resource appropriated from Nabagram Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Nabagram Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
SCREENER:
Case: Nabagram Irrigation, Bangladesh
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a journal article. Currently, there are additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Nabagram Irrigation, situated in Nabagram of Bangladesh. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Nabagram Irrigation. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Nabagram Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 51-100 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Coward and Badaruddin discuss the experience of Nabagram, Bangladesh in successfully providing a tubewell irrigation system. This experience suggests that irrigation programs can be effective when village groups are given a large amount of responsibility for managing the irrigation system, and if a variety of institutional arrangements is allowed to be designed or evolved at the village level. Nabagram's capacity for innovation was facilitated by a flexible bureaucracy tolerant of local variations. The result was that Nabagram improved its efficiency and technology largely through mobilization of locally provided and controlled resources, developing only limited dependency on a government agency.
CITATION(S):
Coward, E. Walter, Jr., and Ahmed Badaruddin (1979) "Village, Technology, and Bureaucracy: Patterns of Irrigation in Comilla District, Bangladesh." JOURNAL OF DEVELOPING AREAS 13: 431-440.*
The resource appropriated from Nabagram Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
SCREENER:
Case: Nabagram Irrigation, Bangladesh
The information regarding the following common-pool resource system was taken from empirical evidence from a field setting. Data on the system was extracted from a journal article. Currently, there are additional documents to cite which may provide further information about this common-pool resource.
These documents describe one resource in detail. The primary resource is the Nabagram Irrigation, situated in Nabagram of Bangladesh. More generally, it is located in Middle East & South Asia. The system's sector is that of water. Relatively good information has been collected about the stakes of participants who appropriate from Nabagram Irrigation. The condition of this resource is not well understood. Complete information is available regarding the strategies used by key groups interacting with the system. There is thorough documentation of the operational rules for this resource. This is the result of a high level of confidence that the authors who recorded the features of Nabagram Irrigation have a complete knowledge of its particulars. Furthermore, the authors have provided sufficient data to formulate a structured coding process.
There are 51-100 total appropriator teams appropriating from the resource . At the beginning of the period discussed by the authors, there was an apparently balanced supply of biological and physical resources withdrawn compared to the number of units available. Appropriator teams for the resource are always formally organized.
Coward and Badaruddin discuss the experience of Nabagram, Bangladesh in successfully providing a tubewell irrigation system. This experience suggests that irrigation programs can be effective when village groups are given a large amount of responsibility for managing the irrigation system, and if a variety of institutional arrangements is allowed to be designed or evolved at the village level. Nabagram's capacity for innovation was facilitated by a flexible bureaucracy tolerant of local variations. The result was that Nabagram improved its efficiency and technology largely through mobilization of locally provided and controlled resources, developing only limited dependency on a government agency.
CITATION(S):
Coward, E. Walter, Jr., and Ahmed Badaruddin (1979) "Village, Technology, and Bureaucracy: Patterns of Irrigation in Comilla District, Bangladesh." JOURNAL OF DEVELOPING AREAS 13: 431-440.*
RESOURCE INFO:
The resource appropriated from Nabagram Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are designated by a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (inferred). There is not considerable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (educated guess). There is not considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (educated guess). There is not considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year (educated guess).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is moderately sloping (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (highly confident). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (highly confident). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (highly confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the village of Nabagram. The boundaries of the location are boundaries of a village. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (inferred). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 9 meters (highly confident). The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 2388 milimeters (highly confident). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
COUNTRY, REGION, TIME:
This study examines a common-pool resource institution in Bangladesh/Commilla District, starting in 1969, ending in 1976.
During the period of time that this region was studied, the citizens of Bangladesh/Commilla District were not able to follow formal procedures to create their own local general purpose governments (educated guess). If a basic charter of a traditionally evolved local general purpose government was in existence, it may or may not have been maintained, but this information was not included. The citizens living in Bangladesh/Commilla District were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local special purpose enterprises with some public powers (inferred). Regarding the charter of a local special purpose enterprise, the citizens had considerable choice and could draft their own charter subject to approval elsewhere (educated guess).
During the time of this study, citizens in this or similar regions had created or evolved public enterprises with public treasuries and collective decisions outside the formal governmental structure (inferred).
The individuals that made collective choice decisions in Bangladesh/Commilla District were locally elected officials who could act on their own without prior review (inferred). The source of funds used by general purpose local governments was not included in the case study. The judiciary system in this region during the time of the study was not included in the case study. The judges gained their positions through ways that were not included in the case information. The tenure of the judges was not included in the case information. In general, the judges in Bangladesh/Commilla District has a reputation that was not included in the case information. The case study did not include information on whether there was a single dominant legal tradition in use in this region.
The resource appropriated from Nabagram Irrigation is water for irrigation. It is produced physically and is a renewable moving (fugitive) unit. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
The boundary of this resource has natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry. The boundaries of this resource are smaller than the location, and exist in one country, and are not divided among multiple general purpose local jurisdictions at a single level. The boundaries of this resource are designated by a development project designed by non-residents.
There are not distinct and stable micro-environmental or ecological zones within this resource (educated guess).
There are strategic points within the resource where the main flow of the water for irrigation can be controlled (inferred). There is not considerable variation over space in the availability of water for irrigation within the resource (educated guess). There is not considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation within a single year (educated guess). There is not considerable variation in the flow of water for irrigation from year to year (educated guess).
The topography of the resource or the land immediately around the resource is moderately sloping (inferred).
The boundaries of the production resource do not coincide with the boundaries of the appropriation resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the location, but lie within the boundaries of the location (highly confident). The boundaries of the distribution resource are roughly equivalent to the boundaries of the appropriation resource (highly confident). The boundaries of the production resource are not equivalent to the boundaries of the distribution resource. The production resource is a facility connected to the distribution resource (highly confident).
The headworks (production resource) are operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource, and the agency(s) or the group(s) of people are the sole operator(s) of the headworks (highly confident). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the appropriation resource (highly confident). The distribution system is solely operated by the same agency(s) (or the same group(s) of people) as the headworks of the system (highly confident).
LOCATION:
The appropriation resources are situated in the village of Nabagram. The boundaries of the location are boundaries of a village. The appropriation resource present in this location consists of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
The system is located within one country. Within this country, the system's location is not divided among several general purpose local jurisdictions at the same level. A permanent population lives year round in this location (inferred). There is frequent contact and communication between people in this location and officials in a nearby administrative center (inferred). This location is also characterized by an economy that is stable and tied to other economic networks during the entire time period (educated guess).
The latitude of this location is not specified, and its longitude is not specified. The elevation of this location is 9 meters (highly confident). The highest elevation is 0. The lowest elevation of this location is 0. The region's average annual rainfall is 2388 milimeters (highly confident). The region's average annual evapotranspiration is . The distribution of rainfall and evapotranspiration per month is as follows:
January precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
February precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
March precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
April precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
May precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
June precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
July precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
August precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
September precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
October precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
November precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
December precipitation: 0, evapotraspiration: 0
COUNTRY, REGION, TIME:
This study examines a common-pool resource institution in Bangladesh/Commilla District, starting in 1969, ending in 1976.
During the period of time that this region was studied, the citizens of Bangladesh/Commilla District were not able to follow formal procedures to create their own local general purpose governments (educated guess). If a basic charter of a traditionally evolved local general purpose government was in existence, it may or may not have been maintained, but this information was not included. The citizens living in Bangladesh/Commilla District were able to follow formal procedures to create their own local special purpose enterprises with some public powers (inferred). Regarding the charter of a local special purpose enterprise, the citizens had considerable choice and could draft their own charter subject to approval elsewhere (educated guess).
During the time of this study, citizens in this or similar regions had created or evolved public enterprises with public treasuries and collective decisions outside the formal governmental structure (inferred).
The individuals that made collective choice decisions in Bangladesh/Commilla District were locally elected officials who could act on their own without prior review (inferred). The source of funds used by general purpose local governments was not included in the case study. The judiciary system in this region during the time of the study was not included in the case study. The judges gained their positions through ways that were not included in the case information. The tenure of the judges was not included in the case information. In general, the judges in Bangladesh/Commilla District has a reputation that was not included in the case information. The case study did not include information on whether there was a single dominant legal tradition in use in this region.
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Nabagram Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1976. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by the appropriators in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because In the 1971 season the cooperative decided to create the position of water distributor (p.435).
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 291800 (highly confident)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 291800
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was well maintained, and in excellent working order (inferred). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was well maintained, and in excellent working order (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource.
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (educated guess). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (highly confident). The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are appropriators and non-appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (confident). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (inferred). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related primarily to other local resources (educated guess). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). It is unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (educated guess). At the end of the period studied there was an estimate of 51-100 participant(s) in this position (educated guess). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators (highly confident). There was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and local non-appropriators are selected by appropriators for this position (confident). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form).
The appropriators do not monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (educated guess). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 1-5 (inferred). Official monitors are paid in money. Almost all of the monitors were full-time (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 3 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 76.1 - 76.2 - 76.3 - 0
Subgroups 76.1 and 76.2 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 76.1 and 76.2 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 76.1 and 76.3 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 76.1 and 76.3 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 76.2 and 76.3 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 76.2 and 76.3 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The author recorded good results in respect to mobilization of local resources and equity. Local inventiveness and bureaucratic tolerance were a factor in the results. Comments recorded regarding evidence that is presented concerning the nature and level of transaction costs are as follows: The information regarding the nature and level of transaction costs involves the difficulties of informing, organizing, and enforcing the contribution of labor from outside the village. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -1
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are cooperative members. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 32 (highly confident). This group ended with a membership of 32 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (educated guess).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are village nonmembers. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 18 (highly confident). This group ended with a membership of 18 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (inferred). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are outside villagers. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 11 (highly confident). This group ended with a membership of 11 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates less than 10% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (inferred). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
The resource appropriated from Nabagram Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
TYPE OF SITUATION
The processes described in the related documents are primarily related to appropriation, production, distribution and use. The formal owner(s) of the resource discussed in this study are local appropriators. The set of individuals who have rights to withdraw from this resource is well-defined. As of the beginning of this period, the owners are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) and effective in gaining closed access to this resource. Since the beginning of this period, the appropriators are exercising (or attempting to exercise de jure) effective closed access to this resource.
EVENTS MARKING THE BEGINNING ACTION SITUATION
It is estimated that the operational level coded on this form ended in 1976. The estimated duration of the patterns that are described in this form is 1 to 10 years. Throughout the duration there was change made primarily by the appropriators in operational, collective, or consititutional rules. There was no change in resource size or structure. There was no new technology introduced to the system over the duration of the patterns coded on this form. There was no substantial external change in the value of the units appropriated. The quantity of units available did not change due to a change in appropriation patterns of other appropriators' withdrawals from the same production or distribution resource. There were no new groups starting to withdraw units from the appropriation resource. There was no recorded change to one or more variables internal to the operational level. The author does not begin the description of this case at this point in history. The author begins at this point in history because In the 1971 season the cooperative decided to create the position of water distributor (p.435).
CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD COVERED BY THIS FORM*
For biological resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For biological resources at the end of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the beginning of this period, the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units was apparently balanced (inferred). For physical resources at the end of the period the balance between the quantity of units withdrawn and the quantity of units needed, given the usual patterns of use for these units, was apparently balanced (inferred).
The following includes the available statistics on the use of this resource at the beginning of the time period, followed by the end of the time period:
Square meters of fields irrigated at the beginning of the period: 291800 (highly confident)
Square meters of fields irrigated at the end of the period: 291800
*In fisheries and other biological systems, this is the maximum sustainable number of units. In irrigation, this refers to the optimal water requirements of the crops in the established fields served by this system.
At the beginning of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
At the end of the period, the units were predominantly used to produce other units.
As of the beginning of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). As of the end of the period, the quality of the units being withdrawn from the resource was passable (educated guess). At the beginning of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources, due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). At the end of the period of the study, there were no problems of pollution in this or other resources due to the way units are being appropriated (inferred). As of the beginning of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). As of the end of the period, the extent of technical externalities resulting from the appropriation activities of participants from this resource was quite low (inferred). At the beginning of this study the appropriation resource was well maintained, and in excellent working order (inferred). At the end of this study the appropriation resource was well maintained, and in excellent working order (inferred). At the beginning of this period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). At the end of the period the appropriators shared moderate to high levels of mutual trust (e.g. oral promises given high credence) (inferred). ## Unknown markup: Start ##By the end of this period no change had occurred in the property rights regime related to the appropriation resource.
INFORMATION LEVELS
There are no maps or charts of the appropriation resource for use by the appropriators (educated guess). Maps and/or charts of the production and distribution resources are not available to the appropriators (educated guess). The appropriators of this resource can be seen by each other while withdrawing units from the resource (educated guess). No appropriators are in radio communication with each other while appropriating from the resource (educated guess). There are actions being taken, by appropriators or officials, to generate information about the condition of the resource (inferred). There are not records of the withdrawals from this resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the physical factors which directly affected the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are not records of the appropriators' contribution to the maintenance of the resource kept in a systematic way (inferred). There are arenas being used for the exchange of information about conditions of the resource (inferred). Appropriators get together to discuss mutual problems of the resource weekly (highly confident). The appropriators have a considerable familiarity with the characteristics of this resource (educated guess).
POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
There are appropriators and non-appropriators that made up a specialized staff or workers to undertake maintenance (confident). The quality or quantity of the units available to the appropriators are not adversely affected by the strategies of prior appropriators, because there are no prior appropriators (inferred). There are not problems of pollution resulting from activities of others who are not appropriators of this resource or inhabitants of this location (e.g. acid rain, sewage disposal) (inferred). There does not appear to be an insurance mechanism available to the appropriators related to variability of income from the resource (educated guess).
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Differences between subgroups relating to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to ethnic identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to racial identification does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to caste identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Differences between subgroups relating to languages spoken does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to general cultural views of the resource system and its use does not exist (inferred). Differences between subgroups relating to any problems that affect communication does not exist (inferred).
The general manner in which appropriators related to one another during this study is a relatively positive, reciprocal manner -- the presumption was made that long-term relationships are involved and positive actions are undertaken without a specific expectation of return (educated guess). The documents present evidence of specific types of cooperative activities between the appropriators related primarily to other local resources (educated guess). If someone violated the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that he/she would encounter social sanctions imposed by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely as not that he/she would encounter physical sanctions by other appropriators (who are not filling posititions as official monitors) (educated guess). If someone violates the rules-in-use related to the appropriation process from this resource, it is likely that an official monitor or guard would move to impose sanctions (educated guess). It is unlikely that local appropriators would attempt to bribe an official if an official monitor or guard moved to impose sanctions (educated guess).
POSITIONS AND PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the period studied the position of non-appropriator (individuals prevented from using the resource) did exist (educated guess). At the end of the period studied there was an estimate of 51-100 participant(s) in this position (educated guess). At the beginning of the period there was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators (highly confident). There was a general estimate of 51-100 appropriators at the end of the period (highly confident). The "official" position of monitor (apart from the willingness of all appropriators to monitor) does exist, and local non-appropriators are selected by appropriators for this position (confident). This position monitors rules devised by local collective choice processes (column 3 of the rules form).
The appropriators do not monitor the appropriation activities of each other apart from the monitoring of any "official" guards (educated guess). The general estimate for the number of official monitors on duty at one time during peak hours was 1-5 (inferred). Official monitors are paid in money. Almost all of the monitors were full-time (highly confident).
NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUBGROUPS
There will be 3 subgroup form(s) completed in relation to this operational level form. The ID number(s) of the subgroup(s) coded are as follows: 76.1 - 76.2 - 76.3 - 0
Subgroups 76.1 and 76.2 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 76.1 and 76.2 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 76.1 and 76.3 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 76.1 and 76.3 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
Subgroups 76.2 and 76.3 differ in legal rights to appropriate units.
Subgroups 76.2 and 76.3 do not differ in withdrawal rates from the resource, in exposure to variations in supply, in levels of dependency on the units withdrawn from this resource, and in the way they use the appropriation units.
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
There are no appropriators who were consistently disadvantaged in this period (educated guess). The relatively worst off appropriators have not been cut out of their benefits from this resource or substantially harmed (educated guess). By the end of the period studied the distance between those who were the least advantaged and those who were the most advantaged could be characterized as remaining relatively constant over time (educated guess).
AUTHOR'S EVALUATION AND CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this coding form the author focuses on the readers' concept of results and the evaluation of results (inferred).
The author recorded good results in respect to mobilization of local resources and equity. Local inventiveness and bureaucratic tolerance were a factor in the results. Comments recorded regarding evidence that is presented concerning the nature and level of transaction costs are as follows: The information regarding the nature and level of transaction costs involves the difficulties of informing, organizing, and enforcing the contribution of labor from outside the village. The author discusses withdrawals per unit of effort based on -1
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are cooperative members. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 32 (highly confident). This group ended with a membership of 32 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource is held de jure (highly confident). Exclusion from use of the entire resource is exercised de jure (inferred). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (educated guess). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (educated guess). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (educated guess). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). At least one member has assumed entrepreneurial activity in trying to achieve coordinated strategies in relationship to both withdrawal and investment (highly confident). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). Action in the collective choice arena has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (educated guess).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 51%-75% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (confident). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are village nonmembers. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 18 (highly confident). This group ended with a membership of 18 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (confident). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (confident). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (confident). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules moderately constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates 26%-50% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (inferred). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
SUBGROUP:
Participants:
This appropriation group are outside villagers. The criteria for who is a member is well defined (inferred). Membership at the start of this group numbered 11 (highly confident). This group ended with a membership of 11 (highly confident).
The following statements characterize the composition of this subgroup's population with respect to variables that may affect the capacity to communicate effectively:
The difference in composition with regard to gender identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Ethnic or cultural identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition with regard to clan identification does not affect communication (educated guess). Racial identification causes no difference in composition (inferred). The difference in composition of the group with regard to caste does not affect communication (educated guess). The difference in composition with regard to religious identification does not affect communication (educated guess). There is no difference in composition with regard to languages spoken (inferred).
.
Legal Rights:
Members of this subgroup have de jure rights of access (highly confident). The right to withdraw is held by this subgroup de jure (highly confident). Rights to participate in management of this resource are not held either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Exlusion from use of the entire resource is not exercised either de facto nor de jure (highly confident). Members of this subgroup cannot exercise the right to decide who can be excluded from particular zones within the resource either de facto nor de jure. (highly confident). The separable right of transfer to the flow of units from this resource is not held either by de jure nor de facto (inferred). The separable rights to exercise transfer to shares of this appropriation resource, or closely related production and/or distribution resources are neither held de jure nor de facto (inferred). Transferring shares of major appropriation equipment which are necessary to engage in appropriation is not exercised either je jure nor de facto## Unknown column: EQUIPSHAR ##.
Stakes and Resources:
The length of time this subgroup has regularly appropriated from this resource is 1 through 10 years (highly confident). Around 91%-100% of members reside in or adjacent to this resource (educated guess). Most people in this subgroup are slightly dependent (i.e. a small part of the family income) on this resource (inferred). Around 91%-100% of this subgroup work a substantial amount of time in activities not associated with appropriation from this resource (educated guess). The proportion of this subgroup that currently appropriates similar units from other resources is less than 10% (inferred). Given the economy of the location, the average annual family income (including all non-monetary forms of income) is considered average (educated guess). The variance of the average annual family income across families is moderate (educated guess). Over time the variance in average annual family income is low (inferred). Capital is owned by 91%-100% of this subgroup (educated guess). No real alternatives for the supply unit are available (educated guess).
Potential Actions and Levels of Control:
A noticeable impact on the balance of the quantity of units withdrawn and the number of units available in this resource would not occur in a drastic reduction of this subgroup's appropriation activities (educated guess). Keeping in mind the physically available levels of withdrawal that are possible from this resource, the following shows the extent to which rules concerning different aspects of withdrawal constrain appropriation: technological rules lightly constrain (educated guess), time limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), quantity limits which limit the range of choice moderately constrain (educated guess), and marginal units or units obtained by increasing levels of appropriation have a moderate value immediate return (educated guess).
Technology:
The appropriative power of the technology used does not threaten the balance between units withdrawn and units available even if no new users are added (educated guess).
Strategies Adopted:
At the beginning of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was increasing (educated guess). At the end of the period the rate of unit withdrawals was constant (educated guess). During this time period members have not invested resources, such as their own labor, in maintaining or improving the structure of the appropriation resource (highly confident). Investment into constructing or improving production or distribution works for maintaining or improving their resource has not been made by members (highly confident). Resources have been expended (including time) to avoid actions that would harm the structure of the appropriation resource (inferred). Members do not have access to an alternative source of supply (educated guess). In characterizing the usual behavior of the members of this subgroup with respect to local operation level rules-in-use (other than in extreme shortage), it can be said that almost all of the members follow the rules set in place (inferred). The level of infraction of members who are not rule followers is generally small (inferred). No action has been proposed to alter the operational or collective-choice rules affecting the appropriation from this resource (inferred).
Subgroup Results:
This subgroup appropriates less than 10% of its total appropriated units at the end of this period (inferred). By the end of this time period the appropriates from this resource have remained approximately constant (educated guess). The absolute quantity of appropriation units obtained by this group has remained constant (educated guess).
RESOURCE:
The resource appropriated from Nabagram Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The sum of the fees and licenses is moderate given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is moderate given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the period of land preparation and transplanting when there is a peak demand on the system's water supply.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the post-transplanting period. (p.435)
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The sum of the fees and licenses is high given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is relatively high given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the period of land preparation and transplanting where there is a peak demand on the system's water supply.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the post-transplanting period. (p.435)
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The sum of the fees and licenses is high given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is relatively high given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the period of land preparation and transplanting where there is a peak demand on the system's water supply.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the post-transplanting period. (p.433)
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
The resource appropriated from Nabagram Irrigation is water for irrigation. This irrigation system is comprised of a network of canals that divert water from a tubewell to farmlands.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring membership in an organization. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The sum of the fees and licenses is moderate given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is moderate given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the period of land preparation and transplanting when there is a peak demand on the system's water supply.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the post-transplanting period. (p.435)
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The sum of the fees and licenses is high given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is relatively high given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the period of land preparation and transplanting where there is a peak demand on the system's water supply.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the post-transplanting period. (p.435)
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring regular maintanence labor input however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
There is a rule requiring emergency repair labor however, the basis criteria for this rule was not included in the case information. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
OPERATIONAL RULES:
Concerning national collective choice relating to the resource, there is a national level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup. Concerning regional collective choice, there is a regional level of government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the type of resource appropriated by this subgroup.
With regard to local collective choice, a level of government or organization of appropriators exists at the location and the author provides relatively full information about operational level rules as devised by collective choice mechanisms which have been coded below.
Boundary Rules
The following rules define the requirements that must be met before individuals are eligible to harvest or withdraw units from the appropriation resource.
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
A rule exists requiring payment of a fixed seasonal fee. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s).
The sum of the fees and licenses is high given the resources of most of the appropriators.
When an entry fee or license is required or permitted, the sum is relatively high given the benefits that can be obtained from withdrawing units from this resource.
Entry rights may be transmitted to anyone designated by the original owner.
Within one generation of potential resource appropriators, entry rights can be given, leased, rented, sold or transferred to others.
When transfer on a temporary or permanent basis is allowed, the person who makes the transfer determines to whom such rights can be transferred.
The boundary rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups over others.
Authority and Scope Rules
The default conditions for both authority and scope rules do not apply.
The following paragraphs include information on rules of 2 cycle(s).
Authority Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, according to the "first in time - first in right" principle. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the period of land preparation and transplanting where there is a peak demand on the system's water supply.
There is a rule requiring withdrawal in a fixed order, based on the needs during time period. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of a less restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules. The rule is in effect during the post-transplanting period. (p.433)
The authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal privileges to some subgroups above others.
Scope Rules:
The national and regional level(s) of government or organization had no jurisdiction over the resource.
There is a rule requiring a periodically assessed appropriation tax, based on the amount of land held. This rule is enforced at the local and rules-in-use level(s), and is part of the most restrictive, regularly adopted/used set of rules.
Authority and scope rules do not assign substantially unequal duties among subgroups.
Information Rules
Payoff Rules
The default condition, that all appropriators can retain whatever they can physically keep hold of and no external rewards, taxes, or sanctions are imposed is not imposed in this case. The authors have the following confidence level for the results of this section: confident. Incarceration is not imposed as penalty on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. No fines can be imposed on appropriators for breaking rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators may not lose their entry or appropriation rights for breaking rules related to the appropriation of the resource. Severe community shunning is used for an unstated duration of time as a sanction that is consciously imposed on appropriators who break rules related to the appropriation of this resource. Appropriators can obtain external aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop their appropriation technologies. Appropriators can obtain aid from a national (private or public) agency(s) to develop or repair their production, distribution, or appropriation resources. Appropriators are not party to price support contracts or guaranteed purchase agreements for the selling of resource units or commodities produced by resource units. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal rewards to some subgroups than others. The payoff rules do not assign substantially unequal punishments to some subgroups than others.
The following percentages indicate the percentages assigned to individual positions. If more than one percentage is listed per position, the individual percentages refer to the different arrangements existing within the operational rules.
Aggregation Rules
Overall Questions About Rules Configuration
The general framework of the rules-in-use has governed the activities of this subgroup for 1 to 10 years.
Nabagram Irrigation
Resource System
Key shared Resource: Irrigation water
Natural Infrastructure: Watershed and 113 acres of cultivated land.
Resource Users
80% of water users are from the Nabagram village, 20% are outside villagers.
There are 50 family units totalling 291 individuals in the Nabagram Village.
Public Infrastructure Providers
Thana Irrigation Program, consisting of:
Thana Central Cooperative Association (TCCA)
Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC)
Thana Training and Development Center (TTDC)
Public Infrastructure
Deep tubewell irrigation, centrifugal pump, a main canal and channels.
Rules (see Institutional Analysis)
Relationship 1
RU => RS: Farmers are allocated water according to a rotation program. The water distributor has sole right to distribute water.
RS => RU: The resource system provides water for irrigation.
Relationship 2
PIP => RU: Appoint the water distributor and pump operator who are responsible for allocating water to farmers.
RU => PIP: Villagers can be members of the TCCA (voluntary). Non-Villagers cannot. Members of the TCCA vote to elect official and meet once a week.
Relationship 3
PIP => PI: The TCCA is in charge of most of the management: the implementation of the tubewell, rule making, distributing (through a selected distributor), and coordinating maintenance that can also be done with villagers that are non-memebers of the TCCA. The authors do not mention the specific roles of the TTDC or the BADC, but they mention that the BADC is in charge of renting the pump to the village cooperative and providing related services.
PI => PIP: Informs the water distributor of water level changes and necessary repairs.
Relationship 4
PI => RS: The tubewell and pump allow for extraction of groundwater (production resource), and the main canal allows for the distribution of water to different fields (distribution resource).
RS => PI: Water flows from the resource system to the public infrastructure for distribution
Relationship 5
PI => Link 2: Restricts allocation to a rotation in 8 blocks. The size and condition of the channels determines how each group of farmers will appropriate water.
Link 2 => PI: The levels of water appropriated inform the water distributor who determines when enough water has been allocated to each block.
Relationship 6
PI => RU: The 8 blocks provide channels for water distribution to individual farmers.
RU => PI: Users that are not members of the TCCA pay a higher water fee that is used for the soft and hard public infrastructure maintenance (maintenance of the canal, rules revisiting, distribution, etc.)
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Resource System)
(none specified)
Exogenous Drivers 7 (Public Infrastructure)
(none specified)
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Resource Users)
(none specified)
Exogenous Drivers 8 (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Resource Users)
(none specified)
Human Infrastructure, Private and Human-Made (Public Infrastructure Providers)
(none specified)
. 1979. Village, Technology, and Bureaucracy: Patterns of Irrigation in Comilla District, Bangladesh. Journal of Developing Areas. 13:431-440.